The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia: A History of the Struggle for Great Power among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs, and Chinese during the Early Middle Ages

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NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTION AND TRANSLATION OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES

For proper names that have well-established English spelling, for place names that have continued in use and thus have modern spellings, and for well-known foreign terms (such as "khan") I have generally retained the traditional forms. In some cases, I have followed convention and used modern rather than medieval place names, for example Aksu (i.e., Aqsu) for Po-huan. I have transcribed other terms according to the following systems.

Tibetan: k, kh, g, ṅ, c, ch, j, ń, t, th, d, n, p, ph, b, m, ts, tsh, dz, w, ź, z, ʿ, y, r, l, ś, s, h, ʾ. (The last letter, the glottal stop, is left unmarked except for cases of possible ambiguity.) Final *ʿa chuṅ* is transcribed "á." I follow in general the commonly used values for consonants and vowels; however, I believe in transcribing Tibetan as a language rather than as an unconnected string of alien syllables haunted by strange practices such as capitalization in the middle of words. Thus, I write Tibetan words as words. This astonishing practice may require a certain amount of adjustment on the part of Tibetologist readers, but then so does all the "strict transliteration" (which is neither strict nor transliteration) of Tibetan that I have ever seen. (Even Greek is not reconvertible

from the usual transliteration unless one knows a little of the language.) The two rules I use in transcribing Tibetan words are:

1. When a preceding syllable ends in a vowel, it is connected to the following syllable without a hyphen. If it ends in a consonant, a hyphen is provided to avoid the ambiguity which could result in some cases.
2. All suffixes or dependent morphemes (case suffixes, nominal suffixes, etc.) are connected without hyphens to the syllables preceding them, whether or not the latter end in vowels.

Perhaps the use of this system of transcription will help rid the world of the nonsensical idea, still current, that the Tibetan language—which is, like Japanese, *written* in monosyllables—could possibly be even remotely similar to the "monosyllabic language" that Classical Chinese is commonly supposed to be.

Arabic: ', b, t, th, ǧ, ḥ, kh, d, dh, r, z, s, š, ṣ, ḍ, ṭ, ẓ, ', gh, q, k, l, m, n, h, w, y. *Alif maqṣûra* is transcribed "á." When giving "strict" transliteration, *alif* is transcribed "â," and an undotted tooth (the base for "b," "t," etc.) is transcribed as a period (".").

Chinese: The modified Wade-Giles system, as used in modern Sinology, is retained. Note that it is the only English-language transcription system that correctly represents the phonetic values of the initial stop consonants in modern Mandarin Chinese (which lacks voiced stops).

Turkic: a, b, c, d, ä, e, i, ï, gh, g, q, k, l, m, n, ń, ng, o, ö, p, r, s, ś, t, u, ü, y, z. When deciding whether to transcribe a Turkic word with "s" or "ś," I have followed the Chinese evidence, where it exists. Some readers may find surprising the large number of Turkic names, taken from Chinese sources, that appear in Turkic form rather than in twentieth-century Mandarin Chinese disguise. While a few of the reconstructions may be incorrect, I decided that it was much better to make an effort to give the original forms of these names when it seemed possible to do so. I encourage those who disagree with my reconstructions to examine them and propose their own. All reconstructions from the Chinese are prefixed with an asterisk. Where the equation is more

obvious—as in Chinese I-nan-ju = Turkic Inancu—or has already become widely adopted, no asterisk is provided or further explanation given. More problematic cases are left in their Chinese guise.

All translations from Oriental-language sources are by me, with a few exceptions that are noted in each case. Other translations have been used when my own translation would differ from them only on minor points, although there are undoubtedly many cases where my translations are very close to those of previous writers. As a rule, I have not given references to the numerous existing translations of standard works such as the *T'ang shu* accounts of Tibet and the Turks. Anyone who wishes may consult them easily and compare the translations therein with mine.

672. In this book it is usually assumed that "summer" in the *Annals* refers approximately to the second half of a Western-style year and that "winter" refers approximately to the first half. (Unfortunately, if this interpretation is followed too strictly, a number of events appear to be misdated; and therefore, I have followed a somewhat looser interpretation in practice.) There is very little in the *Annals* that can help in determining exactly how one is to interpret the entries chronologically. To compound these problems, the fragmentary continuation of the *Annals* is missing most of the year names and is out of chronological order as well. Dating problems in this source are noted individually in the text.

The chronology of the Arabic sources presents few technical problems. More serious is the general sparsity of precise dates. Normally, the only date given for an event is the Muslim lunar year, which usually corresponds to parts of two Western years. Obviously there is often a great deal of imprecision in the dates from these works.

As historical sources, the Old Turkic inscriptions have yet to be thoroughly investigated. Until they are, the chronology that may be determined from their contents will remain uncertain. Briefly, the inscriptions date events according to the age of the person in whose honor the text was written; occasionally, it is according to the animal cycle. As a result, dates (when actually given) are usually determined by calculating backward from the year the given individual died. Since the accounts do not give the age of the subject for every event, it is frequently necessary to interpolate, and thus a certain amount of imprecision is unavoidable.

ABBREVIATIONS

AEMA: *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi.*
AHR: *American Historical Review.*
AOH: *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae.*
Azraqî: Abû al-Walîd Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allâh al-Azraqî. *Akhbâr Makka.* Mecca, 1965.
Balâdhurî: Abû al-ʿAbbâs Aḥmad b. Yaḥyá b. Ǵâbir al-Balâdhurî. *Kitâb futûḥ al-buldân.* Leiden, 1866; repr. Leiden, 1968.
BSO(A)S: *Bulletin of the School of Oriental (and African) Studies.*
CCTC: Li Tsung-t'ung, ed. *Ch'un ch'iu tso chuan chin chu chin i.* 3 vols. Taipei, 1971.
CDT: Ariane Spanien and Yoshiro Imaeda, eds. *Choix de documents Tibétains.* Vol. 2. Paris, 1979.
CHC: *The Cambridge History of China.* Vol. 3. Cambridge, 1979; repr. Taipei, 1979.
CHI: *The Cambridge History of Iran.* Vol. 4. Cambridge, 1975.
CKKCTMTTT: *Chung-kuo ku chin ti-ming ta tz'u-tien.* Shanghai, 1930; repr. Taipei, 1979.

CS: Ling-hu Te-fen. *Chou shu*. 3 vols. Peking, 1971; repr. Taipei, 1974.
CTS: Liu Hsü. *Chiu T'ang shu*. 16 vols. Peking, 1975.
CTW: *Ch'in ting ch'üan T'ang wen*. 21 vols. Kyoto, 1976.
Dhahabî: Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dhahabî. *Ta'rîkh al-Islâm wa ṭabaqât al-mashâhir wa al-aʿlâm*. Cairo, 1947–.
E.I.1: *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 1st ed. Leiden, 1913-1934.
E.I.2: *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2d ed. Leiden, 1960–.
EW: *East and West*.
FHG: Carolus Müllerus, ed. *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*. Vol. 4. Paris, 1868.
HHS: Fan Yeh, *Hou Han shu chu*. 5 vols. Peking, 1965; repr. Taipei, 1973.
HTS: Sung Ch'i and Ou-yang Hsiu. *Hsin T'ang shu*. 20 vols. Peking, 1975.
Ibn al-Athîr: ʿIzz al-Dîn Abû al-Ḥasan ʿAlî b. al-Athîr. *Al-kâmil fî al-ta'rîkh*. 13 vols. Beirut, 1965-1967.
Ibn Aʿtham al-Kûfî: Abû Muḥammad Aḥmad b. Aʿtham al-Kûfî. *Kitâb al-futûḥ*. 8 vols. Hyderabad, 1968-1975.
Ibn Khurdâdhbih: ʿUbayd Allâh b. ʿAbd Allâh b. Khurdâdhbih, *Kitâb al-masâlik wa al-mamâlik*. Leiden, 1889; repr. 1967.
JA: *Journal Asiatique*.
JAOS: *Journal of the American Oriental Society*.
JESHO: *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*.
KDG: Wolfgang Braunfels, ed. *Karl der Grosse: Lebenswerk und Nachleben*. 5 vols. Düsseldorf, 1965-1968.
MD: Dpábo Gtsug-lag ʿphreṅba. *Chos-byuṅ Mkhaspaʿi dgáston*. 2 vols. Delhi, n.d. [1980].
Morohashi: Tetsuji Morohashi. *Dai Kan-Wa jiten*. 13 vols. Tokyo, 1955-1968.
OTA: *The Old Tibetan Annals*. MS Pelliot tibétain 1288 and India Office 750. Reprod. in *CDT*, pls. 579-591.
OTAC: *The Old Tibetan Annals, Continuation*. MS British Museum Or. 8212 (187). Reprod. in *CDT*, pls. 592-595.
OTC: *The Old Tibetan Chronicle*. MS Pelliot tibétain 1287. Reprod. in *CDT*, pls. 557-577.
PS: Li Yen-shou. *Pei shih*. 10 vols. Peking, 1974.

Ptolemaios: Klaudios Ptolemaios. *Geographie 6, 9-12: Ostiran und Zentralasien*. Part 1. Ed. and trans. Italo Ronca. Rome, 1971.
Saṁghavardhana: *Dgra bcompa Dgeʿdun ʿphelgyi luṅ-bstanpa*. In Daisetz T. Suzuki, ed. *The Tibetan Tripitaka: Peking Edition*. Vol. 129 (Tokyo, 1957), 296b-299e [Bstan-hgyur mdo-hgrel skyes-rabs II gtam-yig ṅe: 435r-444r].
SPAW: *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (philologisch-historische Klasse).
SS: Wei Cheng. *Sui shu*. 3 vols. Peking, 1973; repr. Taipei, 1974.
Ṭabarî: Abû Ǵaʿfar Muḥammad b. Ǵarîr al-Ṭabarî. *Ta'rîkh al-rusul wa al-mulûk*. 15 vols. Leiden, 1879-1901; repr. Leiden, 1964-1965.
Taishô: *Taishô shinshû daizôkyô*. 85 vols. Tokyo, 1924-1932; repr. Tokyo, 1960-1978.
TCTC: Ssu-ma Kuang. *Tzu chih t'ung chien*. 10 vols. Peking, 1956; repr. Taipei, 1979.
TFYK: Wang Ch'in-jo. *Ts'e fu yüan kuei*. 20 vols. Hong Kong, 1960.
TG: *Tôyô Gakuhô*.
Thaʿâlibî: ʿAbd al-Malik b. Muḥammad al-Thaʿâlibî. *Thimâr al-qulûb*. Cairo, 1965.
TKPSC: Tu Fu. *Tu Kung-pu shih chi*. 2 vols. Taipei, 1966.
TP: *T'oung Pao*.
TSHHR: Michael Aris and Aung San Suu Kyi, eds. *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson*. Warminster, 1980.
TT: Tu Yu. *T'ung tien*. Shanghai, 1935.
TTHYC: Hsüan Tsang. *Ta T'ang hsi yü chi*. In *Taishô*, Vol. 51 (No. 2087), 867-947.
WC: Chang Chiu-ling. *Ch'ü chiang Chang hsien sheng wen chi*. 4 vols. [Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an, chi-pu, Vols. 616-623.] Shanghai, n.d.
WKJCC: Yüan Chao. *Wu K'ung ju Chu chi*. In *Taishô*, Vol. 51 (No. 2089), 979-981.
WSTB: *Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde*. Nos. 10-11. [Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Tauscher, eds.

Proceedings of the Csoma de Kőrös Symposium Held at Velm-Vienna, Austria, 13-19 September 1981. Vols. 1-2.] Vienna, 1983.

WWTCKC: Hui Ch'ao. *Wang wu T'ien-chu kuo chuan.* In *Taishô*, Vol. 51 (No. 2089), 975-979.

Yaʿqûbî: Aḥmad b. Abî Yaʿqûb al-Yaʿqûbî. *Taʾrîkh al-Yaʿqûbî.* 2 vols. Beirut, 1960.

YHCHTC: Li Chi-fu. *Yüan ho chün hsien t'u chih.* Taipei, 1973; repr. Taipei, 1979.

ZAS: *Zentralasiatische Studien.*

ZDMG: *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.*

The reader is directed to the Bibliography for complete citations of the sources not included in this list.

THE TIBETAN EMPIRE IN CENTRAL ASIA

actually had very little effect on the ethnicity of the region, although it may have affected some other aspects of the indigenous culture. By the early seventh century, for example, Turkic political influence in Sogdiana and eastern Central Asia, originally reinforced by intermarriage with the local ruling houses, had practically disappeared. When the nomadic Turks again intervened in Central Asia (in the seventh century and later), either on their own behalf or in the employ of the Arabs or Chinese, they were viewed culturally as foreigners.[16] Nonetheless, prosperity followed in the wake of their partly successful attempt to unify the lands of the silk routes. And the prosperity of these Central Asian lands drew the attention of the Greeks, the Arabs, the Chinese, and the Tibetans.

[16] The best survey of the history of the Turks in Central Asia during the sixth and seventh centuries is still that in É. Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux* (1903) 217-303.

Chapter 1

ENTRANCE INTO CENTRAL ASIA

The origin of the Yarlung dynasty, the family which was to end up ruling the vast dominions of the Tibetan Empire, is still quite unknown. The *Old Tibetan Chronicle* does not say when the kings of this family began to rule a significant part of Tibet, nor does it hint about any possible foreign ancestry.[1] According to all early

[1] Despite its accepted location deep in the heart of the agricultural south, it has long been believed that the Tibetan state was founded by the descendants of alien or partly alien nomadic steppe-warriors. See for example H. Hoffmann, *Tibet: A Handbook* (1975) 39-40. While there may have been some ultimately foreign influence on the early Tibetans—the Hsiao-Yüeh-chih, for example, moved into the area of northeastern Amdo in mid-classical antiquity (see Watson, 1961, 2:268)—there are absolutely no indications of this hypothetical nomadic structure in south-central Tibet during the time of Gnam ri slon mtshan and his successors. The contemporary Tibetan sources are silent on nomads, nomadism, and steppe-warriors. Moreover, everything in the Chinese sources (with the exception of the *topos* applied to nearly every foreign people—partially true for Tibetans, to be sure—that they wandered in search of grass and water) indicates that the Chinese were well aware that the Tibetans were not primarily a nomadic people. Both Tibetan and Chinese sources remark on the castles built by various Tibetan emperors—surely evidence of their nonmobile lifestyle. These sources further


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Kansu Corridor
Tsaidam
Lop Nor
Tarim
Khotan
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Lake Balkhash
Ili R.
Issyk Kul
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Hindustan
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Indus
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Mekong R.
Yangtze R.
Yellow R.
Nan-chao
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Anhwei
Kiangsu
Chekiang
Fukien
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Soochow
Hangchow
Shanghai
Wuchang
Changsha
Canton
Kweilin
Nanning
Kunming
Yunnanfu
Tali
Chengtu
Chungking
Ichang
Hankow
Foochow
Amoy
Swatow
Hong Kong
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Hanoi
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Ajmer
Indore
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Lahore
Multan
Karachi
Quetta
Kandahar
Herat
Meshed
Tehran
Isfahan
Shiraz
Kerman
Yezd
Tabriz
Erzerum
Trebizond
Ankara
Smyrna
Constantinople
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Aral Sea
Persian Gulf
Red Sea
Mediterranean Sea
Arabian Sea
Gulf of Oman
Gulf of Aden
Gulf of Suez
Gulf of Aqaba
Nile R.
Cairo
Alexandria
Suez
Aqaba
Jerusalem
Damascus
Beirut
Aleppo
Baghdad
Basra
Mosul
Euphrates R.
Tigris R.
Mecca
Medina
Riyadh
Muscat
Aden
Socotra
Abyssinia
Khartoum
Omdurman
Port Sudan
Suakin
Massawa
Asmara
Addis Ababa
Harar
Mogadishu
Kilimanjaro
Nairobi
Mombasa
Zanzibar
Dar es Salaam
Lake Victoria
Lake Tanganyika
Lake Nyasa
Zambezi R.
Salisbury
Bulawayo
Johannesburg
Pretoria
Durban
Cape Town
Port Elizabeth
Orange R.
Kimberley
Luanda
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Lobito
Congo R.
Leopoldville
Stanleyville
Elisabethville
Lake Chad
Timbuktu
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Bissau
Dakar
Bathurst
Rabat
Casablanca
Fez
Tangier
Algiers
Oran
Tunis
Sfax
Tripoli
Benghazi
Sirte
Cyrenaica
Tripolitania
Fezzan
Sahara
Libya
Egypt
Sudan
Ethiopia
Somaliland
Kenya
Uganda
Tanganyika
Rhodesia
Nyasaland
Mozambique
Angola
Belgian Congo
French Equatorial Africa
French West Africa
Nigeria
Gold Coast
Liberia
Sierra Leone
Portuguese Guinea
Spanish Morocco
French Morocco
Algeria
Tunisia
Libya
Italian Somaliland
British Somaliland
Eritrea
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
Union of South Africa
Southern Rhodesia
Northern Rhodesia
Portuguese East Africa
Portuguese West Africa

referred to in the Old Tibetan sources and later histories as "ministers"—held positions of trust with, or were vassals of, another powerful feudal lord known as Dgu gri Ziṅporje. According to the *Chronicle*, he was the overlord of Ṅaspo, the region between present-day ʿPhanpo and Rkoṅpo north of the Brahmaputra, and was apparently the vassal in turn of the Lig-myi dynasty, whose shadowy Źaṅ-źuṅ confederation ruled most of Tibet at the time. It so happened that several of the Ziṅporje's noblemen became disenchanted with his rule due to his preference for evil ministers and his highhanded and unfair treatment of virtuous vassals. A group of conspirators managed to convince Stagbu sṅa gzigs that he would benefit from joining with them to overthrow the Ziṅporje. At this point, however, he died,[9] and negotiations had to begin again with his son and successor, Gnam ri slon mtshan.

Gnam ri needed no convincing, but he and his brother asked for and got sworn oaths of allegiance from all of the conspirators. According to the text of this oath, as represented in the *Chronicle*, they swore that ". . . from now on, they would renounce the Ziṅporje forever, they would always cherish Spurgyal, they would never be disloyal to Emperor[10] Spurgyal, they would

[9] On these events see *OTC*, iii.

[10] The term "emperor" translates the Tibetan title *btsanpo*. The equivalence of this term with the Chinese term for "emperor" has been well known since the publication of P. Pelliot's study of a short Old Tibetan text from Tun-huang, in his posthumous *Histoire ancienne du Tibet* (1961) 143. Unfortunately, several writers have continued to translate *btsanpo* as "king" or in any case have not yet begun to use the precise terminology that reflects the early medieval meaning of this word. The English word "king" (and its equivalents in other modern languages) is translated by the Tibetan *rgyalpo*. Although in postimperial Tibetan writings, after the title *btsanpo* had fallen out of use, the Tibetan emperors were often called *rgyalpo*, this is an inaccuracy on the part of later Tibetan writers and should not cause confusion today. As reported by Pelliot, the title *btsanpo* is translated in a contemporary Old Tibetan-Chinese glossary as "Son of Heaven," i.e., "Emperor." To quote the glossary: "*Bodkyi btsanpo* [:] *T'u-fan t'ien tzu*." Literally, this means: "[Tibetan:] The Emperor (*btsanpo*) of Tibet = [Chinese:] The Emperor (T'ien tzu, 'Son of Heaven') of Tibet." "Son of Heaven" was, of course, the Chinese title for *Chinese* emperors. The same translation occurs in a T'ang-period biography of a Chinese who had been a prisoner of the Tibetans for several years, but had served the Tibetan emperor in some capacity. The prisoner's title was translated into Chinese as *T'ien tzu chia ch'en*, which may be rendered into English as "Chamberlain to the Son of Heaven." On this, see L. Chao's *Yin hua lu* (1958) 97, and the interesting study of this biography by E. Sperling, "A Captivity in Ninth Century Tibet" (1979). It may be noted that H. Satô and T. Moriyasu regularly translate *btsanpo* into Japanese with the word *ô* (in Chinese, read *wang*). For example Satô, in his recent work *Chibetto rekishi chiri kenkyû* (1978) 420, equates the word *ô* with *btsanpo*: ". . . *kono ôkoku no ô (= tsenpo)*," which would normally be understood as "this kingdom's king (= *tsenpo*)." (Note that *tsenpo* is his transcription of *btsanpo*.) Moriyasu, in "Toban no Chûô Ajia shinshutsu" (1984) passim, also translates it with *ô*. However, in a personal communication, Professor Moriyasu has informed me that this practice, common among Japanese scholars, *does* recognize the correct understanding of the word *btsanpo*. He says, ". . . we Japanese scholars . . . use *ô* . . . as a *Japanese* word, which has [a] much broader meaning than the Chinese counterpart; we use *ô* to mean not only 'king; prince', but also 'ruler, sovereign'. In Japanese-Japanese dictionaries, *ô* is equated to *ôkimi* . . . which means Japanese Emperor *tennô*. . . . Thus, when we translate *btsanpo* [as] *ô*, we do not exclude the meaning of 'emperor'. . . . We are quite conscious of this aspect but we prefer to avoid [using] the word *tennô* . . . because of its connotation." Finally, the Arabs usually say the title of the ruler of Tibet is Khâqân, i.e., Qaghan, and explain that he had the imperial dignity over the Turks.

never consider power, they would always wish to cope with his directions, they would never want to conspire, they would never doubt, they would always be brave, they would never want to abandon the life (of the Emperor), whatever Emperor Slon btsan [Gnam ri slon mtshan] ordered they would always listen, and although someone else enticed them they would never listen."[11]

The seriousness of such an oath cannot be underestimated. According to Chinese reports, these men became the sworn companions of the *btsanpo*, the sacred ruler, in life and in death. The account in the *Hsin T'ang shu* describes this: "Their lord and his ministers—five or six persons, called 'common-fated ones'—make friends with each other. When the lord dies, they all commit suicide to be buried with him; and the things he wore, baubles he enjoyed, and horses he rode, all are buried with him."[12]

[11] *OTC*, iv.

[12] *HTS*, 216a:6073; cf. Pelliot, 1961:81-82, and *CTS*, 196a:5220: "When the btsanpo dies, they bury people with him; things like the clothing, pre-

Having thus sworn fealty in true medieval Central Eurasian fashion,[13] it only remained for the conspirators to carry out their plan. With the aid of surprise, they overthrew the Ziṅporje and frightened his son into fleeing to Turkistan. If, as seems quite possible, this last event actually took place, it represents the earliest Tibetan contact with a Central or Inner Asian people known from Tibetan historical sources. Thanks to the initial victories against the Ziṅporje, and subsequently in Dwagspo, Gnam ri slon mtshan gained great personal prestige. He was soon able to push his conquests into the region immediately to the west, called Rtsaṅ-Bod, by defeating its lord Mar-mun, another vassal of Źaṅ-źuṅ.[14]

This first mention of the name Bod, the usual name for Tibet in the later Tibetan historical sources, is significant in that it is used to refer to a conquered region.[15] In other words, the ancient name Bod originally referred to only a part of the Tibetan Plateau, a part which, together with Rtsaṅ (Tsang, in Tibetan now spelled Gtsaṅ), has come to be called Dbus-gtsaṅ (Central Tibet).[16] The early kings of Yarlung were, as they themselves say, southerners.[17] They conquered first Central Tibet and then the

cious trinkets, and horses and swords used by him, they bury them all." (Cf. Pelliot, 1961:3.) Apparently early on in the Tibetan imperial period the influence of Buddhism altered this practice so that the ones slated to die did not actually die. Instead, they were considered to be ritually dead, and were confined to the burial precinct to live out their days on donations. (See D. Snellgrove and H. Richardson, *A Cultural History of Tibet* [1968] 52-53.) In spite of both of these ritual practices, one must note that Sroṅ btsan sgampo was not killed upon his son's accession; he reappeared after the death of Guṅ sroṅ guṅ brtsan, who ruled only five years. See note 31, below.

[13] See my article, "Aspects of the Early History of the Central Asian Guard Corps in Islam" (1984a).

[14] *OTC*, iv. In *OTC*, ii, Gnam ri's minister, Moṅ Khri do re maṅ tshab, is given credit for this deed.

[15] Note that the territory of the Ziṅporje centered on the Skyi Chu and ʿPhanpo, according to *OTC*, ii.

[16] Bod was often used even in modern times to refer to "Central Tibet." (See also the discussion in the Introduction.)

[17] Minister Źaṅ snaṅ even sings about the "southern bamboo" defeating the yak, the symbol of the nomadic north (*OTC*, iv).

rest of the Tibetan Plateau, except for those regions already allied to them by marriage or personal oaths of fealty. Much of the success of these campaigns, particularly those in the west and northeast, must be credited to a political-military genius, the minister Khyuṅpo Spuṅ-sad Zutse. He was no doubt self-serving, ruthless, and quick to commit murder (especially by deceit), as the Tibetan histories claim. But he did help build for the *btsanpo* the foundations of empire.

The newly united and vigorous state, still referred to as the realm of "the Spurgyal, the Btsanpo Gnam ri slon mtshan," was now only separated from China in the east by minor tribes. In the northeast around the Koko Nor, however, stood the powerful empire of the nomadic Mongolic-speaking people of northern origin known as the Togon or ʿAźa in Tibetan,[18] and as the T'u-yü-hun, T'ui-hun, or A-ch'ai in Chinese.[19] Some of the predominantly nomadic tribal peoples in between were subjects of the ʿAźa; others were vassals of the new Tibetan state.[20]

The first contacts of Tibetans with the outside world, so far as can be determined from foreign sources, were two embassies sent to China in 608 and 609. These embassies must ultimately be connected with the outcome of a war between the Chinese and the ʿAźa. To summarize the events very briefly, the emperor Yang-ti of the Sui dynasty wanted control of the routes to the West. But dominion over the three existing routes was then divided between the Turks and the ʿAźa.[21] In the mid-fifth century, the T'u-yü-hun had conquered at least the southeastern portion of the

[18] See G. Uray, "The Annals of the *ʿA-ža* Principality" (1978). On their language, see L. Ligeti, "Le Tabghatch" (1970) and the manuscript Fonds Pelliot tibétain 1283, published in J. Bacot, "Reconnaissance en haute Asie septentrionale par cinq envoyés ouigours au VIII[e] siècle" (1957) lines 28-29, where the languages (and cultural features that are mentioned) of the Khitan and T'u-yü-hun are said to be more or less the same. Cf. the study of this valuable text by Moriyasu in "Chibetto-go shiryô chû ni arawareru Hoppô minzoku——Dru-gu to Hor——" (1977a) 21, 34.

[19] Cf. G. Molè, *The T'u-yü-hun from the Northern Wei to the Time of the Five Dynasties* (1970).

[20] *SS*, 83:1859; cf. *PS*, 96:3194.

[21] Molè, 1970:150 (n. 378).

Tarim Basin, and had even extended their influence as far as Khotan.[22] Some of that control yet remained at the beginning of the seventh century. Yang-ti therefore had his minister P'ei Chü persuade a neighboring group of T'ieh-le Turks to attack the ʿAźa. Since the ʿAźa were their enemies, the Turks were more than happy to oblige: in the seventh month (August 17 to September 14) of 608, the Turks inflicted a severe defeat on them.[23] In the following year, the Chinese armies, under the personal direction of Yang-ti, pressed into T'u-yü-hun territory. On July 5, 609, the Chinese crushed the ʿAźa forces and captured two of their cities.[24] The great majority of the people surrendered to the Chinese, bringing with them their livestock. The ʿAźa ruler (the qaghan) and a small band of his supporters fled to the Great Snow Mountains and sought refuge among the Tanguts.[25] With this overwhelming triumph, the Chinese had conquered all the territory up to the tribes that then separated the Tibetan state from the ʿAźa.

It is thus no coincidence that the Tibetans chose the year 608 to send their first embassy to the Chinese court. The Chinese sources record only that: "In the fourth year of the Ta-yeh period, their king sent a total of eight persons—the envoy Su fu and others—to go to court. The next year, he again sent his servant I-lin to lead sixty Chia-liang *i* [foreigners] to give tribute. They wanted to present their fine horses, but because the roads were dangerous and blocked, they requested that a mountain road be opened in order to improve the giving of tribute. Yang-ti . . . did not give his consent."[26] Since the second embassy proceeded to the Chinese court through the Chia-liang, or Rgyaroṅ,[27] country

[22] Molè, 1970:xv, has mistakenly enlarged their conquest.

[23] *TCTC*, 181:5641. Cf. Molè, 1970:44, 146 (n. 370).

[24] *TCTC*, 181:5644; Molè, 1970:148-149 (n. 378). These "cities" (Ch'ih-shui *ch'eng* and Wan-t'ou *ch'eng*—cf. Molè, 1970:102 [n. 125], 133 [n. 281]) seem to have been real cities, and not merely fortresses.

[25] Molè 1970:44-45, 48. The ethnonym "Tangut" is used herein to refer to the people usually called Tang-hsiang by the T'ang Chinese.

[26] *SS*, 83:1859.

[27] On the identification of Chia-liang *i* with Rgya-roṅ, see Beckwith, 1977:128 et seq.

and the then southwesternmost Chinese province of Shu[28] (the Szechuan Basin)—a substantial detour—it is quite obvious that a struggle between the Tibetans and the ʿAźa was already underway. The veiled reference to an intermediate enemy who prevented the Tibetans from gaining easy access to Chinese markets (the "giving of tribute" of the source[29]) hints perhaps at the real purpose of the embassy. Subsequently the Sui established at the edge of their expanding territory the office of *chu tao tsung kuan* in order, the *Sui shu* says, "to watch over (the Tibetans) from afar."[30]

It was not long after that the deaths of both Sui Yang-ti (in 618) and Gnam ri slon mtshan (probably in the same year)[31] forced the matter of Sino-Tibetan relations into the background. While Tibet and China were thus undergoing a period of internal political turmoil, the ʿAźa freed themselves from the Chinese yoke and regained much of their lost power.[32] The reign of Khri sroṅ brtsan, who succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father Gnam ri slon mtshan, marked the rise of the young kingdom to the status of an empire, which was now known to the world as "Tibet."[33] Henceforth, neighboring states—even haughty

[28] *SS*, 83:1858-1859.

[29] See for example *CHC*, 3:500, and C. Suzuki, "China's Relations with Inner Asia" (1968).

[30] *SS*, 83:1859; *PS*, 96:3194.

[31] Assuming that Tibetan emperors were normally at least thirteen years old at the time of their accession. Since according to Tibetan historians, the heir apparent ascended the throne upon reaching the age of thirteen—when the father "died" or was killed (see Hoffmann, 1975:40-41)—this age can be taken as an absolute minimum. Thus, assuming he was at least thirteen years old when he sent his first embassy to China, Sroṅ btsan sgampo could not have been born any later than 621. Since *his* son, Guṅ sroṅ guṅ brtsan, ascended at age thirteen (as the sources relate) and reigned five years—see W. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History* (1967) 27—the son must have been born no later than 628. Because Sroṅ btsan sgampo took the throne upon the death of his father, it would appear that Gnam ri slon mtshan could have died no later than 618. Shakabpa, relying upon several Tibetan sources, arrives at the date A.D. 617 for Gnam ri's death (Shakabpa, 1967:25). This discrepancy may be due to the fact that the Tibetan year does not correspond exactly to the Western year. See above, note 12.

[32] G. Molè, 1970:48.

[33] The Chinese name now pronounced T'u-fan transcribes the same for-

China—were to deal with Tibet on an equal level, and actually refer to the *btsanpo* either by his Tibetan title or, in unofficial writings, with Chinese terms meaning "emperor."[34] The spread of Tibetan power soon left them little choice.

The young ruler, popularly known as Sroṅ btsan sgampo in Tibetan histories, quickly put down the rebellion that accompanied his father's death by poisoning.[35] He then began the systematic reduction of all opposition to his rule on the Tibetan Plateau. Myaṅ Maṅporje Źaṅ snaṅ, the prime minister he had inherited from his father, assisted greatly in this work by subjugating the Sumpas, former allies from the northeast who had revolted.[36] Marriage alliances, such as that with still-powerful Źaṅ-źuṅ, and murders of convenience, including probably that of his much-too-powerful minister Zutse, complemented the military campaigns. Soon after Sroṅ btsan sgampo's sister, Sad mar kar, was married to Lig-myi rhya, the king of Źaṅ-źuṅ,[37] an opportunity for intrigue presented itself; she led her unsuspecting husband into an ambush in which he was killed and his army defeated.[38] With this victory, Sroṅ btsan sgampo became the master of the high Tibetan Plateau.

During this period, while the tumultuous transition from the Sui to the T'ang dynasties was taking place in China, the once-again independent ʿAźa apparently left the Chinese alone.[39] When the militaristic T'ang emperor T'ai-tsung finally took the

eign name "Tibet," but has nothing whatsoever to do with the country's native name, Bod, as was proven conclusively half a century ago by Pelliot. One may add to that the corollary that the word Bon (the name of one of the two types of Tibetan Buddhism) is equally unrelated to the name "Tibet" (especially in its Chinese transcription, T'u-fan), and probably to Bod as well. See Pelliot, "Quelques transcriptions chinoises de noms tibétains" (1915) 18-20, and Beckwith, 1977:118-126.

[34] Beckwith, 1977:161-163 (n. 77).

[35] *OTC*, vi.

[36] *OTC*, v.

[37] *OTC* viii. See G. Uray, "Queen Sad-mar-kar's Songs in the Old Tibetan Chronicle" (1972).

[38] *OTC*, viii.

[39] Very little is said about the ʿAźa during this period in Chinese sources.

throne, however, he cast his eyes westward. The ʿAźa sent embassies to the T'ang court offering nominal submission. But after a few of their raids on Chinese border towns—so we are told by the Chinese sources—T'ai-tsung organized a punitive expedition composed of Chinese border troops and levies of Ch'i-pi Turks[40] and Tanguts in July 634.[41] On October 29th of that year, the army, under the command of Tuan Chih-hsüan, Grand General of the Courageous Guard of the Left and Commander-in-Chief of the Hsi Hai *tao* Expeditionary Army,[42] attacked and defeated the ʿAźa and pursued them for over 800 *li*.[43] Much booty, in the form of livestock, was captured.[44]

Immediately after the attack, the Tibetan emperor sent an embassy to the Chinese court. It arrived on December 11, 634.[45] The sources unfortunately say nothing about this embassy of the Tibetans to the T'ang, so whatever its message there is no way to tell if it affected Chinese policy towards the ʿAźa at this time. A Chinese ambassador, Feng Te-hsia, was, however, sent to Tibet in reply. A few days later, on December 16, the Chinese ordered a major attack on the T'u-yü-hun. By the 28th of December, an expeditionary force for attacking them was organized, with Li Ching as Commander-in-Chief.[46] In early 635, perhaps in response to the Chinese threat, the Tanguts, who had previously submitted to China, went over to the ʿAźa. Simultaneously, the Ch'iang tribes of T'ao *chou* rebelled, but the Chinese quickly sup-

[40] The Ch'i-pi were a T'ieh-le Turkic tribe in Chinese service. See Molè, 1970:157 (n. 407).

[41] *TCTC*, 194:6106; Molè, 1970:50, 156.

[42] Hsi Hai, "the Western Sea," here refers to the Koko Nor. Since in this case, as in other later ones, the area had not been conquered by the Chinese, the term *tao* is not meant in the sense of a T'ang administrative "circuit." In connection with T'ang expeditionary armies, it indicates the direction of attack and could perhaps be translated as "road."

[43] *TCTC*, 194:6107. There are approximately three *li* to a mile, so the pursuit lasted over 250 miles.

[44] Molè, 1970:50.

[45] *TCTC*, 194:6107.

[46] Ibid.

pressed them.[47] Finally, on May 29, 635,[48] the T'ang army defeated the T'u-yü-hun at K'u Shan. They quickly followed this success with victory after victory until the ʿAźa were totally crushed that summer.[49] The campaign covered the length and breadth of T'u-yü-hun territory, and brought Chinese armies (and ʿAźa refugees, no doubt) into the Tibetan borderlands. The status of the ʿAźa country as a buffer state, insofar as it had indeed functioned as one, was now effectively destroyed.

Following the defeat of the ʿAźa, Sroṅ btsan sgampo sent another embassy, which accompanied the Chinese ambassador Feng on his return home[50] and proposed a marriage alliance between Tibet and China. The proposal was rejected by T'ai-tsung and, according to all sources, the circumstances of that rejection were the cause of the war that ensued.[51] In brief, it appears that Sroṅ btsan sgampo had learned from Feng Te-hsia that both the Turks and the T'u-yü-hun had received Chinese princesses in marriage alliances. He therefore resolved to obtain such an alliance for Tibet, and so sent an official carrying gold and other presents for T'ai-tsung—no doubt on the advice of Feng—with the returning Chinese envoy. But the Tibetan ambassador was angered by what he considered to be a slight against the Tibetan legation. He claimed that when he first arrived, he was well received at court, but when an ʿAźa mission arrived, he was treated with scant respect, and the marriage proposal was turned down. Upon his return to Tibet, he reported this to the emperor and Sroṅ btsan sgampo was duly offended. He strengthened his army with Źaṅ-źuṅ troops and attacked and easily defeated the T'u-yü-hun, probably in 637 or 638.[52] He followed up this success by subjugating two powerful tribes: the Tanguts, who lived in the area between the ʿAźa and the Sumpa of Rgyaroṅ (the vassal-state through which the Tibetans had probably entered the ʿAźa

[47] *TCTC*, 194:6110; Molè, 1970:51-52 (n. C), 163 (n. 427).

[48] *TCTC*, 194:6110; Molè, 1970:52 (n. C).

[49] *TCTC*, 194:6110-6113; Molè, 1970:52-54. On the route followed by Li Ching, see Satô, 1978:227-247.

[50] *TCTC*, 195:6139.

[51] *TCTC*, 195:6138 et seq.

[52] The date is not given in the sources.

lands), and the Po-lan, who were located in the area between the ʿAźa and Central Tibet.[53] It is notable that the Tibetans definitely did not attack the ʿAźa from the west or the north (i.e., from Central Asia) or even from the southwest. The Tibetan state originated in the agricultural south, and, at the time of this war, its strength still lay largely in southerly and easterly lands.[54]

Having established himself as an enemy to be feared, Sroṅ btsan sgampo raided the Chinese border town of Sung *chou*[55] on September 12, 638.[56] The Tibetan emperor let it be known that if he did not receive a princess forthwith, he would lead his army deep into China. He easily defeated a Chinese force sent against him by the commander in Sung *chou*, and he incited the local Ch'iang tribes to revolt against their Chinese masters. On October 18, 638, after the Tibetan army had camped near Sung *chou* for ten days, a Chinese force attacked by surprise, and inflicted a minor defeat on them. According to the Chinese sources, Sroṅ btsan sgampo withdrew, and sent an ambassador to T'ai-tsung to "beg forgiveness for his crimes" and to renew his request for a marriage alliance. This time, with face saved, the Chinese emperor agreed to the proposal.[57]

[53] This story, which is practically identical in both Chinese and Classical Tibetan sources, is curious in more ways than one. The Chinese historians seem to think that the story of ʿAźa interference at court is a fabrication. It may very well be that T'ai-tsung made a private agreement with the Tibetans to conclude a marriage alliance if they would finish off the still-troublesome ʿAźa. Cf. *TCTC*, 194:6117.

[54] Although the purpose of the war was ostensibly to secure peaceful relations with China through a political marriage, it seems that before the Chinese princess finally arrived in 641, Sroṅ btsan sgampo had subjugated Tibet's southern neighbor, Nepal, and had received a Nepalese princess to cement the relationship. This is the conclusion to be drawn from the Tibetan sources. One must observe, however, that the Chinese princess (and thus probably the Nepalese one as well) was obtained not for Sroṅ btsan sgampo himself, but for his son Guṅ sroṅ guṅ brtsan, who ruled only five years (641-646). Upon the death of his son, the old emperor took to wife the Chinese princess. Cf. Shakabpa, 1967:27.

[55] Note its southerly location on Map I.

[56] *TCTC*, 195:6139.

[57] *HTS*, 2:38; cf. *TCTC*, 195: 6139-6140, where the number of Tibetans

On December 11, 640,[58] the great minister Mgar Stoṅ rtsan "the Conqueror"[59] arrived at the T'ang court with 5,000 ounces of gold and several hundred "precious baubles." Agreement was soon reached on the marital question: the Chinese would give Princess Wen-ch'eng to the Tibetan ruler. And so, on February 20 of the following year, Mgar returned to the Chinese court with the purpose of escorting the princess back to Tibet.[60] A week later, Mgar had an audience with T'ai-tsung during which he gave such clever replies that the Chinese emperor said that he wished to give him a princess as well. Mgar declined, and instead was granted the honorary title of "Great Protecting General of the Right."[61] On March 2, 641, Princess Wen-ch'eng left for Tibet; she was escorted by Tao-tsung (the Prince of Chiang-hsia) and Mgar Stoṅ rtsan.[62]

The peace so secured by Tibetan efforts was honored quite well by both sides, and lasted until the death of T'ai-tsung in 649[63] and of Sroṅ btsan sgampo a few months later.[64] Contacts between the two powers were friendly, and a lively cultural exchange took

killed is given as "over 1000 heads." This statement is taken at face value in *CHC*, 3:230, where it says "a T'ang army drove them off with heavy casualties." Even if the number were reliable, by early medieval standards it was not a major battle.

[58] *CTS*, 3:52; *TCTC*, 195:6157.

[59] The *TCTC* (195:6157) specifies Mgar, whereas the *CTS* (3:52) only says "an envoy." Despite the opinion expressed by Uray in his article, "The Annals of the ʿA-ža Principality" (1978) 561-562, there is no reason to doubt that Mgar was the envoy. He may not have gone far from Ch'ang-an, or even have left it at all, but in any case he did have two and a half months in which to do any necessary traveling back and forth. There is a common misconception that the trip from Central Tibet to Ch'ang-an took a year or more. In fact, if the Princess Chin-ch'eng in 710 could travel all the way from Ch'ang-an to Rasa (Lhasa) in Central Tibet—with stops for ceremonies in ʿAźa and elsewhere along the way—in only five or six months, a general such as Mgar obviously could make it from the Tibetan border to Ch'ang-an and back several times in the period available.

[60] *CTS*, 3:52.

[61] *TCTC*, 196:6164.

[62] Ibid.

[63] On June 15, 649 (*CTS*, 3:62, 4:66).

[64] See below.

place throughout the period. With the exception of the defeat and subjugation of the Indian kingdom of Tîrabhukti in 648 (in support of the T'ang ambassador Wang Hsüan-ts'e[65]), Sroṅ btsan sgampo concerned himself largely with the consolidation of his considerable conquests.[66] He seems to have spent his final years principally in the work of completely assimilating the former Źaṅ-źuṅ state into his empire.[67] In a similar manner, T'ai-tsung occupied himself in his last years with the subjugation of the T'ieh-le Turks[68] and of the kingdom of Kucha.[69] In 649, the new Chinese emperor, Kao-tsung,[70] who was a fervent Buddhist, bestowed upon Sroṅ btsan sgampo the title of Pao-wang.[71] In

[65] See S. Lévi, "Les missions de Wang Hiuen-ts'e dans l'Inde" (1900); cf. *TCTC*, 199:6257-6258.

[66] *TCTC*, 198:6251, includes Tibet in a list of countries ordered on January 26, 648, to assist in the "chastising" of the Kingdom of Kucha; see *TFYK*, 985:16v-18v (pp. 11571-11572), for the edict containing this information. Cf. Moriyasu, 1984:6-7. (It should be noted that Moriyasu, like many Japanese scholars, regularly gives the *approximate* Western year equivalent of the Chinese year. In this case, for example, he has 647.)

[67] Satô, *Kodai Chibetto shi kenkyû* (1959) 2:11. *CTS*, 3:60, includes Źaṅ-źuṅ (Chinese, Yang-t'ung) among the countries listed as having come to court in 648.

[68] *TCTC*, 198:6238 et seq.

[69] *TCTC*, 198:6251.

[70] Installed on July 15, 649 (*TCTC*, 199:6268).

[71] *TFYK*, 974:13v (p. 11443). *TT*, 190:1023, *CTS*, 196a:5222, and *HTS*, 216a:6074, have Tsung-wang, "Cloth-tribute King," while *TFYK*, 964:7r (p. 11340), has Pin-wang, "Guest King" (as does the Po-na edition of *CTS*, 196a:3r). These characters are all very similar and easily confused; the only one that makes any sense to me is Pao-wang. The Chinese sources also record that Kao-tsung had previously given two other titles to the Tibetan emperor: Fu-ma tu-wei ("military commander/imperial son-in-law") and Hsi-hai chün-wang ("Sovereign of the Western Sea"). Upon the bestowal of the latter, these Sources report, Sroṅ btsan sgampo wrote a letter to the Chinese minister Chang-sun Wu-chi. In it, he stated that if the T'ang had any problems, the Tibetan ruler would promptly send an army to help straighten them out. He then was given the title presently in question (*TCTC*, 199:6269-6270). I would tend to accept the later title, but not the earlier ones, as having been given to Sroṅ btsan sgampo. It would seem that, in this case, the Chinese historians have confused the Tibetans (Chinese, T'u-fan) with the ʿAźa (T'u-yü-hun) because of their similar locations, their involvement

Chinese Buddhism, *pao-wang* ("Precious King" or "King of Jewels") is an epithet of the ruler of the West; it also appears to be a title of the Buddha Amitâbha, whose realm was thought to be in the West (as seen from China).[72] Significantly, it is known that Sroṅ btsan sgampo was identified with Amitâbha from very early times. It seems probable that Tibetan Buddhism began as a court religion that was fostered by the Chinese and Nepalese princesses along with their retinues, by visiting embassies and merchants, and by certain of the ministers.[73] But in 649-650, this first great Tibetan emperor died, and the accession to the throne of his young grandson left all real power in the hands of the chief minister, Mgar Stoṅ rtsan, who was to be the de facto ruler for the next two decades.

For some time before his patron died, Mgar Stoṅ rtsan had been consolidating his power. It is more than probable that he was ultimately responsible for the death of his powerful rival, Khyuṅpo Spuṅ-sad Zutse, since he was the minister who discovered Zutse's "plot."[74] Beyond such intrigues, Mgar had apparently gotten more or less complete control over the army, and had developed a favorable international image. He is the only Tibetan from this period whose Chinese portrait survives in believable form[75]—albeit in a later copy—and whose personality and

in the same events, and their similar names (both begin with the same character, and the name T'u-yü-hun often appears in the sources in the shorter form T'u-hun). The T'u-yü-hun and the Tibetans both received T'ang princesses almost simultaneously, in early 641 (Molè, 1970:171-172 [n. 470]; *TCTC*, 195:6157, 196:6164). According to the *CTS* and *HTS*, Kao-tsung also gave No-ho-po, the ruler of the ʿAźa, the title Fu-ma tu-wei (Molè, 1970:57). The title could thus have applied to either ruler, and as such would seem already to have been confused by the chroniclers of the early T'ang.

[72] E. Eitel, *Handbook of Chinese Buddhism* (1970) 51; cf. Pelliot, "La théorie des quatre fils du ciel" (1923).

[73] The hat on the statue of Sroṅ btsan sgampo in the Jokhang in Lhasa has an image of Amitâbha on it. It is interesting to speculate if this identification might have been one of the sources for the later identification of this ruler with Amitâbha's emanation, the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, who was from later medieval times on considered the "patron" of Tibet.

[74] *OTC*, ii; cf. Satô, 1958, 1:302-303.

[75] See the reproduction in H. Karmay, *Early Sino-Tibetan Art* (1975) 17 (pl. 6).

intelligence were obviously admired by his Chinese adversaries. From 652 to 667, the *Old Tibetan Annals* is full of the doings of the de facto ruler, Prime Minister Mgar. In 655-656, he wrote a code of laws, perhaps the same as the description of administrative organization that is attributed to Sroṅ btsan sgampo.[76] Then he began work on his greatest accomplishment, the conquest of the ʿAźa.

After their first defeat by the Tibetans, the T'u-yü-hun had submitted again to the Chinese. According to the *Annals*, the ʿAźa qaghan, Mu-jung No-ho-po, had made a deal with the Chinese general Su Ting-fang when the latter was in the district of Mtsho Nag ("Black Lake").[77] This was probably during the general's journey through ʿAźa territory on his way back to China from western Central Asia in the early spring of 660. Mgar Stoṅ rtsan began his long stay in the ʿAźa country by supervising a major defeat of the T'u-yü-hun and their Chinese overlords that autumn.[78]

[76] *OTA*, Hare year 655-656; *OTC*, viii; see Uray, "The Narrative of Legislation and Organization of the Mkhas-pa'i dga'-ston" (1972). Mgar was thus obviously not illiterate. When the Chinese sources comment that a non-Chinese was illiterate (in modern Chinese, *pu shih tzu*, "does not recognize *tzu*," i.e. Chinese ideographic characters), however, they mean that he did not know literary Chinese. (*HTS*, 216a:6075, which says *pu chih shu*, "does not know writings," is followed by Satô, 1958, 1:300: "*monji no koto wa shiranai ga*.") It is of course possible that, at the time of Mgar's visits to Ch'ang-an for the purpose of negotiating the marriage alliance, the Tibetan writing system had still not been developed, or had not yet been learned by him. It is certain, however, that the alphabet had been developed and was becoming widespread during Sroṅ btsan sgampo's reign (*OTC*, viii). According to traditional Tibetan sources, the emperor and his court all set themselves to the task of becoming literate.

[77] Probably the Khara Nor ("Black Lake"), which is located about 130 miles northwest of the Mtsho Sṅon or Koko Nor along a trail going from the Tsaidam to Tun-huang. However, Satô (1958, 1:310, and 1978:32, 236 et seq. and maps), while mentioning this identification, prefers to equate Mtsho Nag with the Wu Hai (Chinese, "Crow Sea"), which was the scene of many later Tibetan battles with the Chinese. L. Petech, "Glosse agli *Annali* di Tun-huang" (1967) 258-259, doubts that Su Ting-fang was there.

[78] *TCTC*, 200:6321. It is unknown where exactly the battle took place. The army was probably led by one of his sons, who is called Ch'i-cheng in

At about the same time, the Chinese conquest of the Western Turks[79] started to have repercussions in the lands of the western Tarim Basin. In 659 Tu-man, the *irkin* of the *Ärski tribe of Western Turks,[80] leading an army composed of his own tribesmen, with contingents from Kashgar and two small western Tarim principalities, attacked and captured Khotan.[81] In response, Su Ting-fang was sent to punish them. He led his army to the River of Śâś (the Jaxartes) and attacked the Turks, forcing the surrender of Tu-man in the later part of the same year.[82] Su then returned to China, where he presented the captives to the emperor in Loyang[83] and was appointed to the Korean campaign.[84] In his absence, however, the *Köngül Turks of the Tien Shan, together with the Yen-mien to their north and the Tibetans to their south, attacked and captured Kashgar.[85] In response, that fall, the Chinese general Cheng Jen-t'ai attacked and defeated the Ssu-chieh, Bayarqu, P'u-ku, and Tongra tribes of the T'ieh-le confederation further to the east of the *Köngül.[86] This was followed by a major uprising of related tribes of the "Nine-surnamed" T'ieh-le,[87] including the Tongra, P'u-ku, Ssu-chieh, and Telengit, in the Tien Shan area. In the winter of 661, three T'ang

Chinese. It appears that the *OTA* entry for the Sheep year 659-660 refers to this event; unfortunately, this disrupts the chronology.

[79] See Chavannes (1903), the classic work on the subject.

[80] Ibid., 72-73, 308 (n. 74).

[81] *TCTC*, 200:6319. On one of the principalites, Chu-chü-po, see Moriyasu, 1984:67 (n. 108), and É. Lamotte, "Mañjuśrī" (1960) 65-66 (n. 156).

[82] *TCTC*, 200:6319.

[83] Ibid.; cf. *HTS*, 3:60.

[84] On April 25, 660. (*TCTC*, 200:6320.) *CTS*, 4:79-80, has this one year early. Hsiao Ssu-yeh was appointed to the Korean campaign in the spring of 661 (*HTS*, 3:61; *TCTC*, 200:6323).

[85] *TCTC*, 202:6372. *Köngül seems to be the name behind the Chinese Kung-yüeh. See F. Müller, *Ein Doppelblatt aus einem manichäischen Hymnenbuch (Maḫrnâmag)* (1913) 10, for mention of a Köngül general.

[86] *TCTC*, 200:6322; *HTS*, 3:60.

[87] *TCTC*, 200:6326. The same source also refers to them as "Uyghurs" (Hui-ho), while *CTS* (83:2781) calls them "Nine-surnamed Turks" or just "Nine Surnames," and *HTS* (111:4119) refers to them as the "Nine Surnames of the T'ieh-le."

armies were organized to attack the rebels. Cheng Jen-t'ai was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the T'ieh-le *tao* Expeditionary Army with Liu Shen-li, the Protector General of Yen-jan, and General Hsieh Jen-kuei as his two assistants. General Hsiao Ssu-yeh was named Commander-in-Chief of the Hsien-o *tao* Expeditionary Army along with Assistant General Sun Jen-shih. The third army was headed by the Turkic general *Arśïla Chung, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ch'ang-ts'en *tao* Expeditionary Army.[88] In the following spring, the forces of Cheng Jen-t'ai and Hsieh Jen-kuei[89] defeated the Turks somewhere in the Tien Shan. When the Chinese armies approached the hiding places of the Ssu-chieh, Telengit, and other tribes in the Tien Shan, these tribesmen all came out to surrender.[90] The approach of Hsiao Ssu-yeh and his Expeditionary Army to the territories of the *Köngül caused the latter nation, and its subject city of Kashgar, to surrender as well.[91]

It may be in connection with these events that Mgar Stoṅ rtsan, temporarily back from ʿAźa, gathered an army in Źaṅ-źuṅ.[92] For early in the following year, a Tibetan force was again[93] allied with forces from *Köngül and Kashgar. The combined Tibetan and Turkic armies appeared south of Kashgar, expecting to do battle with the army of the T'ang general Su Hai-cheng, the I-hai *tao* Commander-in-Chief. Su, who was involved in a campaign againt Kucha, had brought about chaos among the Western Turks by killing *Arśïla Mi-she, who was the Hsing-hsi-wang Qaghan, the theoretical ruler of the eastern (*Tarduś) branch of the On oq. He had thus earned the enmity of the qaghan's tribes, the Shu-ni-shih and Barsqân.[94] After having chased these tribes

[88] *HTS*, 3:61; *TCTC*, 200:6326. For the name *Arśïla, see Appendix C.

[89] There seem to be no more references in the literary sources to *Arśïla Chung. For his tomb inscription, see the work (unavailable to me at the time of writing) cited by Moriyasu, 1984:63 (n. 57).

[90] *CTS*, 83:2781; *HTS*, 3:62, 111:4141; *TCTC*, 200:6327-6328.

[91] *TCTC*, 202:6372.

[92] *OTA*, Dog year 662-663.

[93] *TCTC*, 201:6333, explicitly says "again" (*fu*).

[94] The Shu-ni-shih was one of the five eastern *Tarduś (Chinese, Tu-lu, To-lu) tribes, and the Barsqân was one of the five western Nu-shih-pi (*Nu

some distance to the area around Kashgar, and having pacificed them, Su and his army met the Tibetans and their allies. The Chinese source says that Su's troops were so tired that they did not dare to fight. So Su bought off the Tibetans with his army's military equipment, made peace, and withdrew.[95]

Theoretically, the Tibetans could have rendezvoused with their allies for these campaigns from either the southwestern or the southeastern corner of the Tarim Basin. But, since Kashgar in the northwest was already in the hands of the Tibetans and Western Turks, while Khotan was still under Chinese control and the T'u-yü-hun had yet to be conquered, the Tibetan army must have gone over the high passes north of Gilgit down to the Basin. Thus it is clear that this territory must already have come under Tibetan domination. According to the *Hsin T'ang shu*, sometime during or shortly after the Hsien-ch'ing period (February 1, 656 to February 4, 661), the kingdom of Wakhan was subjugated by Tibet: "Because their land is on the road from the Four Garrisons to Ṭukhâristân, it had to submit to Tibet."[96] It appears therefore that by 663 the Tibetan Empire controlled the far northwestern reaches of the Tibetan Plateau (where the Karakorum range becomes the Pamirs), the kingdom of Balûr,[97] the kingdom of Wakhan in eastern Ṭukhâristân (or the approaches to it from the east), and an area around Kashgar. Tibet had thus gained a strategic advantage that the Chinese obviously did not appreciate until it was too late.

śadpït) tribes. (On these groupings and their names, see Appendix D.) These "tribes" are not necessarily to be considered as distinct ethnic groups. For a recent anthropologically based discussion, see R. Lindner, "What Was a Nomadic Tribe?" (1982). The Barsqân are generally thought to have been based in the southwestern Tien Shan.

[95] *TCTC*, 201-6333; *TFYK*, 449-10r-10v (p. 5324).

[96] *HTS*, 221b:6255. On the Tibetan use of the Pamir route, see also the discussion in Moriyasu, 1984:8.

[97] The correct reading of this country's name, Po-lü in Chinese, was established by Pelliot long ago, but few writers seem to be aware of the fact. (See Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo* [1959] 1:91-92.) For example, Moriyasu, (1984:7) transcribes it in Japanese *katakana* as *bororu*, in *romaji* as "Bolor." Chinese transcription rules out either an "e" in the first syllable or an "o" in the second for early medieval pronunciation.

In the summer of 663, the Tibetan war with the ʿAźa at last came to a head. Both sides sent envoys to China asking for Chinese intervention on their side.[98] The Chinese response was to appoint the Governor-General of Liang *chou*, Cheng Jen-t'ai, as Commander-in-Chief of the Ch'ing Hai (Koko Nor) *tao* Expeditionary Army to save the T'u-yü-hun from the Tibetans. But, with the defection of the ʿAźa minister Su-ho-kuei to the Tibetans, the ʿAźa defenses were revealed; the Tibetans attacked and completely crushed the ʿAźa forces.[99] The qaghan, his Chinese princess, and several thousand families—no doubt largely the nobility and their retainers—fled to the Chinese at Liang *chou*.[100] The whole of the once-powerful Mongolic state was now a part of the Tibetan Empire.

But on January 26, 664, Kao Hsien, the Protector-General of *An-hsi*, the "Pacified West" colonial administration then based in Kucha, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of an expeditionary army intended to attack the *Köngül—and possibly the Tibetans—in order to save Khotan.[101] The outcome of this expedition, if it actually was ever mobilized, is unknown.

As for Mgar Stoṅ rtsan, the Tibetan sources only remark that he remained in ʿAźa from 663 to 665.[102] He was doubtlessly con-

[98] *TCTC*, 201:6335.

[99] *HTS*, 3:63, 216a:6075; *TCTC*, 201:6336. According to *HTS* (216a:6075), the Chinese army was directed "to encamp at Liang [*chou*] and Shan [*chou*]." The famous Su Ting-fang was sent along as *an chi ta shih*, or "Grand Commissioner for Pacifying and Gathering." (His involvement in this move is not mentioned in either of his biographies, which are model "exemplary accounts.") The army seems actually to have been sent to protect Chinese prefectures from incursions by either Tibetans or T'u-yü-hun. There is no mention of Chinese military interference in the Tibetan-ʿAźa war.

[100] *TCTC*, 201:6336.

[101] *HTS*, 3:63; *TCTC*, 201:6339; cf. *TFYK*, 414:21r (p. 4930). The official title of this expeditionary army is not given in the sources. The Tibetans are not mentioned either, but the *OTA* notes that in the Mouse year 664-665 "the Emperor went to the North," and Khotan is indeed north of Central Tibet. Satô, 1958, 1:312-313, believes the latter entry refers to a campaign against the ʿAźa.

[102] *OTA*, Pig, Mouse, and Ox years 663-664, 664-665, and 665-666.

solidating the Tibetan position there, but he was probably also responsible for the Tibetan embassy which arrived at the Chinese court on February 14, 665. Their mission was to get the ʿAźa to restore good relations with the Tibetan ruling house. In addition, the Tibetans came to "seek the region of Ch'ih Shui for grazing their animals."[103] Having the ʿAźa as vassals ruling over their own people would certainly have eased the problems the Tibetans faced in trying to control a subject people totally un-Tibetan in language and culture. Moreover, early medieval political ideology did not allow for vassals—in theory, the position of all conquered peoples—to avoid submission to their overlords. (That such vassals were often referred to with words meaning "slaves" attests to their subordinate status.) That the Tibetans asked for a particular area in ʿAźa territory may indicate either that the area had not yet been completely subjugated—a real possibility—or that the Tibetans wished to assuage Chinese fears and anger by requesting T'ang recognition of the new de facto situation. In any event, although the Chinese denied both requests,[104] the ʿAźa lands remained under Tibetan control. With this success, Mgar Stoṅ rtsan returned from ʿAźa in 666 and had an audience with the Tibetan emperor. He was now an old man, twice prime minister, and his sons were taking over his duties for him. He died in Ris-pu in the following year.[105]

After *Arśïla Pu-chen, the Chi-wang-chüeh Qaghan—theoretically ruler of the western or Nu-shih-pi branch of the On oq—plotted against the other qaghan and had him killed, the Turks "considered Chi-wang-chüeh an oppressor" and pondered ways of getting rid of him.[106] But when he killed himself, for reasons that are still unknown, the Western Turks found themselves without a qaghan altogether, according to the Chinese sources, so in 667 two of their leaders, *Arśïla Tu-chih and Li Che-fu,

[103] *TCTC*, 201:6343; *HTS*, 216a:6075.

[104] *TCTC*, 201:6342; *HTS*, 216a:6075.

[105] *OTA*, Tiger and Hare years 666-667 and 667-668. The location of Ris-pu is uncertain.

[106] *TCTC*, 201:6333.

gathered the tribes and together they submitted to Tibet.[107] This remarkable chain of events, unmentioned in Tibetan sources and only very briefly related in the Chinese, marks the first period of Tibetan domination over the Western Turks, and demonstrates the rapidly growing power of Tibet in Central Asia.[108]

In 668, in apparent preparation for an expected Chinese attack, the Tibetans constructed defensive fortifications in the area of the Jima Gol,[109] a river located in ʿAźa territory south of the Koko Nor and called by the T'ang Chinese Ta-fei Ch'uan.[110] In the following year, perhaps as a result of this show of Tibetan strength, a large number of ʿAźa came to the Tibetan court to do obeisance to the emperor.[111] At the same time, the Chinese were debating whether or not to move the T'u-yü-hun to another place south of Liang *chou*. But, because they were afraid that the Tibetans would attack them there too, nothing was done.[112]

[107] *TCTC*, 201:6332-6333; *TFYK*, 967:11v (p. 2372). Cf. the discussion on this in Moriyasu, 1984:11-12.

[108] One must doubt the Chinese sources' implication that the Western Turks only submitted to the Tibetans by choice and only because they needed a ruler!

[109] *OTA*, Dragon year 668-669. It may be too easy an equation to make confidently without having a thorough study of the internal historical phonology of Tibetan (including the dialects) at hand, but it would appear that the Tibetan name Jima Gol (the 670 entry has Khol) has been *translated* into Chinese as Ta-fei Ch'uan. This could only have been done through the medium of the Tibetan language because the name is patently an ʿAźa name, and of Mongolic origin. Allowing for the perhaps premature aspiration of the initial consonant *j*, the name is a syllable-for-syllable calque of a Tibetan interpretation of the original name: Ji (= *Che*, "big") + ma ("not") and Gol or Khol (Mongolic and Turkic for "river"), which thus corresponds to the Chinese *Ta* ("big"), *fei* ("not"), *Ch'uan* ("river").

[110] For its identification with the Hoyoyun River, see Satô, 1978:145 and maps. See also the discussion in Molè, 1970:168 (n. 451), which includes a Ta-fei Shan. Petech, 1967:250-251, says that it had to be southwest of the Koko Nor. Hu San-hsing's gloss (*TCTC*, 201:6364) says that the Ta-fei Ch'uan was over 300 *li* west of Shan-ch'eng *hsien*, Shan *chou*. Cf. Moriyasu, 1984:9-10, 63 (n. 47). All agree that the river was somewhere south of the Koko Nor.

[111] *OTA*, Snake year 669-670.

[112] *TCTC*, 201:6359; *TFYK*, 991:13v-14v (p. 11642). That such discus-

Suddenly, in the spring of 670, Tibet launched a major offensive against the remaining Chinese-held countries in the western Tarim Basin. With the assistance of troops from Khotan, which had been captured between 665 and 670, Tibet attacked and took[113] the Kuchean fortified city of Aksu.[114] Only Kucha and Agni,[115] which were located further east, apparently held out against the Tibetans.[116] At this point, however, the Chinese abandoned the Four Garrisons of the Pacified West—the major part of their hard-won colonial empire—with, their historians would have us believe, hardly a whimper. Nonetheless, the same historians also record that an ambitious campaign was quickly mounted with the intention of crushing the Tibetans, restoring the ʿAźa to their homelands, and reconquering the Tarim countries.

sions took place would seem to indicate that the T'u-yü-hun had indeed already been conquered (although not yet absorbed) by the Tibetans. But see Moriyasu, 1984:63 (n. 47), 64 (n. 62).

[113] *CTS*, 5:94, 40:1647; *HTS*, 3:68, 216a:6076; *TCTC*, 201-6363; *TFYK*, 986:10v (p. 11579); cf. Moriyasu, 1984:10-11. The *Köngül Turks, the Kashgaris, and the Tibetans had attacked Khotan, one of the Four Garrisons and the key point on the southern branch of the Silk Road, in the spring of 665. The T'ang Governor-General of Hsi *chou*, Ts'ui Chih-pien, and a general, Ts'ao Chi-shu, were ordered to its defense. (*HTS*, 3:64; *TCTC*, 201:6344; *TFYK*, 995:15v [p. 11687]; cf. Moriyasu, 1984:8-9.) Previous attacks of the Tibetans and their allies had failed, and the Chinese sources imply the success of their defense in this case as well.

[114] Chinese, Po-huan. Moriyasu, 1984:63 (n. 48), is inexplicably not convinced by Pelliot's arguments for this identification. See Pelliot, "La ville de Bakhouân dans la géographie d'Idrîçî" (1906) 553-556, and "Note sur les anciens noms de Kučā, d'Aqsu et d'Uč-Turfan" (1923) 128-130.

[115] Chinese, Yen-ch'i, present-day Karashahr.

[116] See the discussion in Moriyasu, 1984:10-11. The Tibetans faced the necessity of controlling Kashgar, or at the very least, of placing the fortress-city in friendly hands, in order to attack Aksu from the west. The *CTS* 5:94, has the Tibetans capturing "Pai *chou*, etc., 18 prefectures," while the *TCTC*, 201:6363, has "the 18 prefectures of the Western Regions." It may be significant to note that the capture of cities to the west of Chinese-held territory should not have caused the T'ang to abandon Kucha and Agni. Indeed, the Chinese recaptured the Tarim Basin (between 692 and 694) by defeating the Tibetans and Western Turks in the area of present-day western Kansu, the region that lay west of China but east of Kucha and Agni (see below, Chapter Three). Moreover, the *HTS*, 217b:6150, refers to the area conquered by Tibet as "the 18 prefectures of Ho[-hsi] Lung[-yu], and the Four Garrisons." Perhaps, then, this expression indicates the area just to the west of ethnic Chinese territories in the Kansu corridor.

On May 3, 670,[117] Great Protecting General of the Right Hseih Jen-kuei was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the huge Rasa *tao* Expeditionary Army. His assistant generals were *Arśïla Tao-chen and Kuo Tai-feng. In late summer,[118] the army arrived at the Ta-fei Ch'uan. Hsieh first gave orders to Kuo that twenty thousand men should remain behind with the baggage and build two palisades on Ta-fei Shan in order to protect the supplies. Meanwhile, Hsieh would lead his unencumbered forces forward to attack the Tibetans. Hsieh's attack succeeded: he badly defeated a group of Tibetans at the river mouth[119] and captured over 10,000 cattle and sheep.[120] He then camped by the Wu Hai (Crow Lake) to wait for Kuo and his army. Kuo Tai-feng, however, had not built the palisades. As he was slowly proceeding to the rendezvous at Wu Hai, he was attacked by an enormous Tibetan army[121] and severely defeated. Dumping their baggage and military supplies, Kuo's army turned back in full retreat; this necessitated Hsieh Jen-kuei's withdrawal to a camp by the Ta-fei Ch'uan. There the Tibetan general Mgar Khri ʿbriṅ, leading a large army, fell upon the T'ang imperial forces, killing or wounding almost

[117] *CTS*, 5:94, 196a:5223; *HTS*, 3:68, 216a:6076; *TCTC*, 201:6363; *TFYK*, 986:10v (p. 11579).

[118] On the problem of dating, see Molè, 1970:180-182 (n. 499). *TCTC*, 201:6364, gives the eighth month (August 21 to September 20), sometime after September 6. *TFYK*, 443:2r (p. 5254) also gives the eighth month. *CTS*, 5:94, and *HTS*, 3:68, both give August 8 as the date of the Battle of Ta-fei Ch'uan. *OTA*, Horse year 670-671, records that "many Chinese were killed at Jima Khol." See the Note on Chronology.

[119] Or perhaps at a place called Ho-k'ou, as punctuated by the editors of the *TCTC* (201:6364). Hu San-hsing's gloss says this refers to the mouth of the Chi-shih Ho.

[120] *CTS*, 83:2783. This "battle" sounds suspiciously like a massacre of shepherds rather than a military engagement. Although there is no explicit evidence, the accounts seem to have been altered from whatever the truth may have been, perhaps to protect Hsieh Jen-kuei from incrimination.

[121] The army supposedly numbered over 200,000 men.

all of them. But the three Chinese generals escaped slaughter; after making peace with Mgar Khri 'briṅ, they returned to China.[122]

This military disaster marked the end of two decades of Chinese domination of the Tarim Basin. A new army was soon organized to be sent west,[123] but this time its destination was more realistically ordered to be Liang *chou*, and its purpose was to defend against an expected Tibetan invasion.[124] The T'ang moved the government of its *An-hsi* Protectorate General back to Hsi *chou* in the Turfan Depression, where it had been originally established. The first period of Tibetan domination over the Tarim states and neighboring regions had begun.

[122] *OTA*, Horse year 670-671; *CTS*, 5:94, 83:2782-2783; *HTS*, 3:68, 111:4142; *TCTC*, 201:6364-6365; *TFYK*, 456:14v-15v (pp. 5405-5406). The number of Tibetans alleged to have attacked the Chinese army is 400,000 this time! The defeated generals were demoted to the rank of commoner on their return to China.

[123] On November 2, 670 (*HTS*, 3:68, 216a:6076; *TCTC*, 201:6365).

[124] *HTS*, 3:69, says this army was to "chastise" or "subjugate" Tibet. Its military destination, however, is here given also as Liang *chou*, thus disproving the above statement.

Chapter 2

THE TIBETAN EMPIRE IN THE WESTERN REGIONS

The Tibetans had now conquered a fairly large expanse of territory in eastern Central Asia. The region straddled the main East-West transcontinental trade routes, and was then a dynamic, integral part of the highly civilized Buddhist heartland of Eurasia.[1] Thus, the loss of this profitable and most strategic part of their colonial empire was a shock to the T'ang Chinese,[2] who for a brief period after the devastating defeat at Ta-fei Ch'uan were unable to devise any serious countermeasure. In 671, the Chinese attempted to reestablish control over the *Tarduś tribes of the Western Turks through the appointment of *Arśïla Tu-chih[3]

[1] On the importance of Central Asian culture for the development of the early Tibetan Buddhist and the Arab Islamic civilizations, see Beckwith, "The Revolt of 755 in Tibet" (1983) and "The Plan of the City of Peace" (1984b).

[2] Cf. Satô, 1958, 1:324.

[3] On May 31, 671. (*HTS*, 215b:6064; *TCTC*, 202:6366.) *TFYK*, 964: 9r (p. 11341), has 670, but this is probably a misprint. Far from demonstrating the submission of his branch of the Western Turks to the Chinese, *Arśïla's appointment indicates rather that he had great need of T'ang help, and may

both as a military general and as Governor-General over the Ch'u-mu-k'un, one of the five *Tarduś tribes of the On oq. Unfortunately, the sources are silent about the outcome of this scheme. The T'ang did undertake one concrete action in 672, one more revealing of the seriousness of the situation: they moved the T'u-yü-hun farther into China—away from Shan *chou*—because the Chinese believed that their fear of the Tibetans was making them restless.[4]

In view of the various T'ang attempts at dealing with this potent Tibetan threat, the Chinese sources' explanations for the monumental setbacks seem ludicrous. The account in the *Chiu T'ang shu* states: "When Kao-tsung succeeded to the throne, he did not want extensive territories to trouble the people, so he ordered the officials concerned to abandon Kucha and the other [three] of the Four Garrisons, and move the Protector-Generalship of the Pacified West to Hsi *chou*, where it had been of old."[5] This distortion, although not uncommon in Chinese sources, doubtlessly resulted from a desire to conceal the blame for this blow to T'ang imperial prestige by making it seem a voluntary, or even virtuous, action by the emperor. In the meantime, the great defeat of the Chinese imperial army, which had been sent in 670 to the nearby Koko Nor to crush the Tibetans and recover the Four Garrisons, is ample proof of the seriousness and extent of the Chinese loss.

The only other Central Asian power which might have been able to turn back the rising power of Tibet was the Arab caliphate. However, the early Arab conquests did not extend as far as the new Tibetan imperial borders. The furthest east they had reached by 670 was western Ṭukhâristân and Siǧistân.[6] These regions had allegedly been brought under Chinese control as a result of Su Ting-fang's conquest of the Western Turks between

have come to court to get it. This is clear from his appointment as Governor-General over only one of the five eastern tribes.

[4] *TCTC*, 202:6368.

[5] *CTS*, 198:5304; cf. *HTS*, 221a:6232.

[6] M. Shaban, *The ʿAbbāsid Revolution* (1970) 32. The Arabs under ʿUbayd Allâh b. Ziyâd first crossed the Oxus in 674 (p. 35).

657 and 659.[7] In fact, this territory passed out of the Chinese sphere of influence directly after the Chinese officially announced its political organization—into T'ang protectorates, prefectures, and so on—in 661.[8] Thanks to Su Hai-cheng's campaign of 662, the region was thrown into civil war, and virtual rebellion ensued as the Western Turks rose against the T'ang.[9] Thus the Chinese attempt to impose a unifying T'ang rule over western Central Asia was a total failure.

For their part, the Arabs still had to contend with many more-or-less independent city-states which tended not to cooperate much with each other. Contrary to the generally accepted view, however, such intransigent independent-mindedness made them much more difficult to subdue than if they had been part of a centralized empire.[10] Moreover, the civil war which followed the death in 683 of Yazîd b. Muʿâwiya, the second Umayyad caliph, was soon to result in the loss of central control over the Arab conquests in Central Asia.[11] In short, the Chinese were at that time Tibet's only potential rivals for the domination of Central Asia from the Pamirs eastward.

[7] *TCTC*, 200:6301-6319, gives the most coherent account.

[8] The best treatment remains that of Chavannes, 1903:67-71. The long glosses in *TCTC*, 200:6324-6325 are also useful.

[9] See Chapter One.

[10] H. Gibb, *The Arab Conquests in Central Asia* (1923) 4 et seq., and Shaban, 1970:3-15, have noted this lack of cooperation and the difficulties the Arabs faced in their conquests. But neither has suggested that the complex political situation, with frequent unpredictable rebellions against Arab authority, was what stymied the caliphate's expansion there for so long. The sudden fall to the Arabs of the Persian Empire and of most of the Eastern Roman Empire would seem to demonstrate the dangers of over-centralization. Despite the fame of these historic collapses, Gibb states: "There is not a hint of united action in the field [by the Central Asians against the Arabs] in Ṭabari's accounts" (1923:22). One could, however, easily point out many contradictory examples—quite a few of which Gibb himself deals with—in the source he cites. An early example of such cooperation is the account in Ṭabarî (ii:394) of the annual meeting of the "kings of Khurasan" near Khwârizm. Gibb has questioned this account, saying it "possesses little intrinsic probability," among other things. See Gibb, 1923:28 (n. 12).

[11] Shaban, 1970:41 et seq.

Of the former T'ang possessions, Tibet was now theoretically sovereign over at least two of the Four Garrisons—Khotan and Kashgar—as well as Aksu and, probably, the western or Nu-shih-pi branch of the On oq.[12] Nothing is yet known about Tibetan administration of these conquered territories.[13] However, if the contemporary Chinese and Arab conquests can be considered at all comparable in nature, it is most probable that the Tibetans left control in the hands of local dynasts, and merely exacted as much tribute from them as they could. Under such lax control, local rulers of the major Central Asian principalities began to act almost as if they were independent again. Their policy with respect to T'ang China bore great resemblance to that of the rulers of western Central Asian principalities which were coming under Arab domination at the same time. The few major differences were determined in part by the greater proximity of the Tarim Basin to China than of Khurasan to the Arabian homeland.

At the beginning of 674, according to Chinese sources, the kings of ★Köngül and Kashgar came in person to the T'ang court, then in Ch'ang-an,[14] to "surrender."[15] The *Chiu T'ang shu* states

[12] There is no statement concerning the Nu-shih-pi in the Chinese sources at this point, but toward the end of the century Mgar Khri 'briṅ claimed that they were close to Tibet and of strategic importance to the Tibetan Empire.

[13] The Old Tibetan documents from East Turkistan and Tun-huang have generally been dated to the eighth and ninth centuries, so these copious materials may not reveal much about this early period even after they have been better studied. In addition, extremely little archaeological work has been done in the region. Thus the only usable information available at present on early Tibetan activities in Central Asia comes from literary sources.

[14] *TCTC*, 202:6371. Moriyasu, 1984:12, has "673" (see Chapter One, note 66).

[15] *CTS*, 5:98; *TCTC*, 202:6371. This event could possibly be connected with the appointments of ★Arśīla Tu-chih mentioned above. Since ★Köngül and Kashgar had both fallen to Tibet with the assistance of ★Arśīla's Turks, it would perhaps not have been difficult for these Turks to turn the cities over to the Chinese. Such an interpretation would, however, be erroneous, as shown below. See also Appendix A, where H. Satô's interpretation of the ambiguous data—on further developments with regard to Kashgar—are discussed (Satô, 1958, 1:327-328).

that the T'ang subsequently established a Governor Generalship in Kashgar.[16] Soon afterward, in early 675,[17] Fu-she Hsiung, the king of Khotan, came to China with some seventy followers; later in the same year a Governor Generalship was also created for Khotan. The jurisdiction was named P'i-sha—after the native dynastic name—and had ten prefectures, with Fu-she Hsiung as Governor-General.[18] Coincident with the arrival of Fu-she Hsiung, the pretender to the throne of Persia, Pêrôz, whom the Chinese had appointed Governor-General of Persia a decade before, also came to the Chinese court. The "king of Khotan" and the "king of Persia" are treated in the sources as exact equals, even though the latter had never ruled Persia, and his father, the last ruler of the Sassanid dynasty, had been killed in the course of the Arab conquest forty years before.[19] Since there is no reference to Chinese military activity in the Tarim during this period, and since foreign kings never traveled by choice to the T'ang capital,[20] it seems clear that these kings were refugees rather than victorious rebels who had received Chinese assistance against the Tibetans.[21] If it is true, however, that the Tibetans had let slip their control

[16] *CTS* 40:1648; cf. Satô, 1958, 1:327. Since this information occurs at the end of the account in the *CTS*, its remarks on Kashgar's Governor-Generalship could conceivably be taken to apply to the period of the *second* Shang-yüan reign (760-761). There are innumerable references to the second period in the "Treatise on Geography," but no references to the earlier Shang-yüan period, although some probably can be found.

[17] Moriyasu, 1984:12, has "674" (see Chapter One, note 66).

[18] *CTS*, 5:99-100, 40:1648; *HTS*, 221a:6235; *TCTC*, 674:6374. The chronology in *CTS*, 198:5305, is difficult to reconcile with that of the other sources.

[19] In addition to the other embassies to China, it may be noted that, at the beginning of 675, the king of Kucha or his envoy presented the gift of a silver *p'o-lo* (*CTS*, 5:100).

[20] It is highly improbable that the Central Asian rulers who assisted the T'ang in putting down the An Lu-shan rebellion did so of their own free will, despite all the hoopla to the contrary in the Chinese sources. If they had known that the rebellion was destroying T'ang military power, and that the Chinese would therefore not be able to punish them for "rebelling," they would doubtlessly have ignored the T'ang summons.

[21] See further in Appendix A.

over Khotan and Kashgar, in 675 and 676 their dominion was restored.[22]

During these years, Great Minister Mgar Btsan sṅa ldombu first mustered Źaṅ-źuṅ troops,[23] and then led the Tibetan armies into "Turkistan."[24] The following winter, Mgar again led the armies in Turkistan,[25] this time with the renewed cooperation of ★Arśīla Tu-chih, who had now become qaghan of the Western Turks, and Li Che-fu.[26] Into the next year, they campaigned together in the area of the former Four Garrisons, from west of Agni to as far east as Tun-huang.[27] The result, according to Tibetan sources, was victory; the Chinese sources report that "the Four Garrisons were all lost." Also in 677,[28] the Tibetans raided

[22] Another possible explanation is as follows: After their initial victories, the Tibetans left the Central Asian states alone, presumably with the understanding that they would pay their tribute. Tibet actually began its second wave of invasions in 674, and the kings then fled to China. (In this regard, we should recall that the *OTA* dating system, or the lack thereof, has not yet been perfectly elucidated: the source may refer to 674 as well as 675, or it may simply be off by one year.)

[23] *OTA*, Pig year 675(-676), summer. The levy was made in Guran, in Źims, both unknown places. Beginning in the Sheep year 671-672, the *OTA* divides each entry by season, usually just "summer" and "winter." See the Note on Chronology.

[24] *OTA*, Pig year 675(-676), summer. The Old Tibetan text says he "went to Turkistan for *ltaṅ-yo*." The grammatical construction of this sentence does not allow the last word, the meaning of which is unknown, to be taken as a place name. Nonetheless, every writer on the subject—most recently, Moriyasu (1984:14): "*kono* Dru-gu *(chyuruku) koku no* Ltang-yo *to wa* . . ."—has hitherto so understood it. I would etymologize the word as a compound of *ltaṅ*, "a bale (of goods), and the *yo* of *yobyad*, "necessities for life, provisions, supplies." Perhaps it meant something like "booty" or "plunder." (The term is somehow reminiscent of the contemporaneous Arabic word *athqâl*, which was used to refer to valuable caravan goods; see below, Chapter Five.) The clause may thus mean "he went to Turkistan for plunder."

[25] *OTA*, Mouse year (676-)677, winter.

[26] *HTS*, 216b:6077; *TCTC*, 202:6390. Cf. Chavannes, 1903:74-76, on this and the subsequent Chinese "campaign" of P'ei Hsing-chien.

[27] *HTS*, 216a:6079.

[28] *OTA*, Mouse year (676-)677, winter; *HTS*, 3:73, 215b:6064, 216a:6077, 221a:6232-6233; *CTS*, 198:5304. The account in *TFYK* is chronologically out of order; it refers to the activities of P'ei Hsing-chien in 679.

the fortified Chinese prefectural capitals of Shan *chou*, K'uo *chou*, and Ho *chou*, among others.[29] In response, the T'ang government organized two armies, a T'ao *chou tao* Expeditionary Army and a Liang *chou tao* Expeditionary Army, to punish Tibet. Ultimately, however, the army never went on campaign.[30] In fact, at no time after 670 did any Chinese soldiers or officials enter the new Tibetan sphere of influence. Thus, by the end of 677, Tibet had established control over the whole of the Tarim Basin and the neighboring mountainous lands to the southwest.

The total failure of Chinese attempts to recover the lucrative colonies along the Silk Road apparently stimulated them into direct military action against the nearby northeast flank of Tibet. This came precisely at a time when the Tibetans could least afford it, since in the winter of 677 the Tibetan emperor Khri maṅ slon died, and Źaṅ-źuṅ revolted.[31] Only the firm governance of the great leaders of the Mgar clan prevented a serious setback for the Tibetan Empire.

Beginning on January 25, 678, the T'ang government mounted a general levy of men from Kuan-tung, Ho-tung, and other prefectures in order to supply the manpower for this new offensive.[32] After some three weeks of bickering among the

[29] *CTS*, 196a:5223; *HTS*, 216a:6076; *TCTC*, 202:6379-6380, 6383. The lists of places attached include a Fang *chou*, located in the same area.

[30] *CTS*, 5:101; *HTS*, 3:72, 216a:6076; *TCTC*, 202:6379-6380.

[31] For the emperor's death see *OTA*, Mouse year (676-)677 winter; *MD*, ja:70r. *TCTC*, 202:6389, appears to record his death in 679; however, the context makes it clear that this is another instance in which the lack of a past perfect tense form in Chinese can create confusion. The beginning of the entry should read: "The Tibetan *btsanpo* having died. . . ." Thus it records the unofficial Chinese knowledge of the Tibetan emperor's death. The next entry in the *TCTC* is that his son, Khri 'dus sroṅ, succeeded him (Chinese *li*, literally, "was set up [on the throne]"). But this is directly contradicted by the *OTA* account, which states that in the winter of the same year "The emperor, the son Khri 'dus sroṅ, was born in Lhaluṅ in Sgregs." The Źaṅ-źuṅ rebellion is recorded in the *OTA* under the Ox year 677-678. Khri maṅ slon was buried in the Hare year 679-680 (*OTA*). The purpose of the embassy sent to China by Princess Wen-ch'eng late in 679 was to formally announce the death of the ruler. The Chinese then dispatched, on November 24, 679, an envoy to attend the funeral (*TCTC*, 202:6393).

[32] *CTS*, 5:103, 196a:5223; *HTS*, 3:73; *TCTC*, 202:6384.

Chinese generals,[33] Li Ching-hsüan was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the T'ao Ho *tao* Expeditionary Army and Inspector of the Shan *chou* Military-Governorship. Orders were also given to draft troops in Chien-nan and Ho-pei without regard for the social standing of the conscripts.[34]

According to the sources, Li Ching-hsüan's armies reported initial victories over the Tibetans at Lung-chih in Shan *chou* sometime toward the late summer of 678.[35] But on October 3, Li Ching-hsüan's army fought a great battle "across the Koko Nor" with a Tibetan army under the command of Mgar Khri 'bring btsan brod. The Chinese suffered a major defeat. Liu Shen-li, a high-ranking general who was Superior Administrator of the expeditionary army[36] and President of the Board of Works,[37] was captured by the Tibetans.[38] The Assistant Commander-in-Chief, Wang Hsiao-chieh, was also captured.[39] Li Ching-hsüan hastily retreated to Ch'eng-feng Ling (in southwestern K'uo *chou*), but found himself forced into a vulnerable position.[40] Only a nocturnal attack on the Tibetan camp by a suicide squad led by the Korean Hei-ch'ih Ch'ang-chih forced the Tibetan contingent to withdraw; Li was then able to return with the remnants of his army to Shan *chou*.[41]

Although this serious defeat brought about another reevaluation of Chinese policy and strategy toward Tibet, disagreements at the T'ang court prevented any definite actions being taken to change the course already set. One young student from the Imperial Academy remarked at the end of a long analysis of the situation which he delivered at court: "I am afraid that the pacification of Tibet is not something that you can expect to accomplish between dawn and dusk."[42]

In the middle of the following year, P'ei Hsing-chien, who was vice-president of the Board of Civil Office, finally responded to demands from the T'ang emperor and his court that something be done about the continued Tibetan–Western Turkic control of the northern branch of the Silk Road. P'ei proposed to capture the Turks by subterfuge, since direct military action was, in his opinion, impossible. He suggested that Ni-nieh-shih, the son of Pêrôz and therefore the pretender to the Persian throne, be sent back to Persia. While Ni-nieh-shih passed through the land of the Western Turks, P'ei would take advantage of the Persian's diplomatic immunity and catch the Western Turkic qaghan unaware. The plan was approved. P'ei was appointed Envoy for Pacifying the Arabs, and was officially charged with the task of "appointing and setting up [on the throne] the King of Persia."[43]

In the autumn of 679, P'ei Hsing-chien arrived in Qocho under

[33] *HTS*, 3:74; *TCTC*, 202:6384.

[34] *CTS*, 196a:5223; *HTS*, 216a:6077; *TCTC*, 202:6384.

[35] *TCTC*, 202:6385. Ssu-ma Kuang only states that Li memorialized his defeat of the Tibetans. *CTS* (5:103) is more specific; it says that Li memorialized that "the Tibetans entered Lung-chih; Chang Ch'ien-hsü did battle with them—two battles in one day—and beheaded extremely many." According to Satô 1958, 1:329, Lung-chih is to be located in this area of present-day Ch'ing-hai province, 80 *li* (about 28 miles) southeast of Hsi-ning *hsien*.

[36] *TFYK*, 756:4r-5r (pp. 8993-8994). "Superior Administrator" is my translation of R. des Rotours's translation of the title *Ssu-ma*; see his *Traité des fonctionnaires et traité de l'armée* (1974) 1004.

[37] *CTS*, 77:2678; *TCTC*, 202:6385. I suspect that this is a posthumous title, but have been unable to determine this from the sources.

[38] *CTS*, 5:104, 77:2678; *HTS*, 3:74; *TCTC*, 202:6385-6386; *TFYK*, 443:2v-3r (pp. 5254-5255), 756:4r-5r (pp. 8993-8994).

[39] See note 84, below, for Wang Hsiao-chieh. His name is not mentioned in the accounts that directly pertain to this army.

[40] *TCTC*, 202:6385, says he "blocked up a canal [to create a moat] to hold his position." But from the other sources it would seem that he had been trapped, with a canal on one side and the Tibetans holding the ridge above him.

[41] *CTS*, 5:103, 81:2755, 196a:5224; *HTS*, 3:74, 106:4052-4053, 110:4121, 216a:6077; *TCTC*, 202:6385. The Tibetans were under the command of an otherwise unknown general, Pa-ti-she. Liu Shen-li's son Liu I-ts'ung, a model of filial piety, traveled to the Tibetans to ransom his father. When the younger Liu learned that his father was already dead (*CTS*, 77:2678, reports that he died in captivity in 681), he lamented so grievously that the Tibetans pitied him and gave him the body, which he then brought home.

[42] *TCTC*, 202:6387-6388.

[43] *TCTC*, 202:6390-6391; *CTS*, 84:2802-2803; *HTS*, 108:4086-4087; *TFYK*, 366:9r-10v (p. 4355). Cf. Chavannes, 1903:74-75 (n. 3), where the biography of P'ei in the *HTS* is translated and annotated. The diplomatic immunity is nowhere explicitly mentioned in the Chinese sources.

the guise of escorting Ni-nieh-shih back to Persia. Then, invoking the friendships he had made while he was Governor-General of the Pacified West,[44] he gathered a group of local youths and told them he wished to go hunting with them. With this double disguise covering his true purpose, P'ei was able to capture *Arśīla Tu-chih by treachery and then force Li Che-fu to surrender. In the process, P'ei captured the commanders of each of the ten West Turkic tribes as well as the city of Sûyâb in western Central Asia. P'ei then ordered his second in command, Wang Fang-i, to stay and build a fortress at Sûyâb while he returned to the T'ang capital with his prisoners.[45] The Chinese sources laconically report that "the king of Persia was sent to return to his country by himself."[46]

Although this T'ang victory north of the Tien Shan may have had repercussions on the countries of the Tarim Basin, which were nominally under Tibetan control, the Chinese sources make no mention of them. Indeed, nothing in the sources would lead one to believe that anything had changed. The whole affair had taken place outside of the area under Tibetan domination, and no reliable source records anything with respect to Chinese activity in the Tarim Basin countries at the time. Moreover, Tibet is ignored in all of the accounts of the P'ei Hsing-chien expedition insofar as it was known to be allied with the Western Turks and appeared invincible at that time. It seems clear that the Chinese carefully avoided the Tibetans in the Tarim Basin. At the same time, it is apparent that the Tibetans had not yet involved themselves in the affairs of the region to the north of the Tien Shan.[47]

[44] He had been appointed in 665 (*CTS*, 84:2802; *HTS*, 108:4086). *TCTC*, 202:6391, states that he had only been *chang-shih* of Qocho (Chinese, Kao-ch'ang, Hsi *chou*). The gloss says he was appointed in 654.

[45] He returned on November 8, 679, according to *CTS*, 5:105, and *HTS*, 3:75. On the fortress at Sûyâb, see the comments in my article, "The Plan of the City of Peace" (1984b).

[46] *TCTC*, 202:6391-6392. Cf. *CTS*, 84:2802-2803, 185a:4802; *HTS*, 108:4086-4087, 215b:6064.

[47] There has been a certain amount of controversy about this episode. Moriyasu, 1984:15-16, is the most recent to argue that the T'ang recovered the Four Garrisons in 679. In fact, there is a complete absence of Chinese claims to have reconquered—or even to have recaptured by subterfuge—the Four Garrisons of the Pacified West. The sole source which supposedly would support such a claim is an isolated line in the midst of the general account of the Western Turks in the *TFYK* (967:11v [p. 11372]) which states: "First year of the Tiao-lu [period]: Sûyâb, Kucha, Khotan, and Kashgar were made [or 'were taken to be'] the Four Garrisons." Nothing is said to explain this remark in the source itself, and none of the other Chinese sources support it. It should be further pointed out that the statement in question says nothing about a restoration of Chinese rule over those Garrisons. It merely reports that, henceforth, references to "the Four Garrisons" denote the four cities named and exclude other possibilities, such as Agni. (On the changes of the cities of the Four Garrisons, see Chavannes, 1903:113-114.) What is alone clear from the accounts is that P'ei's mission had succeeded in capturing Sûyâb, which at the time had not been considered one of the Four Garrisons. The Chinese then declared that it was one of the Four Garrisons, no doubt so that they could still claim to rule part of their old colony in Central Asia. Although the Tibetans may have been unable or unwilling to exercise too much control over the Tarim Basin cities, it is clear that the Chinese had at that time no effective influence there.

But with the capture of the strategic T'ang fortress of An-jung City on Tibet's eastern border, Tibetan control over the whole of China's western frontier to the south of Qocho was secure.[48]

Immediately after P'ei Hsing-chien's return to China, a serious rebellion broke out among the Eastern Turks,[49] and P'ei was appointed to command the armies sent to suppress it. He was victorious in 680 and 681,[50] but these triumphs were soon dampened by the news that the Western Turks, under *Arśīla Ch'e-pu, had rebelled in the spring of 682.[51] When P'ei died before he could lead an army against this revolt, Wang Fang-i, P'ei's former lieutenant and now the Assistant Protector-General of the Pacified West, took command.[52] He attacked the Western Turks as they were besieging *Köngül City, and defeated them by the Ili River. When the "Three-surnamed" Yen-mien Turks, who had allied

[48] *CTS*, 196a:5224; *HTS*, 216a:6078; *TCTC*, 202:6396. The compilers of these Chinese histories believed that the Tibetans were then in control of the original Four Garrisons, which the historians specifically list.

[49] In late 679 (*TCTC*, 202:6392).

[50] *TCTC*, 202:6393-6394, 6403-6404.

[51] *HTS*, 3:77, *TCTC*, 203:6407.

[52] *CTS*, 5:109, 84:2804-2805; *HTS*, 3:77, 108:4088; *TCTC*, 203:6407.

themselves with Ch'e-pu, counterattacked by the Issyk Kul, Wang repulsed and then vanquished their combined forces. The leaders of both Turkic groups were captured.[53] Thus, the T'ang managed to maintain their domination over the Western Turks to the north of the Tien Shan. But at the end of 682, the remaining Eastern Turks of the *Arśïla royal clan again rebelled, and this time succeeded. The result was the formation of the Second Eastern Turkic Empire, under Elteriś Qaghan.[54]

The expansionist policies of the three major Asian empires were now for a time hindered by serious internal political difficulties. In the winter of 676-677, Khri maṅ slon had died just as his son, Khri ʿdus sroṅ, was being born.[55] A period of uncertainty over the succession lasted until Khri ʿdus sroṅ was confirmed as emperor in the winter of 685-686.[56] In China, the later years of Kao-tsung were marked by intrigues surrounding the imminent succession. When he died at the age of 56 on December 27, 683,[57] his consort Wu Chao came to power, first in the name of Chung-tsung, then in the name of Jui-tsung. As already mentioned, the Arab caliphate was wracked at this time by a major civil war that followed the death of the Umayyad Caliph Yazîd in 683. It was only in 691[58] that the dynasty reestablished its control over most of the Arab Empire. For these reasons, and because the expan-

[53] *CTS*, 5:109; *HTS*, 3:77, 111:4135 (this source adds the title *cur* to Ch'e-pu's name *TCTC*, 203:6409.

[54] *TCTC*, 203:6412.

[55] *OTA*, Mouse year (676-)677 winter; *MD*, ja:70r. The name ʿdus is also spelled ʿdu.

[56] *OTA*, Bird year (685-)686 winter.

[57] *TCTC*, 203:6416. It is interesting to note that his illness was treated by a court physician who was, according to his name, most probably a Greek. The emperor complained that he could not see, so the doctor suggested that, if he could "lance the head to remove [extra] blood, he could cure [him]." After the operation, which was performed over the objections of the empress, Kao-tsung exclaimed: "My eyes seem to be clear!" (*TCTC*, 203:6415.) See the discussion of Greek medicine in T'ang China in my paper, "The Introduction of Greek Medicine into Tibet in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries" (1979) 297-302, n. 6.

[58] Shaban, 1970:44.

sionist Mgar clan ministers effectively wielded Tibetan political power, Tibet's grip on eastern Central Asia remained relatively unchallenged until the late 680s, when Wu Chao firmly established herself in power in China.

With the exception of several minor raids on the Chinese border to the east,[59] however, the Tibetans appear to have remained relatively uninvolved in foreign military adventures for several years. Finally, in 685, the T'ang strategists decided to attack Tibet from the north. On December 2, 685, Wei Tai-chia, the President of the Board of Civil Office, was appointed commander-in-chief of an expeditionary army sent to attack Tibet, apparently by way of the Western Turks.[60] This army never left China, however. The only action taken by the Chinese authorities seems to have been the appointment of Yüan Ch'ing, a son of *Arśïla Mi-she, the Hsing-hsi-wang Qaghan, as a general and Protector of K'un-ling. Thus he was charged with controlling (on China's behalf) the five *Tarduś tribes which had been under his father.[61] Unfortunately, no more is said about Yüan Ch'ing's activities, if there were any.[62] But it is notable that the geographic area affected by Yüan Ch'ing's appointment was the same—except the cities—as that supposedly recovered six years earlier by P'ei Hsing-chien and three years earlier by Wang Fang-i. Chinese power in Central Asia, even to the north of the Tien Shan, was hardly as firm as the Chinese historians would have us believe.

[59] Their only recorded military action in 680 was a raid on Ho-yüan in which Hei-ch'ih Ch'ang-chih succeeded in driving them off. (*TCTC*, 202:6395; Ssu-ma Kuang shows in his *K'ao-i* that the accounts in the other sources are mistaken.) In the summer of 681, Hei-ch'ih Ch'ang-chih defeated a Tibetan army led by Tsan-p'o and Su-ho-kuei at Liang-fei Ch'uan. (Incidentally, one may suspect this name to be a calque of a Tibetanized one, as was discussed in the case of Ta-fei Ch'uan.) The Chinese captured the Tibetans' supplies and returned. (*CTS*, 196a:5224; *HTS*, 216a:6078; *TCTC*, 202:6401.) The accounts of both the Ho-yüan and the Liang-fei Ch'uan episodes need further examination because of the confusion in the sources between them on the one hand and the accounts of Li Ching-hsüan's defeat on the other.

[60] *TCTC*, 203:6435.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Cf. Chavannes, 1903:281.

Also in 685, the Tibetan Prime Minister, Mgar Btsan sña ldombu, died, apparently from meddling in the imperial succession. His brother, Mgar Khri 'briṅ btsan brod, was appointed to replace him, and thus the succession of Khri 'dus sroṅ as emperor was assured.[63] After eight years of internal strife, Tibet could now address its external problems.

Early in 686, Mgar planned to lead an army into Turkistan,[64] but was delayed until the following year. Meanwhile, the T'ang government went on with its effort to reassert control over the Western Turks. In the autumn of 686, they appointed *Khusraw (also known as the Pu-li *śad*), a son of the Western Turk *Arśïla Pu-chen, the Chi-wang-chüeh Qaghan, as the general authorized to inherit the five Nu-shih-pi tribes that his father had ruled.[65]

In early 687, Mgar invaded the "Turkic country of Guzan," in other words, the kingdom of Kucha. It is clear from the Tibetan sources that from this point on he remained outside of Tibet.[66] Wu Chao's reaction to the news of this invasion was to again appoint Wei Tai-chia as a general, this time as Commander-in-Chief of the An-hsi ("Parthia") *tao* Expeditionary Army.[67] This campaign was canceled, however, as was (after trenchant criticism) another she proposed at the end of the year.[68] But in the following year, China finally took action against Tibet. On May 28, 689, Wei Tai-chia was again ordered to be Commander-in-Chief of the An-hsi *tao* Expeditionary Army.[69] The army must have left immediately after it was mustered, for it arrived during the seventh lunar month (July 22 to August 30) of 689 in the vicinity of *Köngül, north of the Tien Shan. In that month, a great battle with the Tibetans took place by the Yin-chih-chia River, southwest of *Köngül, and the T'ang army suffered a severe defeat. The remnants of the army, further diminished by bad weather and supply problems, retreated back to Qocho. Punishment from the T'ang court was swift. Wei was demoted, and Yen Wen-ku, his Assistant Commander-in-Chief and the Great Protector of the Pacified West, was decapitated. T'ang Hsiu-ching, who was the Assistant Protector of the Pacified West and had organized the army's retreat, was rewarded with the appointment as Governor-General of Qocho.[70]

The victorious Tibetan army under the command of Mgar Khri 'briṅ returned to Tibet in the latter part of the year.[71] It would seem indisputable that the Tibetans had reconfirmed their mastery of the northern Tarim Basin region—at least in the area from *Köngül to Kucha—and had done it without permitting a single Chinese army to penetrate their territories. But not all was well. The T'ang presence in Sûyâb and Qocho continued to pose a serious threat to any real Tibetan expansion into the region north of the Tien Shan. In addition, it is probable that the Tibetans, like the contemporaneous Arabs, had great difficulty in holding on to the new conquests. This was due in part to their inability to keep the same army—made up of independent-minded warriors—mobilized for long without mutinous thoughts arising among the rank and file. Moreover, leaders such as Mgar Khri 'briṅ had to worry about maintaining their power

[63] *OTA*, Bird year 685-686 (no season given). Cf. Satô, 1958:342-344.

[64] *OTA*, Dog year 686(-687) before summer. Cf. Moriyasu, 1984:16-17.

[65] *TCTC*, 203:6441. Cf. Chavannes, 1903:4, 76, 281. The T'ang strategists thus employed the same method they had used in the previous year with Yüan Ch'ing and the Eastern Turks. *Khusraw (Chosroes) apparently lies behind the Chinese transcription Hu-se-lo. The name is Persian, not Turkic.

[66] *OTA*, Pig year 687(-688) before winter; cf. Moriyasu, 1984:17-18. On the equivalence of the name Guzan with one of the many names for Kucha, see P. Pelliot, "À propos des Comans" (1920) 181; cf. Moriyasu, 1984:17, 65 (n. 84).

[67] On January 10, 688 (*HTS*, 4:86; *TCTC*, 204:6446 gloss, *K'ao-i* quotation of a *Shih-lu* passage).

[68] *TCTC*, 204:6456. The famous minister Ch'en Tzu-ang opposed the latter plan in a long argument he presented to the throne. In it, he states: "The nation has recently abandoned the Pacified North, withdrawn from the Shan-yü [Protectorate Generalship], discarded Kucha, and let Kashgar go . . ." (*TCTC*, 204:6456). In other words, Ch'en argues, having just been defeated on the northern and western fronts, and with problems at home—he mentions a famine in Shantung, among other things—it would have been disastrous to mobilize a weak China against the stronger Turks and Tibetans.

[69] *CTS*, 6:120; *HTS*, 196a:5224; *TCTC*, 204:6457.

[70] *CTS*, 6:120, 196a:5224; *HTS*, 4:88, 216a:6078; *TCTC*, 204:6459. *HTS*, 111:4149, states that he was made Governor-General of Ling *chou*.

[71] *OTA*, Ox year 689-690 before the winter assembly.

at court during a prolonged absence on campaign. Such constraints were important factors in the subsequent development of the Tibetan Empire.

Late in the year 690, Wu Chao, who had been the de facto Chinese ruler since the death of Kao-tsung, officially usurped the throne. First she was proclaimed by a Buddhist monk to be an incarnation of the "future Buddha" Maitreya and the ruler of the "Jambudvîpa of the present age," China.[72] Then she changed the name of the dynasty to Chou, that dynasty of kings who had reigned during the great age of Classical China.[73] Finally, she was made *Huang-ti* ("Emperor").[74] With her control over the court complete, she was now able to turn her attention to the pressing matter of the state of China's imperium.

Fortunately for the Chinese expansionists, the political situation within Tibet was beginning to show signs of strain. The new emperor, Khri ʿdus sroṅ, was now old enough to want greater personal control of the Tibetan government, the administration of which had rested for decades in the hands of the powerful Mgar clan. One after another, Khri ʿdus sroṅ began eliminating the less powerful of these belligerent rivals.[75] Obviously, such internal discord could only lead to disaster for Tibetan colonialism in Central Asia.

Thus, towards the end of 690 the political situation in Central Asia began to favor the Chinese again. The Eastern Turks under Elteriś Qaghan are said to have repeatedly raided and robbed the On oq. *Khusraw, the Chi-wang-chüeh Qaghan who was also the Chinese-appointed Protector-General of Meng-ch'ih (based apparently in Sûyâb),[76] led sixty or seventy thousand Western

[72] *TCTC*, 204:6466; cf. *CHC*, 3:311.

[73] *TCTC*, 204:6047.

[74] Cf. R. Guisso, *Wu Tse-t'ien and the Politics of Legitimation in T'ang China* (1978); *CHC*, 3:305 et seq. She had many names and honorific titles. The sources indicate she was called "Emperor" (Chinese, *ti*) during her reign. Although she is better known by her posthumous name, Empress Wu Tse-t'ien, I prefer to follow her own intentions and also to give her credit for her accomplishment; thus I call her "Emperor Wu."

[75] See Satô, 1958:362-372.

[76] See Chavannes, "Notes additionnelles sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux" (1904) 26.

Turks into Chinese-controlled territory. Accordingly, he was rewarded with appointment as Great Protecting General of the Right, and was titled Chieh-chung-shih-chu Qaghan.[77]

In the middle of 691, the T'ang organized an army to attack the Tibetans on their nearer, eastern flank toward Wu-wei. But the army was recalled before it reached Wu-wei,[78] and there matters rested until the beginning of 692. By that time, it was probably obvious that the Tibetans were not prepared to fight off a concerted attack of any kind.[79] Moreover, local rebellions against Tibetan rule made Chinese intervention seem opportune. For these reasons, perhaps, the T'ang now appointed Hsia, the son of Yüch'ih Fu-she Hsiung (the former king of Khotan who apparently died in China), as the new king of Khotan. This "Hsia" was evidently the famous King Vijâya Sangrâma "the Lion," although at this point he was but seven years old.[80]

The extent of the turmoil within the Tibetan realm became more obvious when, on Tibet's eastern border with China, a large group of subject Tanguts submitted to the Chinese on February 25, 692.[81] That summer, a Tibetan leader known as Ho-su attempted to defect with a large group of followers from Kuei Ch'uan. Ho-su's plans were discovered and he was arrested. Notwithstanding, another Tibetan, leading eight thousand Ch'iang tribesmen (Tibetan subjects), went over to the Chinese army at the Ta-tu River. It is possible that the subsequent meeting of the Tibetan Mdosmad assembly in Rgyam śigar and the seizure of certain Sumpas was connected with these defections.[82]

[77] *TCTC*, 204:6469.

[78] *CTS*, 6:121, 196a:5225; *HTS*, 4:91; *TCTC*, 204:6475.

[79] *HTS*, 111:4148; *TCTC*, 204:6487.

[80] *TCTC*, 205:6477; cf. R. Emmerick, *Tibetan Texts Concerning Khotan* (1967) 52-53. When he reached manhood, he campaigned against "the Turks." Later, in penance for this, he built the *vihâra* of ʿGuźan. One wonders if this means that he was involved in otherwise unknown campaigns against the Turks of the Śâhî dynasty of Kabul in the region of Guṣân, i.e., Kushan.

[81] *TCTC*, 205:6482; cf. *CTS*, 198-5292, and *HTS*, 221a:6216, which both state that 200,000 households submitted.

[82] *OTA*, Dragon year 692-693 winter assembly of Mdosmad; *CTS*,

With the news of this Tibetan weakness, T'ang Hsiu-ching, who was the Governor-General of Qocho, urged Wu Chao to retake the Four Garrisons, which then included Kucha, Khotan, Kashgar, and Sûyâb.[83] She responded by appointing Wang Hsiao-chieh[84] as Commander-in-Chief of the Wu-wei *tao* Expeditionary Army. In this capacity, he led T'ang Hsiu-ching and the Turkic general *Arśïla Chung-chieh against the Tibetans.[85] On December 9, 692, according to the extremely laconic report in the Chinese sources, Wang defeated the Tibetans and recovered the Four Garrisons.[86] The sources are so unexpectedly brief and undetailed that, in view of the great attention usually afforded to victories, one can seriously doubt that any major battles occurred in 692.

Nonetheless, it is clear that Wang's appointment to the Wu-wei *tao* Expeditionary Army indicates that originally the campaign probably had the very modest but strategically crucial objective of securing the nearer section of the route to the West. Wang's apparent success in this venture then allowed him to retake virtually unhindered the fortified cities of the Tarim Basin.[87] He moved the Protector Generalship of the Pacified West back to Kucha from Qocho, and stationed an army there to garrison it. Thus ended the first period of Tibet's colonial domination of the countries of the Tarim Basin: through Tibetan internal collapse.

196a-5225; *TCTC*, 205:6482. Cf. *HTS*, 216a-6078, which confuses the account somewhat, and contains numerous variant characters. The *OTA* mentions the seizure of Śochigs or "the *śochigs*" of the Sumpas.

[83] Sûyâb, the only one still under Chinese control, had replaced Agni as one of the official Four in 679. See note 47, above.

[84] Wang was a Chinese general who had been captured and held by the Tibetans in the campaign of 678, in which he served as the Assistant Commander-in-Chief. He is reported to have been treated very well by his captors (*TCTC*, 205:6487). See above, note 39.

[85] *HTS*, 216a:6078; *TCTC*, 205:6487.

[86] *CTS*, 6:123, 196a:5225, *HTS*, 4:93, 216a:6078; *TCTC*, 205:6487-6488; *TFYK*, 358:8r (p. 4243).

[87] It would seem, however, that Khotan was not yet recovered. See below, Chapter Three.

Chapter 3

THE ARABS AND WESTERN TURKS

The Chinese recapture of the Tarim Basin countries came as quite a surprise to both Tibet and China. In China, it was not even agreed that the renewal of military domination in the West was a good thing. Nonetheless, it seems that the logic expressed in a lengthy opinion favoring the retention of the Four Garrisons prevailed. This opinion, which is preserved in the *Hsin T'ang shu*, recalls the long history of Chinese adventurism in the region, and warns about the danger to Ho-hsi, the Circuit "West of the Yellow River," if the Garrisons were abandoned.[1]

It is quite possible that Tibetan unpreparedness was due as much to a policy conflict at court as to the ongoing power struggle between the Mgar clan and the emperor. Nevertheless, far from losing more power as a result of the T'ang victory, the Mgar family seems to have been temporarily strengthened by it. Even the pacifists at court would not have intended to lose such a profitable colonial territory, and perhaps even the emperor saw the advantage of retaining the militarily experienced Mgar clan lead-

[1] *HTS*, 216a:6078-6079.

Chapter 4

THE TÜRGIŚ ALLIANCE

It is testimony to the actual weakness of the T'ang, in comparison with their self-portrait in the dynastic histories, that they could not seriously alter the course of events in central Eurasia during the eighth century. In the end, the proud Chinese had to silently accept the fact of equality with their neighbors.[1] On an official plane, of course, none of the great powers of the early Middle Ages publicly accepted equal or subservient status to another great power. All of them seem to have maintained a confident and aggressive stance down to their last days. But it is equally true that a fairly stable balance of power—on a continentwide scale—was finally established in 715. The only problem with this momentous development was that none of the major powers, in particular the Chinese, accepted this state of affairs. Nor did the Türgiś confederation of Western Turks, who were, geographically, in the middle of everything.

Shortly after their defeat of the Türgiś,[2] the Eastern Turks

[1] Cf. M. Rossabi, ed., *China among Equals* (1983).

[2] The Qara Türgiś, the "Black Bone" half of the confederation, suffered

withdrew homeward. Very quickly, the scattered tribes of the Türgiś were reorganized and unified by one of the greatest of all the early Turkic leaders. The Chinese transcribed his name "Su-lu," but to the Arabs he was known as Abû Muzâḥim, the "Father of Competition, because he competed with the Arabs."[3] By 715, he had restored stability in his country and felt confident enough to send an embassy to the Chinese emperor, who, in turn, bestowed two titles on him.[4] Apart from these niceties, the embassy had a more serious message: the new Türgiś ruler notified the T'ang that his "hordes amounted to 200,000." "Consequently," the Chinese sources add, "he had taken forcible possession of the West."[5]

In 716, while the Tibetans continued their raids on China's eastern border,[6] Qapaghan Qaghan led the Eastern Turks north on a campaign of devastation into the lands of the Bayarqu tribes; he was completely victorious. On his way back, however, he was so overconfident that he was easily ambushed and killed by some of the very tribesmen he had just beaten.[7] As a result of this un-

a particularly devastating loss, according to the Old Turkic inscriptions, which speak of them several times. Theoretically, they constituted only one-half of the tribes, but they were the dominant half for nearly twenty-five years after about 715. It is important to recall that both *Ocïrlïq and *Saqal belonged to the "Yellow Bone" branch. It would seem that the authors of the Old Turkic inscriptions—engraved long after the fact—confused the two branches. Tekin (1968:269-270) has taken Qara to mean "common."

[3] Ṭabarî, ii:1593.

[4] It appears that before 718 he was awarded the fairly ordinary titles of Great General of the Military Guards of the Right and Governor-General. This can be deduced from the sources relating the events of 718, in which he is called by those titles while being presented with more impressive-sounding ones. See *TCTC*, 211:6714, 212:6733; *TFYK*, 964:13v (p. 11343); *CTS*, 194b:5191; *HTS*, 215b:6067. Cf. Chavannes, 1903:308, 1904:35-37. He also seems to have received the title Shun kuo *kung* in 718.

[5] *TCTC*, 211:6714.

[6] *HTS*, 5:125; *TCTC*, 211:6716.

[7] *CTS*, 8:176; *HTS*, 5:126; *TCTC*, 211:6719. The Bayarqu presented the qaghan's head to a Chinese then visiting the Eastern Turks. He returned home with it to Ch'ang-an. In true "medieval" fashion, the head was hung up above a broad thoroughfare where everyone could see it.

expected turn of events, the T'ieh-le tribes of Bayarqu, Uyghur, Hsi, and P'u-ku[8] all "surrendered" to the T'ang. The impact on Eastern Turkic dynastic affairs was even more dramatic. Kül Tegin killed Qapaghan Qaghan's son and erstwhile successor, the "Little Qaghan," along with every member of his family except the aged counselor Toñuquq. He then placed on the Eastern Turkic throne his older brother, the "Little Śad," known under the name Bilgä Qaghan, "the Wise Qaghan."[9] The Eastern Turks immediately sent envoys to China requesting peace.[10] Absorbed in their internal affairs, they were relegated to a passive role in the struggle among the great powers for control of Central Asia.

As a consequence of this weakening of their main enemy, the strength and confidence of Su-lu and the Türgiś increased rapidly. In the late summer of 716, according to Ssu-ma Kuang, he declared himself qaghan.[11] Su-lu was well on his way to reestablishing the predominance of the Türgiś in the West.[12] By the summer of 717, the Türgiś had regained much of their former strength. One Chinese report of May 717 claimed that, although the Türgiś were still sending tribute, they were using the tribute missions as a pretext for spying out the border. In June, *Arśïla Hsien, the On oq Qaghan, requested permission from the T'ang to lead an army of the subject Qarluq Turks to attack the resurgent Türgiś. The emperor Hsüan-tsung refused his request.[13] The Chinese seemed determined to maintain a posture of neutrality in this intra-Turkic struggle. In July 717, Hsüan-tsung declined to accept presents brought by a Türgiś envoy. This was the early medieval method of refusing to establish diplomatic relations.[14] But if the emperor or his advisers were expecting some

[8] Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours* (1955) 2n, has reconstructed the name as "*Buqut" or "*Buqu."

[9] *CTS*, 8:176; *HTS*, 5:125; *TCTC*, 211:6719.

[10] *HTS*, 5:126; *TCTC*, 212:6731.

[11] During the eighth month (August 22–September 20) (*TCTC*, 211:6720).

[12] See Shaban, 1970:98-99.

[13] *TCTC*, 211:6727.

[14] *TFYK*, 971:2v (p. 11405). Cf. Chavannes, 1904:33-34.

Türgiś move, they were as yet unwilling to prepare any offensive military response.

On the Tibetan front, however, Hsüan-tsung's government began a major diplomatic offensive at this time. On July 10, 717, Su-fu-she-li-chih-li-ni, the king of Balûr, was awarded by official decree the title "King of Balûr."[15] Innocuous though it may sound, this indicated formal T'ang acceptance of Balûr as a state within the Chinese *oikouménê*, and thus deserving of protection. Technically it was not yet considered part of the T'ang empire. But a clear message was sent to Tibet: the Chinese intended to supplant them as the dominant power in the region of the Karakorum, Pamir, and Hindu Kush ranges.[16]

Meanwhile, the Arabs also mounted a diplomatic offensive. In 717, the caliphal seat passed to ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz. One of his first actions was to send a declaration to the kings of Transoxiana, asking them to embrace Islam as equals of the Arabs.[17] As might have been expected, the response was fairly positive among peoples who had been strongly influenced by the Arabs or who were under their rule. It seems quite likely that the Tibetans, who were included among the princes of Transoxiana, also received the Arab proposal. In the same year, a delegation of Tibetans visited the new governor of Khurasan, al-Ǵarrâḥ b. ʿAbd Allâh al-Ḥakamî: "Envoys of Tibet called on him, asking him to

[15] *TFYK*, 964:13r-13v (p. 11343). Cf. Chavannes, 1903:199-200, where the folio number is incorrectly given as "12r°." *HTS*, 221b:6251, specifies that he was the king of Great Balûr.

[16] Moriyasu, 1984:28-30, discusses at length the extent of Tibetan influence in the area. But it is difficult to draw any conclusions due to the extreme paucity of material. For instance, whether or not the Chinese had troops in the mountains south of Ferghana is essentially unknown. One thing is clear, however. Although most of the area was not under the direct rule of any major power, Tibetan armies had for years passed freely through it. It was only under Hsüan-tsung, and in fact only after the Arab-Tibetan-Türgiś alliance of 717 failed to capture the Tarim Basin from the T'ang, that the Chinese began to enlarge their influence in the area.

[17] Balâdhurî, 426. Shaban, 1970:86-87, details the concrete benefits which Muslims had but non-Muslims did not, and the general policies of the Arab government which were behind his proposal.

send them someone who would explain Islam to them; so he sent to them al-Salîṭ b. ʿAbd Allâh al-Ḥanafî,[18] and he sent ʿAbd Allâh b. Maʿmar [b. Samîr] al-Yaśkurî[19] [with an army] to Transoxiana . . ."[20] Al-Yaśkurî led his troops "to Transoxiana, and he penetrated deeply into the lands of the enemy—and these [lands] were [located] at the entrance of China."[21]

The Chinese sources confirm the Arabic accounts. On or about August 15, 717, a Türgiś-led allied army of Tibetans, Arabs, and Türgiś laid siege to Aksu and Üc-Turfan, both on the northern edge of the Tarim Basin. In response, the Chinese colonial governor, Assistant Grand Protector-General of the Pacified West T'ang Chia-hui, ordered *Arśïla Hsien, the Western Turkic qaghan, to lead the "three-surnamed Qarluqs" in an attack on the besieging forces. The T'ang army, which was composed exclusively of ethnic Turks, drove off the allies.[22] The Arabs under al-

[18] He seems to be otherwise unknown, but was obviously a proponent of the Hanafite school. See D. Dunlop, "Arab Relations with Tibet in the 8th and Early 9th Centuries A.D." (1973) 306 et seq., on the cultural implications of this Islamic mission in Tibet.

[19] In spite of Shaban's contention (1970:86), this is not the same person as the ʿAbd Allâh b. Maʿmar al-Yaśkurî who was killed earlier during a revolt in Ǵurǵân at the time of the governorship of Yazîd b. al-Muhallab. (A priori, it would have been rather strange for al-Ǵarrâḥ to entrust such an expedition to one of Yazîd's men, especially after he had just locked them all up.) Rather, this was no doubt ʿAbd Allâh b. Maʿmar b. Samîr al-Yaśkurî, one of the Arab military leaders in Transoxiana. He is also mentioned in Ṭabarî under 82 A.H./A.D. 701-702 and 112 A.H./A.D. 730-731 (ii:1078, 1538).

[20] Yaʿqûbî, ii:302.

[21] Balâdhurî, 426.

[22] *TCTC*, 211:6728. The information is contained in a memorial to the throne by T'ang Chia-hui, so the events probably occurred slightly before the date given here. In his memorial, T'ang claimed that the Türgiś planned to capture the Four Garrisons, and he gives that reason for mobilizing his army of subjugated Qarluqs without advance permission from Ch'ang-an. The *Old Tibetan Annals* may hint at preparations for this campaign, or for the simultaneous one in the northeast (see below). In 692, 717, and 721 the Mdosmad assembly was held in Rgyam śigar. In each of these three years, the Western Turks conducted major campaigns; in two of them, the Chinese sources mention Tibetan involvement. Significantly, it would seem, the third coincided with Tibetan activity in the area of the Pamir and Hindu Kush mountains.

Yaśkurî escaped back to Islamic territory, and made their way to Tashkent.[23] At exactly the same time, a Tibetan army was severely defeated at the "Bends of the Yellow River" by Kuo Chih-yün, the Military Governor of Lung-yu.[24] So ended what appears to have been a well-coordinated but premature Tibetan effort at the reconquest of the Tarim Basin.

In the following three years, the T'ang diplomatic offensive began to succeed. A host of peoples from Arab-dominated Khurasan sent embassies to China requesting help against the Arabs: in 718, Maimargh and Samarkand; in 719, Kumidh, Samarkand again, and Bukhara, among others.[25] The Yabghu of Ṭukhâristân and the Nîzak, the king of Kâpiśa,[26] also sent embassies in the same year. In 720, other countries, including Wakhan, Udyâna, Khuttal, Chitral, Kashmir, Zâbulistân, and South Hindustan,[27] sent missions to the court at Ch'ang-an.[28]

With regard to the Türgiś, the T'ang resorted to the traditional Chinese ploy of granting official titles; in this way, they could both mollify the Turks and gain some sort of influence at their court. In 718, Su-lu was enfeoffed as the Duke of Shun-kuo ("Duke who obeys the nation" or "Duke of the Obedient Country"), and was appointed Grand Imperial Commissioner over Chin-fang *tao*.[29] As a symbol of having entered into official relations with China on an inferior-to-superior basis, he was given, among other things, a "fish-bag," which contained half of a metal

[23] Balâdhurî, 426; Yaʿqûbî, ii:302.

[24] *HTS*, 5:126; *TCTC*, 211:6728; *TFYK*, 434:9v-10r (p. 5158).

[25] *TCTC*, 212:6735. Their petitions are translated in Chavannes, 1903:203-205. The king of Bukhara's petition specifically requests the T'ang emperor to order the Türgiś to come to his aid and destroy the Arabs (p. 203). The same request was made later (in 727) by the Yabghu of Ṭukhâristân (pp. 206-207).

[26] Chinese, Ko-p'i-shih. See Chavannes, 1904:40, and J. Harmatta, "Late Bactrian Inscriptions" (1969) 406 et seq.

[27] *CTS*, 8:181. Chinese, Nan T'ien-chu. Because T'ien-chu referred to what is now northern India, I have rendered it into English as Hindustan.

[28] *TCTC*, 212:6740; Chavannes, 1904:34-45.

[29] Chin-fang *tao* can be loosely translated "Northern Road" or "Northern Circuit."

fish, the other half of which was kept at the T'ang court.[30] Su-lu responded with a "tribute-mission" in 719,[31] and was rewarded at the end of the year with the bestowal of the title of Chung-shun Qaghan, the qaghan "who is loyal and obedient."[32] Nevertheless, the Türgiś still went ahead with their effort to reestablish their rule over the western lands that were not under direct Arab control. Thus, despite their improved relations with China, they took Sûyâb from the T'ang in 719.[33] Simultaneously, they began to pose as the protectors of the lands of Khurasan against the Arabs. The petition of the king of Bukhara, presented at the Chinese court in the same year, requested the Türgiś qaghan to assist the Transoxanians militarily in their struggle with the Arabs.[34] Although the T'ang dynasty was then at its height, and the ambitious Hsüan-tsung had numerous armies at his disposal, the emperor contented himself with awarding the princes various honorary titles and politely encouraging but empty diplomas. A combination of this reluctance to commit troops and, perhaps, anger at the retaking of Sûyâb resulted in no support from Ch'ang-an for a Türgiś alliance. Additional reasons for Hsüan-tsung's inaction may have been the distance involved or even the beginnings of the Arab-Chinese alliance against the Türgiś, which only became openly known in the following decade.

Yet there was at this time some cooperation between the Yabghu of Ṭukhâristân and the T'ang generals of the Four Garrisons, at least according to a petition from the Yabghu's younger brother *Arśïla Tegin *Boghra, who was formerly a Tibetan-supported Western Turkic qaghan, to Hsüan-tsung. This petition, which was presented on December 13, 718, reads in part: "Our country's borders adjoin [those of the] Arabs and Tibetans,

[30] *TCTC*, 212:6733; *TFYK*, 964:14r (p. 11343). Cf. Chavannes, 1904:36 (nn. 3-4). On the Tibetans' refusal of the fish-bag, see below.

[31] *TFYK*, 971:3r (p. 11400). Cf. Chavannes, 1904:37.

[32] *TCTC*, 212:6737; *TFYK*, 964:14v (p. 11343). Cf. Chavannes, 1904:42.

[33] Chavannes, 1903:113-114.

[34] *TFYK*, 999:14v-15v (pp. 11721-11722); *TCTC*, 212:6735. Cf. Chavannes, 1903:203-204. The king of Kumidh listed Ṭukhâristân, Bukhara, Tashkent, and Ferghana as under Arab control (p. 204).

and [on] our eastern border are the [T'ang's] western garrisons. Whenever *Boghra's elder brother levies the tribes he sends out military forces to punish [the enemies]. As for discussing striking the [Arab and Tibetan] bandits, he and the Chinese generals are well informed, and they express support and respond to each other. This is the reason that robbery has been prevented on the frontier."[35] Evidently, the Tibetans were passing through Little Balûr, and no doubt Wakhan, on their way to raid the Four Garrisons.[36] In *Boghra's view, in other words, Ṭukhâristân was a strategic country as far as the security and further expansion of China's Central Asian possessions were concerned. It was therefore important for the T'ang to maintain good relations with Ṭukhâristân if the Chinese were serious about breaking Tibetan power in the Pamirs. But, although the Chinese had intervened in Ferghana as recently as 715, and would march into Balûr in 722, they remained militarily quiescent. Apparently intervention in Khurasan proper was not thought by T'ang strategists to be in Chinese interests.

The Tibetan position in the Pamirs was now so compromised by the rash of political defections to the Chinese that a serious conflict between them was practically inevitable. In 720, the T'ang bestowed titles on the kings of Udyâna, Khuttal, and Chitral, supposedly as rewards for preventing the Arabs from invading the Chinese colonial empire in the Tarim region.[37] In the same year, the king of South Hindustan requested Hsüan-tsung to order him to attack the Arabs and Tibetans.[38] Evidently, the threat of the Tibetan-Arab alliance, which was still in effect in 720, was felt even deep in northern India. But even more seriously felt by the Tibetans was the Chinese threat to their one secure route to the West. After Tibetan requests for peace in 716, 718, and 719[39]

[35] *TFYK*, 999:14v-15v (pp. 11721-11722). The entire text is translated and discussed in Chavannes, 1903:200-202.

[36] *HTS*, 216a:6083.

[37] *TFYK*, 964:14v (p. 11343). Cf. Chavannes, 1904:42-43.

[38] *TFYK*, 973:13v (p. 11433) et seq. Cf. Chavannes, 1904:44.

[39] On the mission of 718, see Moriyasu, 1984:30-33, especially with regard to the letter of Mes ag tshoms to Hsüan-tsung, which is preserved in

were brushed aside by Hsüan-tsung, the Tibetans ended up at war with China over the lower Pamirs.

In the face of T'ang intransigence, it appears that the Tibetans continued their quiet alliance with the Eastern Turks. In 720, an envoy from Bilgä Qaghan arrived at the Tibetan court.[40] That winter, the Turks foiled a T'ang-inspired plot to overthrow their qaghan. In the process, they besieged Pei-t'ing and defeated and enslaved the Basmïl Turks. They then went on to raid Kan *chou* and Liang *chou*, defeating the Military Governor of Ho-hsi and robbing the Ch'i-pi Turkic tribes which were settled there.[41] It is unknown if Tibetans were involved in this affair, but in the winter of 720-721 they captured a "Chinese fort" called "Sog-soṅ."[42] The outcome of this struggle was a stalemate between the Eastern Turks and the Chinese. In early 721, Bilgä Qaghan sent an envoy to the T'ang court to request peace. Although no formal agreement came out of this embassy, Hsüan-tsung at least admitted in a letter the mutual benefits of trade between the two nations:

TFYK, 981:6v-8r (pp. 11526-11527). In this extremely polite letter, the Tibetan ruler states that he would break ties with the Eastern Turks if the T'ang would resume peaceful relations. The letter was very clearly intended to assuage the ancient Chinese fear of an alliance between Tibet and the nomadic power in Mongolia, which would cut China off from the West. It is difficult, however, to suggest that there was ever much of a relationship between the Tibetans and Eastern Turks when the evidence consists only of this letter and a few other references. On the mission of 719, see *TCTC*, 211:6720, 212:6734, 212:6736. There were at least seven embassies sent to China between the Chin-ch'eng Princess's request to renew the treaty and Hsüan-tsung's eventual grudging acceptance of the Tibetan peace proposal of 730. The long letter from Mes ag tshoms to Hsüan-tsung (see the translation in Pelliot, 1961:98-99) points out that the Sino-Tibetan border conflicts were due to incursions by China, not Tibet.

[40] *OTA*, Monkey year 720(-721) before the summer assembly.

[41] *CTS*, 8:181; *HTS*, 5:128; *TCTC*, 212:6742-6743.

[42] *OTA*, Monkey year (720-)721 winter. Sog-soṅ is otherwise unknown. But, since *Sog* is the Old Tibetan short form (or etymologized singular) of the name Sogdag (Sogdians), it is possible that the Tibetan campaign referred to in the *Annals* was connected with the revolt of the "Six Sogdian Prefectures" that began in 721. It is, however, hard to imagine the Tibetans in the Ordos (see Map I) at this time. See *TCTC*, 212:6745 et seq.

"Our country buys Turkic sheep and horses, Turks receive our country's silks. Both sides are abundantly supplied."[43]

In 720, just as the Tibetans were on the brink of open conflict with the Chinese in the Pamirs, there was a change in Arab colonial policy. In that year, the caliph ʿUmar II was succeeded by Yazîd b. ʿAbd al-Malik, a representative of the expansionist faction among the Umayyads. His new governor for Khurasan, Saʿîd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz, first continued the relatively mild policies of his predecessors. Then, in the spring of 721, a Türgiś army led by Kül Cur entered Sogdiana in support of a rebellion by a group of nobles who had renounced Islam.[44] The Turks had advanced as far as Qaṣr al-Bâhilî, which was located on the route to Samarkand,[45] when Saʿîd finally felt threatened enough to lead an army against them. The result was an Arab victory. But Saʿîd neglected to follow up on this triumph, and his army was soon after easily defeated by the Türgiś in a classic maneuver: "[The Turks] were lying in ambush, and the horses of the Muslims came into their view, so they attacked them; the Turks withdrew, and made [the Arabs] follow them until they passed the ambush; [the Turks] came out against them, and the Muslims were routed."[46] Thenceforth, Saʿîd was impotent in the face of the Turks. He was able only to maintain himself near Samarkand, where he watched and waited until the Turks retired.[47]

When news of the open revolt of such a large number of Sogdian nobles and merchants reached Damascus, the Umayyad government saw no alternative to forceful military action in order to maintain its grip on Transoxiana. A new governor, Saʿîd b. ʿAmr al-Ḥaraśî, was sent to replace Saʿîd b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz. The new governor sent on to Khurasan as his temporary surrogate, al-Muǵaśśir b. Muzâḥim al-Sulamî, was a military leader who had long complained about Arab softness on the Sogdians. The Arabs now seemed prepared to reassert their authority.

[43] *TCTC*, 212:6744.

[44] Ṭabarî, ii:1421, 1428, 1430. Gibb, 1923:61-62; Shaban, 1970:99-101.

[45] Ṭabarî, ii:1421.

[46] Ṭabarî, ii:1428.

[47] Cf. Gibb, 1923:61.

Forewarned, the rebels decided to take immediate action.[48] In the fall of 721, they sent envoys to "the king of Ferghana, Aluṭâr, asking him to help them, and lodge them in his city." Alutâr, who, it may be recalled, had once been enthroned jointly by the Arabs and Tibetans (and later fled from the Chinese), agreed.[49] So, after rejecting all offers of reconciliation from Ghûrak, the king of Samarkand and, by force of circumstance, an Arab ally, the rebels left their countries and fled to Ferghana:[50] "And Kârzang and Ġalang left with the people of Qiyy, and Abâr b. Makhnûn and Thâbit with the people of Iśtîkhan; and the people of Bayârkath left, and the people of Sabaskath, with a thousand men, on them belts of gold, along with the lords of Buzmâġan; and the Dîwâśtîġ[51] left with the people of Bunġîkath to the castle of Abghar, and Kârzang and the people of al-Sughd entered Khuġanda."[52] The Sogdian rebels now thought they were safe from Arab retaliation.

When al-Ḥaraśî's army arrived at Khuġanda in the spring of 722, however, Aluṭâr betrayed the Sogdians to the Muslims, and, after a short struggle, Kârzang surrendered.[53] But, having accepted the surrender, the treacherous al-Ḥaraśî then had the captives murdered—between three and seven thousand nobles and commoners. Only the merchants were spared,[54] for "with them was immense wealth which they had brought from China."[55] The savage massacre was a terrifying lesson to the non-Muslims of

[48] Cf. Shaban, 1970:101.

[49] Ṭabarî, ii:1440. It is unknown when he regained the throne after the events of December 715. See Appendix E.

[50] Ṭabarî, ii:1139-1140. Cf. Gibb, 1923:62; Shaban, 1970:101.

[51] Ṭabarî (ii:1446, with variants among the manuscripts) spells it Dîwâśtî and notes: "It is said that Dîwâśtî was the *dihqân* of the people of Samarkand, and his name was Dîwâśnġ [i.e., Dîwâśtiġ, for Dêvastic], but they Arabicized it Dîwâśnî."

[52] Ṭabarî, ii:1441. Most of the proper names are unknown to me, and not all are pointed in the text. The vowels presumed to be missing are here given as short *a* in all cases.

[53] Ṭabarî, ii:1444.

[54] Ṭabarî, ii:1445.

[55] Ṭabarî, ii:1445-1446.

Transoxiana. "Thâbit Quṭna said, recalling those fallen from among the nobles:"

> The eye delighted in the death of Kârzang,
> and Kaśśîn, and that which Bayâr suffered,
> And the Dîwâśnî, and that which Ġalang suffered,
> at the castle of Khuġanda when they were ruined and perished.[56]

Notwithstanding the thoroughness of the massacre, a number of Sogdians somehow escaped the fate of their countrymen. Some even made their way to the Türgiś lands, where they organized a special corps of Sogdian exiles within the Türgiś armies. Thereafter, these expatriates particularly distinguished themselves in the fight against the Muslims.[57]

While the Arabs were completing their subjugation of the rest of Sogdiana, the Tibetans—perhaps in response to requests from "many envoys from the Western Regions"[58]—occupied the region of Little Balûr. Mo-chin-mang, the king, escaped to Chinese territory, where he pleaded with the Military Governor of Pei-t'ing, Chang Hsiao-sung: "Balûr is T'ang's western gate. If Balûr is lost, all of the Western Regions will be Tibetan!"[59] Chang agreed. He sent a combined army of four thousand Chinese and foreign troops under the command of Chang Ssu-li, the Assistant Commissioner of Kashgar, to join the army of Little Balûr in a counterattack to be led by King Mo-chin-mang. On October 29, 722,[60] they attacked and routed the Tibetan army, killing and capturing "several ten-thousands of men" according to the Chinese account.[61] After this setback in Little Balûr, the Tibetans did not undertake military campaigns in the West for several years.[62]

[56] Ṭabarî, ii:1446.

[57] Gibb, 1923:63.

[58] *OTA*, Bird year 721(-722) summer. On the term "Western Regions" (Old Tibetan, *stod-phyogs*), see Appendix B.

[59] *TCTC*, 212:6752.

[60] *HTS*, 5:129; *TCTC*, 212:6752.

[61] *TCTC*, 212:6752.

[62] *TFYK*, 358:10v-11r (pp. 4244-4245); *TCTC*, 212:6752. It appears

Within two years the Arabs also suffered a major defeat in Central Asia, in a battle known as "the Day of Thirst."[63] After an unsuccessful campaign in 723, in which Arab armies were pushed back across the Oxus by a Türgiś army, and after a moderately successful campaign in 724,[64] Muslim b. Sa'îd al-Kilâbî, the governor of Khurasan, decided upon a major operation. He led an army into Ferghana, besieged "its capital,"[65] cut down the trees, and otherwise devastated the countryside.[66] But when a Türgiś army led by the qaghan approached,[67] the Arabs fled in headlong

from Hui Ch'ao's account (in *WWTCKC*) of his trip to India that the split of Balûr into Greater and Lesser parts was due to Tibetan pressure. This pressure, which is referred to in other accounts, was the Tibetan insistence on using Balûr as a passageway to the Tarim Basin (cf. *HTS*, 221b:6251) and to Ṭukhâristân and Transoxiana. Thus it is not clear that the T'ang victory denied Tibet access to the West. (Cf. Moriyasu, 1984:33-34). An example of this may be drawn from the following incident. In the summer of 723, the Chin-ch'eng Princess wrote to Chandrâpîda, the king of Kashmir, to ask for asylum. Instead of consulting with the king of Little Balûr, who was both a close neighbor and a Chinese ally, Chandrâpîda wrote to the Tegin, the ruler of Zâbulistân (1500 *li* distant from Kashmir), to ask if he would support Kashmir militarily against the Tibetans. The Tegin assented, but then dispatched an envoy to the T'ang court requesting advice. In the tenth month (October 22–November 20) of 724, Hsüan-tsung approved of what they had done. (See *TFYK*, 979:7v-8r [p. 11501], translated in Chavannes, 1903:205-206.) But nothing concrete seems to have come of this. It would thus appear that Tibet was still a power to be reckoned with in the area north of Kashmir, and so Tibetans and their allies continued to move unchecked through the same area after the Chinese victory. (Cf. Moriyasu, 1984:37.)

[63] Arabic, *yawm al-'aṭaś*. Ṭabarî, ii:1480.

[64] Ṭabarî, ii:1462 et seq. Cf. Gibb, 1923:64-65.

[65] Presumably, "its capital" (Arabic, *madînatihâ*, lit. "its city") was in a part of Ferghana that was not then under Arab control. According to Ibn Khurdâdhbih, 207-208, "the city of Ferghana" was another name for Akhsîkath, which was located on the north bank of the Jaxartes (see G. Le Strange, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* [1966] 477.) Akhsîkath is said to have been the capital and one of the six or seven major cities of the country (Chavannes, 1903:148). Hui Ch'ao observed that in his day Ferghana was divided into two parts: the north, which was allied with the Türgiś, and the south, which had submitted to the Arabs (*WWTCKC*, 978).

[66] Balâdhurî, 428.

[67] Ṭabarî, ii:1478; Balâdhurî, 428. Gibb, 1923:66, states: "According to the Arab tradition, the Türgesh armies were led on this occasion not by Sulu himself, but by one of his sons." Gibb's idea that the armies were led by a son of the qaghan apparently derives from a passage in Ṭabarî (ii:1479) which reports "a son of Khâqân followed them." Most likely the qaghan was simply accompanied by his son on the campaign.

retreat—constantly harried by the Turks—only to find their escape barred by the forces of Tashkent and Ferghana. The Arabs fought frantically. Some managed to cut their way out and escape to Arab-held Khuǵanda.[68] This battle marked a turning point in the conflict over control of Transoxiana. The Türgiś were now unquestionably predominant, and the Arabs were on the defensive.[69]

Further to the East, 724 saw the appointment of a particularly odious T'ang military governor over the Pacified West: Tu Hsien.[70] He had recently proved his resourcefulness by tricking the Türgiś and escaping when pursued by them.[71] Now he was appointed Assistant Grand Protector-General of the Pacified West and Military Governor of the lands West of the Desert.[72] Tu's first action was to discover a purported plot by Yü-ch'ih T'iao, the king of Khotan, to rebel along with "the Turks and various Westerners."[73] He promptly captured and decapitated the king, killed some fifty of his adherents, and installed another king in his place.[74]

[68] Ṭabarî, ii:1478 et seq. Cf. Gibb, 1923:65-66.

[69] Cf. Gibb, 1923:65-66; Shaban, 1970:106-107.

[70] *CTS*, 98:3076, remarks that Tu "was in *An-hsi* for four years." This is true only if his year(s) as *chien ch'a yü shih*, during which he traveled to the Pacified West, are counted.

[71] In 723? *TCTC*, 212:6758, gives no date. According to *CTS*, 98:3076, and *HTS*, 126:4421, this happened much earlier, in 716. All these sources agree, however, that the Turks tried to bribe him, and that, through some deception, he avoided taking the bribe.

[72] On April 2, 724. *CTS*, 8:190; *TCTC*, 212:6758. The coappointment is not mentioned in *CTS*, 98:3076, or *HTS*, 126:4421.

[73] "Westerners" here translates Chinese, *Hu*.

[74] *CTS*, 98:3076; *HTS*, 126:4421; *TCTC*, 212:6769. Cf. Chavannes, 1903:82n; Moriyasu, 1984:34. A more precise date than 725 is not given. The origin of this plot, which sounds phony, may have been Tu Hsien himself, who needed a justification for the plundering and subjugation of semi-independent Khotan.

Tu Hsien's arbitrary and oppressive policies were again manifested in the fall of 726 at the T'ang's official international market at Kucha.[75] Türgiś Qaghan Su-lu's T'ang consort, who was of royal Turkic blood, sent an envoy with a thousand horses to trade at the market. The Türgiś envoy is said to have proselytized "the princess's religion"[76] before Tu Hsien, whose anger was aroused: "How dare an *Arśïla woman proselytize me!"[77] He had the envoy severely beaten and locked up; neglected during a snowstorm, the horses died. Unperturbed, Tu then departed for the Eastern Capital, Loyang.[78] Later Chinese historians laud Tu Hsien as one of those few governors of the Pacified West since its reconquest in 692 who "had good administrations and were praised by the people."[79] He was especially favored by Hsüan-tsung, and when he died the emperor grieved for him.[80] But the consequences of his harsh and high-handed rule were soon to appear.

Not coincidentally, another Chinese official was establishing a similar reputation in the eastern regions of China's colonial empire at about the same time. Wang Chün-ch'o, a native of Ch'ang-lo *hsien* in Kua *chou*, had first made his name as a tough warrier under Kuo Chih-yün, the Military Governor of Ho-hsi and Lung-yu. When Kuo died in 721, Wang succeeded him,[81] and in a short time managed to antagonize the subjugated tribes of

[75] Chinese, *hu shih*, lit. "mutual market."

[76] The consort was the Chiao-ho Princess, a daughter of the Chinese-supported On oq qaghan, *Arśïla Huai-tao. Her religion is not mentioned, but was almost certainly Buddhism, the dominant faith of the Western Turks by the early seventh century.

[77] *TCTC*, 213:6775.

[78] *CTS*, 194b:5191; *HTS*, 215b:6067; *TCTC*, 213:6775. Cf. Chavannes, 1903:81-82. Both of Tu's official biographies (*CTS*, 98:3075-3077; *HTS*, 126:4420-4422) omit this outrageous incident. In Loyang, Tu was appointed a chief minister of the Secretariat-Chancellery on October 14, 726 (*CTS*, 8:190; *HTS*, 5:132; *TCTC*, 213:6773). Cf. *CHC*, 3:390 et seq., on Tu's official career. Loyang was the functioning capital from late 724 to late 727 (*CHC*, 3:388-392).

[79] *CTS*, 98:3076; *TCTC*, 213:6773.

[80] *CTS*, 98:3077; *HTS*, 126:4422. He died in 740, when he was over sixty.

[81] *CTS*, 103:3190-3191; *HTS*, 133:4545-4547; *TCTC*, 212:6747.

Uyghur, Ch'i-pi, Ssu-chieh, and Hun which lived in his jurisdiction between Kan *chou* and Liang *chou*.[82] Among other things, he seems to have slandered Ch'eng-tsung, the leader of the Uyghurs, and then caused his death.[83] His arrogant and aggressive colonialism could not fail to gain favor for him at Hsüan-tsung's court.

About this time, the perennial debate over Tibet again surfaced at the T'ang court. In response to Hsüan-tsung's complaint that the Tibetans used "enemy-country protocol,"[84] Chang Yüeh, the President of the Board of War declared: "The Tibetans are discourteous; we really ought to punish the aliens.[85] But our troops have been deployed for over ten years, and [the mobilized border prefectures of] Kan, Liang, Ho, and Shan cannot bear their distress. Although the army sometimes wins victories, what is gained does not make up for what is lost. I have heard that they [the Tibetans] have acknowledged their errors and seek peace; I would hope that we can accept their desire to submit, in order to relieve our people on the frontiers."[86] When Hsüan-tsung said that he would discuss the matter with Wang Chün-ch'o, Chang took leave of the emperor. On his way out, he is said to have remarked to an associate: "Chün-ch'o is brave but does not have [the ability to] plan; he usually counts on luck. If the two countries were to make peace,[87] how could he [ever] be a success?

[82] *CTS*, 103:3192; *HTS*, 133:4547; *TCTC*, 213:6779.

[83] *CTS*, 103:3120; *HTS*, 133:4547, 217a:6114; *TCTC*, 213:6779.

[84] Chinese, *ti kuo li* (*TCTC*, 213:6776). See also earlier, in 714 (*TCTC*, 211:6706). In other words, the Tibetans had referred to China in official discourse as the equal, not the superior, of Tibet. In early medieval theory, this was indeed a diplomatic affront. But the emperor's faction at court seems to have deliberately pounced on it as the justification for a war against Tibet. Chang Yüeh was appointed President of the Board of War and "third *ad hominem* chief minister" in 721 (*CTS*, 8:182, 97:3053; *HTS*, 5:128; cf. *CHC*, 3:376 et seq.). Chang was active in Buddhist circles and, by T'ang standards, can be considered a pacifist.

[85] "Aliens" here translates Chinese, *i*, a generic, slightly pejorative, and somewhat literary term for foreigners during the T'ang period.

[86] *CTS*, 97:3055, 196a:5229; *TCTC*, 213:6776. Chang seems to be referring to the Tibetan peace initiatives of 716, 718 and 719. See note 39, above.

[87] Chinese, *ho hao* (*CTS*, 196a:5229). *TCTC*, 213:6776, has the expres-

[Therefore,] what I said will certainly not be [accepted and] put into practice!"[88] True to Chang's prediction, Wang advised the emperor to invade Tibet.[89] But, due either to their superior military intelligence[90] or simply to coincidence, the Tibetans attacked first.

In the winter of 726-727, an army led by Stag sgra khoṅ lod raided Ta-tou Valley,[91] attacked Kan *chou*, burned its outlying villages,[92] and retreated. Immediately, Wang Chün-ch'o and his army advanced with the hope of surprising the Tibetan rear. As the Tibetan troops withdrew to the Ta-fei River (Jima Gol) along a road to the west of Wang's Chi-shih Army, however, a heavy snowfall intervened, and great numbers of wounded Tibetans fell victim to the cold. Wang and his assistant generals pursued, but were unable to overtake the Tibetans until they reached the western shores of the Koko Nor. To the Tibetans' dismay, however, Wang had secretly sent men ahead to burn the grass in the area, so many Tibetan horses died. Just as Stag sgra's army had almost completed crossing the Ta-fei River, Wang and his troops, who had traversed the frozen Koko Nor, attacked. Wang captured those Tibetans who were stranded on the near bank of the river, and also took the Tibetan baggage and supply train, which included some ten thousand sheep and horses.[93] For this less-than-heroic victory, Wang Chün-ch'o was personally feted by Hsüan-

sion *ho ch'in*, which in T'ang histories normally means "marriage peace." This seems to be an error, since the Tibetan emperor still had a living T'ang consort.

[88] *CTS*, 196a:5229; *TCTC*, 213:6776.

[89] *CTS*, 196a:5229; *HTS*, 216a:6083; *TCTC*, 213:6776.

[90] See the comments of Po Chü-i in a memorial submitted in 810 (*TCTC*, 238:7673): "I have heard that the Uyghurs and Tibetans both have spies. As for Chinese affairs, trifling or great, they know everything."

[91] Chinese, *Ta-tou Ku*, "Big Dipper Valley." *HTS*, 133:4547, has *Ta-tou-pa Ku*.

[92] Chinese, *shih li* in *CTS*, 103:3191, 196a:5229. *HTS*, 216a:6083, has *hsiang chü*. Pelliot, 1961:17, 99, translates both as "villages." *TCTC*, 213:6776, says only "they burned and robbed, and then left."

[93] *CTS*, 8:190, 196a:5229; *HTS*, 5:132, 216a:6083; *TCTC*, 213:6776; *TFYK*, 358:11r-11v (p. 4245), 384:19v (p. 4571).

tsung, who gave him gifts and bestowed titles on him, his wife, and his father. The elated emperor even enfeoffed Wang and his wife, he as Earl of Chin-ch'ang *hsien*, she as Lady of Wu-wei *chün*.[94]

In the autumn of 727, however, the inexorable law of karmic retribution (as the Buddhists might say) manifested itself. At the end of that summer, Mes ag tshoms had himself gone to ʿAźa for the campaign against China.[95] On September 27, Tibetan armies led by the generals Stag sgra khoṅ lod and Cog ro Maṅporje attacked and captured the Chinese fortified city[96] of Kua *chou*. They took Wang Chün-ch'o's father and the prefect T'ien Yüan-hsien prisoner and plundered the city of its food stores and military supplies.[97] Although unmentioned by the Chinese sources, they also took a vast quantity of silk: "The many riches of the Chinese being taken out to the Western Regions, after having been amassed in Kua *chou*, were all confiscated by the Tibetans, who thereby once again found great wealth. Even the ordinary people joined in covering themselves with good Chinese silks."[98]

The Tibetans then turned to attack the Jade Gate[99] Army 200 *li* west of Su *chou*.[100] During this offensive, they captured a number of Buddhist monks,[101] and then released them, sending them back to Liang *chou* to chastise Wang Chün-ch'o. They reportedly said to him: "General, you have always wanted to avenge the na-

[94] *CTS*, 103:3191; *HTS*, 133:4547; *TFYK*, 384:19v (p. 4571).

[95] *OTA*, Hare year 727(-728) summer; *OTC*, vii.

[96] *TCTC*, 213:6778. *CTS*, 103:3191, has T'ien Jen-hsien.

[97] The *OTC* account says that the Tibetans "overthrew the Chinese walled city of Kua *chou*." "Walled city" = Tibetan, *mkhar*, the equivalent of Chinese, *ch'eng*, and Arabic, *madîna*. The Old Tibetan verb *phab*, which usually means "conquered" or "subjugated," literally means "threw down," and is translated here as "overthrew." The Chinese sources (*CTS*, 99:3094, 196a:5229; *HTS*, 216a:6083; *TCTC*, 213:6779) attest to the Tibetan destruction of the city walls.

[98] *OTC*, vii.

[99] Chinese, Yü-men *chün*.

[100] *TCTC*, 213:6778 gloss. 200 *li* is about 66 miles. The attack seems to have been unsuccessful (*HTS*, 216a:6083). Cf. P. Demiéville, *Le Concile de Lhasa* (1952) 294-295.

[101] *CTS*, 103:3191; *TCTC*, 213:6778.

tion with your patriotism and courage. Why not go out for just one battle today?"[102] Wang, having heard that his father had been captured, "ascended the city wall, looked westward, and wept: he did not really dare to send out the army."[103]

Meanwhile, Cog ro Mañporje led a detachment to besiege Ch'ang-lo *hsien* in Kua *chou*, but failed to capture it.[104] The combined Tibetan forces then turned west to Kucha,[105] where, together with the Türgiś under Su-lu,[106] they raided throughout the region.[107] Finally, they laid siege to the city of Kucha itself.[108] The siege lasted quite a long time. Chao I-chen, the Assistant Protector-General of the Pacified West, made one attempt to break the siege, but he was easily driven back.[109] Free of concern about more of such attacks, the besiegers took the opportunity to thoroughly plunder the neighboring territories of the Four Garrisons. They opened granary stores, terrorized the local inhabitants, and seized their animals. Only Kucha City, with Chao I-chen's forces bottled up inside, withstood them. As the Chinese chronicles remark, "the Pacified West was barely held."[110]

Before their attack on Kua *chou*, the Tibetans had sent a letter to Bilgä Qaghan of the Eastern Turks, asking if he would like to join the raid. Instead of politely declining the invitation—what one might have expected—Bilgä Qaghan sent the letter to the

[102] *CTS*, 103:3191; *HTS*, 133:4547; *TCTC*, 213:6778; *TFYK*, 453:21r (p. 5374). As usual, the quotations differ from source to source, and there is no way to tell which is more correct.

[103] *CTS*, 103:3191; *HTS*, 133:4547; *TCTC*, 213:6778.

[104] *CTS*, 103:3192-3193; *HTS*, 133:4548; *TCTC*, 213:6778.

[105] *HTS*, 216a:6083.

[106] *CTS*, 8:191; *HTS*, 215b:6067; *TCTC*, 213:6779. Su-lu sought revenge for Tu Hsien's maltreatment of his trade envoy in 726.

[107] *CTS*, 194b:5191; *HTS*, 215b:6067. The correct sequence of events is only made clear from a reading of all the sources; no single account gives the complete story. *TCTC*, 213:6775-6776, misdates Su-lu's campaign by including it in the year-end catchall for 726. Cf. Moriyasu, 1984:34-35.

[108] *TCTC*, 213:6779. The attack is recorded under October 20, 727, but it is uncertain if this date refers to the event itself.

[109] *HTS*, 215b:6067, is the only account that explicitly mentions Chao's attack; it may, however, be inferred from the other sources.

[110] *CTS*, 194b:5191; *HTS*, 215b:6067; *TCTC*, 213:6776. Tu Hsien had left Chao I-chen in charge when he was called to court.

T'ang court, where it arrived on October 6, 727.[111] Hsüan-tsung was of course delighted, and then granted the Turk's request to trade horses—for silk and other commodities, no doubt—at Hsi Shou-hsiang City.[112] So ended Tibetan–Eastern Turkic amity.

While the Tibetans were on campaign at Kucha, the partisans of the murdered Uyghur leader Ch'eng-tsung set out to avenge their fallen chief. They killed Wang Chün-ch'o,[113] and then fled to Tibet.[114] The hatred for Wang among the Uyghurs and Tibetans—and even by the T'ang historians of the day—can still be sensed in the normally dry Chinese chronicles. But when Hsüan-tsung heard about Wang's death, he felt extremely sorry, and bestowed high posthumous honors on him.[115]

Meanwhile, the Tibetan-Türgiś siege of Kucha continued until, with the onset of winter, the Tibetans and Türgiś were forced to withdraw. The campaign and siege had lasted eighty days.[116] This was not, however, an utter disaster. The solidification of the Tibetan-Türgiś alliance on the battlefields of Central Asia was a most important event. The T'ang government remained confused. Expecting further Tibetan attacks, it had mobilized armies in Lung-yu *tao* and Ho-hsi *tao*. Then, when winter arrived without the Tibetans, the Chinese canceled the mobilization. But on January 26, 728, they were surprised by "the spying thralls" sweeping in to raid.[117] No doubt, this foray was prefatory to the Tibetan raid on Kucha, which is reported under February 19, 728. Nothing is known about this raid except that Chao I-chen apparently repulsed the raiders.[118]

[111] *CTS*, 8:191; *TCTC*, 213:6779; *TFYK*, 999:25r (p. 11727).

[112] *CTS*, 194a:5177; *HTS*, 215b:6053; *TCTC*, 213:6779.

[113] Dated November 9, 727, in *CTS*, 8:191, and *HTS*, 5:133.

[114] *CTS*, 103:3192; *HTS*, 117a:6114, 133:4547. *TCTC*, 213:6780, has them fleeing to the Turks.

[115] *CTS*, 103:3192; *HTS*, 133:4547-4548.

[116] *CTS*, 196a:5229.

[117] *TCTC*, 213:6781. The term here translated as "thralls" is *lu*, which literally means "captive" or "slave." It was the strongest T'ang pejorative word for "foreigner." The word *fan* in T'ang usage was the ordinary neutral or polite word for "foreigner," "foreign country," "abroad," and so forth.

[118] *CTS*, 8:192; *HTS*, 5:133; *TCTC*, 213:6791.

At this point, a major rebellion broke out in southern China,[119] and for several months the Chinese chroniclers' attention was apparently drawn away from the West.[120] Indeed, the next information that is given is the account of another Tibetan raid on Kua *chou*, which was led by a general Hsi-mo-lang in the autumn of 728.[121] This time, the raid backfired. The raiding party was driven off by the prefect Chang Shou-kuei,[122] and was subsequently attacked in K'o-po Valley by Hsiao Sung, Military Governor of Ho-hsi, and Chang Chung-liang, Military Governor of Lung-yu and Governor-General of Shan *chou*. From there, the victorious Chinese pursued the Tibetans to "their Ta-mo-men City,"[123] which they captured, along with over 1,000 prisoners, 1,000 horses, 500 yaks, and a great quantity of armaments and supplies. After burning Tibet's Camel Bridge,[124] the Chinese forces returned home completely victorious.[125] In the following month, Tibetan misfortunes compounded. While on a raid at Chi-lien City, (near Kan *chou*), they were overwhelmed by an army led by an assistant general of Hsiao Sung.[126] Hsüan-tsung himself claimed credit for planning the strategy which his armies used in this engagement.[127]

In April of 729, the Tibetans suffered two more serious defeats in the northeast. Chang Shou-kuei and Chia Shih-shun, the perfect of Kua *chou*, attacked "the Tibetan Ta-t'ung Army" and

[119] *CTS*, 8:192; 5:133; *TCTC*, 213:6781.

[120] *TCTC*, 213:6781-6782. The rebellion was suppressed with the usual brutality by the end of the year. The executions and tortures are described fairly explicitly in *TCTC*, 213:6783.

[121] The raid is dated to the seventh lunar month, i.e., August 10–September 7, 728.

[122] *CTS*, 8:192, 196a:5230; *HTS*, 5:133, 216a:6084; *TCTC*, 213:6782.

[123] Literally, "Great Desert-Gate City." For its location, see Satô, 1978:110 et seq.

[124] Chinese, *lo-t'o*, which is identified with the Tibetan place, Rag-tag. See Petech, 1967:253, and Chapter Six, below, under the events of 745.

[125] *CTS*, 8:192, 99:3094, 196a:5230; *HTS*, 5:133, 216a:6084; *TCTC*, 213:6782.

[126] *CTS*, 99:3094; *TCTC*, 213:6782-6783; *TFYK*, 986:22r (p. 11585).

[127] *CTS*, 196a:5230.

claimed a victory.[128] Then, later in the month, Li Wei, the Prince of Hsin-an and the Military Governor of Shuo-fang, attacked the Tibetan fortress of Shih-pao City,[129] captured it, and established a T'ang garrison there.[130] Upon hearing this news, Hsüan-tsung bestowed the name "Chen-wu Army" on the garrison.[131] Later in 729, the string of Tibetan defeats came to an end. That summer, the *Annals* records a Tibetan victory over the T'ang at a place called Mu le cu le; many Chinese were killed.[132] Nothing more is known about the battle, but it was certainly a great victory, for immediately afterward a T'ang envoy, Li Tsoṅ-kan—"Commander-in-Chief Li"[133]—did obeisance at the imperial court at Brag mar in Central Tibet.[134]

Nevertheless, the picture obtained from the official Chinese accounts is of a Tibet reeling from the blows dealt by China. In

[128] In the third month (April 3–May 2). *TFYK*, 986:22r-22v (p. 11585). The Tibetan name for this army is unknown.

[129] Previously a T'ang establishment, according to *TCTC*, 213:6784.

[130] *CTS*, 8:193, 76:2652, 196a:5230; *HTS*, 80:3568, 216a:6084; *TCTC*, 213:6784; *TFYK*, 986:22v-23r (p. 11585-11586), 369:9v-10r (p. 4387).

[131] *TCTC*, 213:6784. *Chen-wu* may be loosely translated as "Awe-inspiring." The name was also used in the Ordos region.

[132] *OTA*, Snake year 729(-730) summer.

[133] Old Tibetan *Tsoṅ kan* transcribes Chinese *tsung-kuan*, the well-known title here translated as "Commander-in-Chief."

[134] *OTA*, Snake year (729-)730 winter. That Li is called a "Chinese envoy" means that he was undoubtedly not the defeated general. As Petech (1967:263) has suggested, it would seem that this Li was none other than the Li Wei who had recently captured the fortress of Shih-pao. Li returned to Ch'ang-an before October 21, 729 (*TCTC*, 213:6787). According to *TCTC*, 213:6780, on November 30, 727, "the Grand General of the Chin-wu Guards of the Left, Wei the Prince of Hsin-an, was appointed Assistant Grand Military Governor, etc., of Shuo-fang." (Note that during this period the full [non-Assistant] Grand Military Governorships were held by high-ranking imperial princes who stayed at the capital [*TCTC*, 213:6777]; at this time, the Grand Military Governor of Shuo-fang was Chün, Prince of Chung [*CTS*, 8:191].) Li Wei replaced Hsiao Sung, who was appointed to the corresponding position in Ho-hsi. For Li's other titles, see his biographies (*CTS*, 76:2651-2652; *HTS*, 80:3567-3568). Unfortunately, no mention of a journey to the Tibetan court is made in the Chinese sources dealing with Li's career.

truth, the Chinese armies were quite modest in size, and, despite the number of military clashes, there were no major confrontations between the Chinese and the Tibetans. The only evidence which the Chinese sources adduce to prove a Tibetan decline is the claim that a Chinese spy had been sent to slander Stag sgra khoṅ lod, whom the Tibetans then executed. The loss of this general allegedly "somewhat weakened" Tibet.[135] It is therefore not surprising to read that a Tibetan envoy arrived at the border in the summer of 730 to request peace.[136] After a certain amount of discussion, Hsüan-tsung agreed. Ambassadors shuttled between the capitals, presents were exchanged, grandiose speeches were made, and the affair was settled by the end of the year.[137] The Great Minister Ming-hsi-lieh,[138] the Tibetan envoy dispatched to Ch'ang-an to complete the formalities, was an experienced diplomat, could speak and read Chinese, and so was not fooled by Hsüan-tsung's attempts to have him accept the symbols of Chinese sovereignty.[139] The two nations remained separate and equal, even in Chinese eyes.[140]

At about the same time, the Türgiś joined the peace process. In 730, they too sent an envoy, Yeh-chih A-pu-ssu,[141] to the

[135] *CTS*, 196a:5229; *HTS*, 216a:6083; *TCTC*, 213:6781. This happened after the Tibetan capture of Kua *chou*. *OTA*, Dragon year (728-)729 winter, records Stag sgra khoṅ lod's disgrace.

[136] *TCTC*, 213:6789, says Tibet sent him "to the border." He is called a *nang ku*, and his letter is preserved in *HTS*, 216a:6084, where it is explained that "a *nang ku* is like an official [with the wealth] of a thousand [head of] cattle."

[137] *CTS*, 8:196, 196a:5230-5231; *HTS*, 5:135, 216a:6084-6085; *TCTC*, 213:6790-6791. A treaty inscription was erected at Ch'ih-ling in about 733 (*TCTC*, 213:6800).

[138] He is probably the *lun* (Tibetan, *blon*, "minister") Mang-je, or *Maṅ bźer, of the envoy's letter. He was not the great minister because, according to the *OTA*, 'Bro Chuṅ bzaṅ 'or maṅ was appointed to that position in the Dragon year (728-)729 winter, and served until at least the Pig year (747-)748 winter, where a break occurs in the *Annals* manuscript.

[139] *CTS*, 8:196, 196a:5230-5231; *HTS*, 5:135, 216a:6084-6085. *TCTC*, 213:6791, has an incomplete and inaccurate version.

[140] On these events and their implications, see the important short article by H. Richardson, "Ming-si-lie and the Fish-Bag" (1970).

[141] His name is given only in *HTS*, 215b:6067, and *TFYK*, 975:9v (p. 11452). Czeglédy has reconstructed this name as *Abuz. See K. Czeglédy, "Gardizi on the History of Central Asia (746-780 A.D.)" (1973) 266 (n. 26).

T'ang court. His mission was ostensibly to complain about their treatment at the hands of Tu Hsien. But, since the embassy was given fairly high honors, it is probable that its actual purpose was to mollify the Chinese after the latest Türgiś raids on the Pacified West.[142] Peace was then concluded between the T'ang and the Türgiś.[143] The reason for this apparently sudden Türgiś move, and for the unexpectedly quick and easy peace accord between the T'ang and the Tibetans, is the subject of the next chapter.

[142] As they had once before (in 718), the Türgiś accepted the fish-bag, the symbol of submission to the T'ang. See *TFYK*, 975:9v (p. 11452), where the aberrant date would seem to be a mistake. This is due, possibly, to the attachment at some time of this entry to the entry on Tu Hsien (also under the sixth month of 729) in the *Shih-lu*.

[143] *CTS*, 194b:5191.

There were also major internal problems in Tibet, and in 755 they came to the attention of the Chinese. At the very beginning of the year, Stag-sgra, a "prince of the Sumpa,"[208] abandoned Tibet and surrendered to the T'ang.[209] More seriously, the emperor Khri lde gtsug brtsan (Mes ag tshoms) was murdered during a revolt led by the great ministers 'Bal Skyes bzaṅ ldoṅ tsab and Laṅmyes Gzigs. Sroṅ lde brtsan, the crown prince, was sorely beset, and could not be enthroned. This rebellion had serious implications for the next two decades of internal political development in Tibet.[210] Meanwhile, China seemed nearly invincible.

Then, on December 16, 755,[211] the Turco-Sogdian military governor An Lu-shan rebelled against the T'ang and shook "all under Heaven."[212]

with Hsüan-tsung in 753 (Demiéville, 1952:180-181). According to Chang, 1980:76, they were seated in the second highest position, after the Arabs.

[208] Chinese, Su-p'i.

[209] *HTS*, 216a:6087; *TCTC*, 217:6929. Defections such as this were regular occurrences during times of political disturbance in the Tibetan Empire.

[210] For more on this rebellion, see Beckwith, 1983.

[211] *TCTC*, 217:6934. Cf. Des Rotours, 1962:167.

[212] *CTS*, 104:3213; *HTS*, 135:4570; *TCTC*, 216:6916. These three sources quote a conversation between An Lu-shan and his bitter enemy Qośu Khan that took place prior to the rebellion in the presence of Hsüan-tsung. Trying to placate Qośu, An said: "My father was an Indo-European, my mother a Turk; your father was a Turk, your mother an Indo-European." Qośu Khan's father was indeed a Türgiś. (Cf. Des Rotours, 1962:1-2.) In An Lu-shan's case, the word *hu* ("Indo-European, especially Sogdian") almost certainly identifies him as a Sogdian because his surname (An), although inherited from his stepfather, was commonly used to refer to natives of Bukhara. (Nothing is known for certain about his natural father.) *Hu* did not mean just "Serindian" during the T'ang period, but anyone of Indo-European race no matter where they were born (p. 1 [n. 3]).

Chapter 6

THE LATE EMPIRE

The mighty T'ang Empire, which had made the Western Regions tremble and which had tried to "swallow the peoples of the four directions"[1] was now itself shaken, its powerful armies shattered one by one.[2] The "Brilliant Emperor," Hsüan-tsung, could not control his anger when his attempts to personally direct the campaign against An Lu-shan's rebels led to the slaughter of his troops. For their failures, he executed two of his most experienced generals, Feng Ch'ang-ch'ing and Kao Hsien-chih. Qośu Khan, recalled with his seasoned troops from the Tibetan border, replaced them at the strategic T'ung Pass, just east of Ch'ang-an. Despite overwhelming advice from his generals to the contrary, Hsüan-tsung and his chief minister ordered Qośu to attack. As predicted, the T'ang army was totally crushed; even Qośu Khan was captured.[3] The rebels poured through the pass on the way to

[1] *TCTC*, 216:6889.

[2] For a more detailed account of these events, see *CHC*, 3:453-461. The description therein is based on the *CTS*, *HTS*, and *TCTC* versions.

[3] CTS, 104:3213-3215; *HTS*, 135:4571-4574. Cf. *CHC*, 3:457, 459-460. He was executed by An Lu-shan late in 757 (*TCTC*, 220:7041).

Ch'ang-an, and Hsüan-tsung and his coterie fled. On the second day of the flight (July 16, 756), the imperial party encountered a Tibetan embassy of about two dozen men at Ma-wei Station. The emperor's bodyguard slaughtered the hapless Tibetans, and, after accusing Yang Kuo-chung (Hsüan-tsung's chief minister) of collaborating with them, killed him and many of his accompanying family members as well. Even when they demanded the execution of the emperor's consort, Yang Kuei-fei, Hsüan-tsung acquiesced. She was strangled on the spot.[4] After some discussion, it was decided that the emperor would continue his flight to Sze-chuan, while the heir apparent would go with a small force to Ling-wu in the far northwest to organize resistance against the rebels.[5] Once at Ling-wu, the crown prince usurped the throne. On hearing the news a month later, Hsüan-tsung surrendered the imperial regalia, which he had held for almost forty-five years, to the new emperor, Su-tsung.[6] So ended the reign of the Brilliant Emperor. He had rejuvenated the T'ang dynasty, but he had also brought it to the brink of destruction. He had pressed the Tibetans most mercilessly, but in so doing he had created an enmity that would result in nearly a century of Tibetan aggrandizement at China's expense.

The withdrawal of the most effective elements of the Chinese garrisons in Central Asia to put down the rebellion had an immediate impact on the Tibetan presence there. In 756, a number of envoys from the Western Regions—including the northern Pamir countries of the Black *Ganjak,[7] Wakhan, and Shugh

[4] *CTS*, 9:232; *HTS*, 5:153; *TCTC*, 218:6973-6974. Cf. *CHC*, 3:460.

[5] *TCTC*, 218:6975-6976. Cf. *CHC*, 3:460-461. Ling-wu is another name for Ling *chou*.

[6] *TCTC*, 218:6982. Cf. *CHC*, 3:461. Su-tsung is of course his posthumous temple-name.

[7] The name is written *Ban 'jag*, which is a perfectly good transcription of the Middle Persian word for hemp, *banjak*. (See H. Nyberg, *A Manual of Pahlavi, Part II: Glossary* [1974] 44.) This would, however, seem to be a scribal error for **Gan 'jag*, a transcription of *Ganjak* (the country above Kashgar), the language of which was mentioned by the medieval linguist Kâśgharî. In Old Tibetan, the letter *b* is often written with a long tail on the right side, and so may easily be confused with the letter *g*. See Uray, "On the Tibetan Letters *Ba* and *Wa*" (1955), Table II (Suite), column III, under "VII-Xth century forms" (according to Francke), example "c," which, although not well drawn, does indicate the tail on the letter *b* (*ba*).

nan[8]—paid homage at the Tibetan court, and Tibetan envoys were sent in return.[9] The reassertion of Tibetan influence in the heart of Central Asia had already begun. The main thrust of the Tibetan military counteroffensive, however, was clearly directed against China, and nothing is known of extensive Tibetan activities in Central Asia for many years after these first contacts with the Pamirs.

After Qośu Khan removed the Chinese garrisons in northeastern Tibet,[10] and when, not long afterward, the T'ang Central Asian garrisons were likewise withdrawn,[11] the Tibetans were freed to reexpand their frontiers into Central Asia and northwestern China. The first place to fall[12] (in the autumn of 756) was Sui *chou*, on Tibet's eastern border. Next were a number of Chinese forts in northeastern Tibet, including those held by the Armies of Wei-jung, Shen-wei, Ting-jung, Hsüan-wei, Chih-sheng, Chin-t'ien, and T'ien-ch'eng, as well as the fortified cities of Pai-ku, Tiao-k'o, and Shih-pao.[13] All of these forts and cities had been established only two years before by Qośu Khan. When

[8] Tibetan, *śig nig*. The name is transcribed Shih-ni in Wu-k'ung's itinerary. See Lévi and Chavannes, 1895:346 (n. 3), 347, 362.

[9] *OTAC*, Monkey year 756-757 winter. On chronology problems with this source, see the Note on Chronology.

[10] This was during the last days of 755 (*TCTC*, 217:6943-6944). The *K'ao-i* provides much information on this from various sources.

[11] An account of the activities within China of these forces, which included the king of Khotan and his men, some Ferghanians, and even some Arabs, among many others, lies outside the scope of this book. The Central Asians' influence on China must have been very great, however, and should be investigated in depth. Was their impact on the Chinese as powerful as it was on the Arabs in Iraq after the Abbasid revolution?

[12] In the ninth month, following the *K'ao-i* in *TCTC*, 218:7000. According to this source, Sui *chou* was taken by the joint forces of Tibet and Nan-chao. The *OTAC*, Monkey year (756-)757 winter, reports that the king of Nan-chao led one of the three armies that took Sui *chou*. *OTAC* also dates the capture of Te'u cu mkhar (T'ao *chou* City) first; Se cu (Sui *chou*) followed in the next year.

[13] *TCTC*, 219:7011.

the Tibetans retook the fortified city of T'ao *chou*, the Tibetan "Yellow River" commandery was reestablished, and a minister appointed Military Governor over it.[14] In 757, the Tibetans and their vassals—including the Tanguts, T'u-yü-hun, and others—captured Hsi-p'ing.[15] During the succeeding years, they continued their march through Mdosmad.

By the middle of 763, Tibet had captured the eastern part of Lung-yu *tao*.[16] Later in the year, the Tibetans took Ch'ang-an itself,[17] and, in subsequent years, made further conquests into the ethnically Chinese territories immediately to the north and northwest of the T'ang capital. Hostilities eventually ended with the landmark Sino-Tibetan Treaty of 821.[18] But these events are subjects for another story, one that deserves full treatment elsewhere. Suffice it to say that, with these new conquests, Tibet cut T'ang China off from direct contact with the West. From 763 until the end of the T'ang dynasty, what little news of the West that reached China had to pass through the hostile territory of the Ti-

[14] *OTAC*, (Sheep year 755-756 summer). The parentheses around the dates indicate that the source is defective; they are approximations based on the requirements of the preceding and succeeding passages in the source. As mentioned in the Note on Chronology, the chronology of the *OTAC* is in serious disorder. The animal years simply cannot be made to correspond to the dates, most of them quite certain, in the Chinese sources. Because of the relative uncertainty of the *OTAC* chronology at this point, I have generally followed the Chinese accounts with regard to dating. A serious study of this fragment of the *Annals* is a great desideratum.

[15] *TCTC*, 220:7038.

[16] Lung-yu *tao* corresponded approximately to modern Kansu.

[17] It is odd that the Chinese should have been so hostile to the Tibetans but so friendly to the Uyghurs, considering the striking difference between the apparently mild Tibetan treatment of Ch'ang-an and the shockingly brutal Uyghur treatment of Loyang. One reason may have been northeastern Tibet's location on both sides of the Yellow River, right on China's western frontier. The Uyghurs, on the other hand, were on the opposite side of the river to the north, and were further separated from China by the Gobi Desert. The Tibetans, in short, were dangerously close. Another factor may have been the pro-Turkic inclinations of the powerful Sogdian merchant community in China. The Sogdians were presumably not averse to influencing Chinese politicians with bribes.

[18] On the treaty, see note 158 below.

betans or the not much less hostile realm of the Uyghur Turks. Despite the presence of small T'ang garrisons in the Tarim Basin and Pei-t'ing until late in the eighth century, China was no longer a major factor in Central Asian history; but Central Asia and Central Asians continued to be major factors in Chinese history.

While the Tibetans were engaged on the Chinese front, important changes were taking place to the north. In 758, the Uyghurs, erstwhile allies of the Qarluqs, destroyed an army of some 50,000 Kirghiz, apparently occupied some of their territory, and cut off their communication with the Chinese.[19] In the aftermath of this debacle, the Kirghiz moved into an area from which they could not be seriously threatened by their Uyghur enemies.[20] They also cemented friendships with neighboring peoples by, not long afterward, coming to an agreement with the Qarluqs, Tibetans, and Arabs regarding international trade and communications. This agreement provided for the safety of those traveling between Tibet and the Arab caliphate who had to journey through the lands of the Qarluqs, the new rulers of the Western Turks in Jungaria and west of the Issyk Kul. In Qarluq territory, travelers were joined by Kirghiz escorts, who protected them from Uyghur banditry on their journey.[21] The Arabs com-

[19] See C. Mackerras, *The Uighur Empire* (1972) 66-67.

[20] They were, however, nearly constantly at war with the Uyghurs at this time, and were again during the twenty years before A.D. 840 (see below).

[21] This description presumably refers specifically to merchants traveling between Tibet and the caliphate. *HTS*, 217b:6149. Moriyasu, "Zôhô" (1979) 220-224, and in the shorter French version of this article, "Qui des Ouigours ou des Tibétains ont gagné en 789-792 à Beš-balïq?" (1981) 202 (where the reference is misprinted as "le chapitre 215" of the *HTS*), argues cogently for his view that this refers to travelers from Tibet to the Kirghiz in the period after 790. I cannot, however, agree with his interpretation. *HTS* gives no indication of a date, except to note that the defeat by the Uyghurs, which is recorded immediately before this, occurred in the Ch'ien-yüan period (758-760). Furthermore, it nowhere states that the final destination of the Tibetan travelers was the land of the Kirghiz. Since the source reports that Arabs as well as Tibetans and Qarluqs allied together against the Uyghurs, it obviously describes a trade route between Tibet and Arab Central Asia; the Arabs are otherwise inexplicable. In addition, the Kirghiz never (before modern times) dwelt anywhere near western Central Asia, the Pamirs, or the Tarim

pensated the Kirghiz with heavy silk brocades of Arab manufacture. The Kirghiz, in turn, purchased fancy clothing for their women from the Arabs and from the countries of the Tarim Basin and Jungaria.[22] In other words, at the time to which the Chinese report refers, the Uyghurs were raiding the route that was taken by merchants traveling between Tibetan territory and Arab territory. It is also obvious from the same account that the Tibetans were not in control of the Jungarian Basin either; the Qarluqs were, despite Uyghur depredations. There is, however, no mention in the Chinese source of any Tibetan military activity in the Tarim Basin or Jungaria at this time.

After the Tibetans had punished the Chinese in 763 by capturing Ch'ang-an, which the new emperor Tai-tsung had abandoned just in time, and by enthroning a new Chinese emperor (none other than a brother of the Chin-ch'eng Princess), they turned their attention to the northwest.[23] Liang *chou*, raided by

Basin. Moreover, they are not mentioned in the Chinese sources on the T'ang period as having appeared any further south than perhaps the northern edge of the Jungarian Basin, and, after 840, the southern edge of the Gobi Desert. After the defect of 758, the Kirghiz had fled to the northwest of the Uyghurs, who were then based in Mongolia. This leaves only one possible location for the trade route described in the Chinese source: It must have run from northern or northeastern Tibet to the eastern edge of Jungaria, then along the northern slopes of the Tien Shan to the Arab dominions in the West. It is true that the Uyghurs were pressuring the people of Pei-t'ing before the Tibetan attack in 789, but the city remained under Chinese rule. The neighboring tribes, in fact, seem to have been fairly independent, although (as the Chinese sources say) they suffered from Uyghur oppression. After the Uyghur capture of the city from the Tibetans and the Uyghur expansion westward, of course, there is no question of a Tibetan presence—even, presumably, of Tibetan merchants—north of the Tien Shan. In short, the text discussed here refers to the period between 758 and 791.

[22] *HTS*, 217b:6148. The name *An hsi* ("the Pacified West") was officially changed to *Chen hsi* ("the Garrisoned West") in 757 (*TCTC*, 220:7051); in 767, it was changed back (*TCTC*, 224:7197).

[23] On the capture of the city, see *OTAC*, end. The dates are missing in the manuscript, but the events it describes should allow the entries to be dated. The dating proposed by F. Thomas (in J. Bacot et al., *Documents de Touen-houang relatifs à l'histoire du Tibet* [1940] 58-59), while logical for the text itself, cannot be accepted. There is also a brief account of the campaign

the Tibetans between 758 and 760,[24] was taken in 764;[25] Kan *chou* and Su *chou* fell in 766.[26] Ten years later, the Tibetans took Kua *chou*.[27] In 781, the town and county of Shou-ch'ang, only 150 *li* south of Tun-huang (which the Tibetans besieged unsuccessfully), was captured.[28] At some time before 781, even Hami[29] was besieged by the Tibetans; it too fell into their hands.[30] The 783 Treaty of Ch'ing Shui finally brought peace between Tibet and China and practically an end to further Tibetan inroads into Central Asia.

Although Tibetan incursions may have ended, Sino-Tibetan hostilities soon broke out again. The Chinese and Tibetans had signed a separate bilateral agreement for Tibetan military assistance against the serious rebellion of Chu Tz'u in 783 and 784. The Uyghurs, putative allies of the T'ang, had joined with Chu in an effort to overthrow the struggling dynasty. But a Tibetan force, guided into battle by a Chinese general, crushed Chu's army and turned the tide firmly in the T'ang's favor.[31] Despite this victory, the Chinese refused to honor their promises as defined in the agreement.[32] The Tibetans were understandably angered.[33] The

of this year and of the following thirty years in *OTC*, viii. The Chinese sources contain a vast amount of material awaiting thorough study.

[24] *OTAC* (Dog year 758-759 [?] or 759-760 [?] winter).

[25] *YHCHTC*, 40:2v (p. 557); *CTS*, 196a:5239; *HTS*, 216a:6088.

[26] *YHCHTC*, 40:4v (p. 558), 40:7r (p. 560).

[27] *YHCHTC*, 40:11r (p. 562).

[28] See Demiéville, 1952:172-177, 359-360.

[29] Chinese, I *chou*.

[30] Demiéville, 1952:170-171 (n. 1).

[31] This is a fact admitted by the local reports and by the new emperor, Te-tsung, himself (*TCTC*, 231:7442). Accusations that the Tibetans had been bribed by Chu Tz'u to withdraw are highly doubtful. The charge that Tibetans had indulged in plunder on their way home is meaningless, for it was in no way comparable to the ferocious behavior in China of the T'ang's supposed allies, the Uyghurs, as the same Chinese sources reveal. See especially the glosses from the *K'ao-i* in *TCTC*, 230:7424.

[32] In the seventh month (July 22 to August 20) of 784 (*TCTC*, 231:7442).

[33] Once again, the problem of an anti-Tibetan faction at the Chinese court arises. Li Mi (supported by Lu Chih; see *TCTC*, 231:7429-7431), who advised Te-tsung to renege on his promises (*TCTC*, 231:7442), was the same

main promise had been to give the Tibetans the Military Governorships of the Pacified West and Pei-t'ing upon the success of their mission.[34] Although the Chinese garrisons in this area were not very strong, T'ang governors still dwelt in all of the cities, at least all of those visited by the Chinese monk Wu-k'ung before his departure from Pei-t'ing in 789.[35] As the dynasty had done a century earlier, the T'ang could have recalled its governors and left the local kings to face the Tibetans unaided. But when the Chinese broke the agreement, the Tibetans considered the Treaty of Ch'ing Shui also broken.

T'ang officials immediately began to discuss the danger of a new Tibetan invasion,[36] a possibility made more menacing by the proximity of Ch'ang-an to territories just to the west that remained under Tibetan control. Led by Źaṅ *Rgyal *btsan, the Tibetans began to raid soon enough, and threatened the capital in 786.[37] After a setback, though, they took a new tack.[38] On December 10, 786, they occupied Yen *chou*, in the southern Ordos

one who convinced him to make a "grand alliance" with the Uyghurs and others (see below) even though the Uyghurs were allied to Chu Tz'u! (See *TCTC*, 230:7426-7427.)

[34] *TCTC*, 231:7442.

[35] Pei-t'ing was under Chinese rule when Wu-k'ung left it for China on October 6, 789, which was shortly before the Tibetans captured it (*WKJCC*:981). Cf. Lévi and Chavannes (1895). Khotan remained under Chinese rule at least until 790; see É. Chavannes, "Chinese Documents from the Sites of Dandan-Uiliq, Niya and Endere" (1907) 533-536. Cf. Moriyasu, 1984:56.

[36] In 784; see *TCTC*, 231:7446 et seq.

[37] *TCTC*, 232:7470-7473.

[38] This was not all that new, since the Tibetans had raided the same places as early as 778 (*TCTC*, 275:7252-7253), and had occupied Yüan *chou* (in southern Kuan-nei) for some time (*TCTC*, 223:7157) in 763. (*TCTC*, 224:7224, discusses the Tibetan positions in 773.) The Tibetan raids north into Kuan-nei had been preceded by Tangut, and later Nu-la (Tibetan, Lolad) Turk raids, which began shortly after the outbreak of the An Lu-shan rebellion. The Tanguts had supposedly been settled in this area during the early T'ang period in order to keep them away from the Tibetans (*TCTC*, 220:7060 et seq.).

just north of the Great Wall. The Tibetans permitted the local prefect and his troops to leave the city peacefully.[39] In the last few days of December, they also raided and occupied Hsia *chou*,[40] Lin *chou*, and Yin *chou*,[41] all located further east along the Great Wall. The Tibetan occupation of the Ordos was potentially disastrous for the T'ang. It meant that China was now in real danger of being surrounded on land by the Tibetans. This Tibetan campaign was successful enough that the T'ang once again was willing to discuss peace.[42]

The subsequent peace negotiations[43] ended in the abortive Treaty of P'ing-liang of 787. At the treaty ceremony,[44] the Tibetans evened up the diplomatic score by kidnapping many of the T'ang officials and military leaders who were present. Źaṅ *Rgyal *btsan then strategically withdrew the garrisons of Yen *chou* and Hsia *chou*, which were too distant from the Tibetan lines to be easily supplied. To make these cities worthless to the enemy, the Tibetans drove out the inhabitants, burned the buildings, and destroyed the walls before departing.[45] In the following month,[46] the Chinese minister Li Mi developed his famous "Grand Alliance" strategy of containment. That autumn,[47] Li revealed his plan: "I would like His Majesty to make peace with the Uyghurs in the north, come to terms with Nan-chao in the

[39] *CTS*, 12:355, 196b:5249-5250; *HTS*, 7:194, 216b:6095; *TCTC*, 232:7474.

[40] Most of the Tanguts settled in Kuan-nei, the future center of the early Tangut Hsi-hsia state.

[41] *TCTC*, 232:7475, *CTS*, 12:355, and *HTS*, 7:194, state that Hsia and Yin were captured.

[42] *TCTC*, 232:7481-7482 et seq. The Tibetans raided in Kuan-nei again in 788 (*CTS*, 13:365, 196b:5256; *HTS*, 7:196, 216b:6098; *TCTC*, 233:7513).

[43] *TCTC*, 232:7481-7483.

[44] *TCTC*, 232:7486-7487.

[45] *CTS*, 196b:5253; *HTS*, 216b:6096-6097; *TCTC*, 232:7489. Yin *chou* had never been a walled city (see P. Pelliot, 1961:48) and was, with Lin *chou*, apparently not occupied by the Tibetans as long as Hsia and Yen were.

[46] *TCTC*, 232:7495.

[47] *TCTC*, 233:7505.

south, and unite with the Arabs and Hindustan in the West. In this way the Tibetans would themselves be in trouble, and horses would also be easy [for us] to obtain."[48]

The Uyghur-hating Emperor Te-tsung[49] was at first opposed to the inclusion of the Uyghurs in Li's plan. But this was the plan's most crucial element, and Te-tsung was finally convinced. At just about this time—somewhat after the beginning of the reign of the celebrated caliph, Harun al-Rashid[50]—a long war between the Arabs and Tibetans began. It thus appears indisputable that the alliance advocated by Li Mi, whether formal or informal, was indeed concluded.[51] Unfortunately for the Chinese, the T'ang-Uyghur peace[52] came too late to save the T'ang colonies in Central Asia.

In 787, Tibet captured Sha *chou*, or Tun-huang.[53] Having already secured the area of Hami, the farthest outpost of T'ang China's home administration and a city strategically located near the point where the Silk Road forks to the north and south of the Takla Makan Desert, the Tibetan armies were poised for a thrust

[48] *TCTC*, 233:7502. The difficulty of obtaining horses, which is understandable considering China's hostile relations with both the Uyghurs and the Tibetans at the time, is mentioned frequently; see, for example, *TCTC*, 133:7501 et seq.

[49] On the reasons for the emperor's reluctance, see *CHC*, 3:567, and C. Backus, *The Nan-chao Kingdom and T'ang China's Southwestern Frontier* (1981) 89.

[50] He reigned from 786 to 809.

[51] There is no record of any treaty being signed with any of the Chinese allies. The T'ang did conclude a matrimonial alliance with the Uyghurs, however, and, somewhat later, pried Nan-chao away from the Tibetans. Wei Kao, the powerful Military Governor responsible for the restoration of diplomatic and military relations with Nan-chao, is recorded as having said in a letter to the king of Nan-chao that China should take advantage of the Uyghurs' offer of help to annihilate Tibet (*TCTC*, 233:7517).

[52] *TCTC*, 233:7505-7506.

[53] See the bibliography in Moriyasu, 1981:193-195 (n. 4). The Tibetans also occupied and rebuilt the walls of Yüan *chou*, in Kuan-nei (*TCTC*, 233:7507). In the early summer (fifth month) of 788, Tibetans raided the prefectures of Ching, Pin, Ning, Ch'ing, and Fu, all of which were in Kuan-nei just north of Ch'ang-an (*TCTC*, 233:7513). In the autumn (ninth month), they raided as far as Fang *chou* (*TCTC*, 233:7515).

into the Lop Nor region[54] and the area of the Two Garrisons, Pei-t'ing and Kucha.[55] At this time, Khotan was still nominally governed by a Chinese resident and the native king.[56] Nothing is known about the status of Kashgar, the fourth of the former Four Garrisons of the Pacified West, but it is presumed that it had already come under Qarluq domination.[57] The Tibetans thus returned to the eastern Tarim region after a long absence, but found ready allies nearby for the next stage of their campaign.

According to the Chinese sources, for some time prior to 789 the Uyghurs had been harassing the people of Pei-t'ing, the Sha-t'o Turks (dependents of the city),[58] and even those neighboring tribes of Qarluq and White-clothed Turks who had submitted to the Uyghurs. The Uyghurs had been expanding into the territory by force, and were extorting exorbitant fees to allow merchants and Chinese officials to pass through Uyghur-controlled lands on journeys between the West and China:[59] "From this point on, although they were able to pass through by this route, the barbarians[60] demanded and took an exorbitant price for the use of it. Six thousand families of different Sha-t'o tribes, who were in dependence on Pei-t'ing, also grew to resent their excessive demands. The three tribes of the Qarluq,[61] and the White-

[54] If they had not already recaptured it; see Uray, 1979a.

[55] The Tibetans had appropriated, no doubt with ironic intent, the term "Four Garrisons" for four of their positions in the Kuan-lung region. The first Chinese reference to it that I have noticed is in *TCTC*, 225:7237; it describes the defeat of their Military Governors (Chinese, *chieh-tu-shih*) there in 776. These Four Garrisons are discussed in a gloss in *TCTC*, 247:7999.

[56] See Chavannes, 1907.

[57] This is, however, purely hypothetical. O. Pritsak, "Von den Karluk zu den Karachaniden" (1951), draws numerous conclusions which are not warranted by the Chinese sources.

[58] They were a branch of the *Cigil (Chinese, Ch'u-yüeh); see Hamilton, 1955:135, 151.

[59] Several important studies have been published by T. Moriyasu over the past decade on this period. They have greatly revised the previous interpretation of these events.

[60] Chinese, *lu*; here, the Uyghurs.

[61] Mackerras, 1972:103, "Kharlukh."

clothed Turks,[62] those who were normally subjects of the Uyghurs,[63] were particularly resentful and bitter. They all secretly submitted to the Tibetans, so they and the Tibetans, with the support of the Sha-t'o, together raided[64] Pei-t'ing."[65] In the winter of 789,[66] the Tibetans and their allies attacked the city. When the Uyghurs, under their general the El ügäsi, attacked the besiegers in the early summer of 790, the Tibetans defeated them.[67] The allies then pressed their attack on Pei-t'ing, and, because the people of the city "were bitter about the Uyghurs' insatiable demands, all of them, along with the Sha-t'o chief Chu-hsieh Chin-chung, surrendered to the Tibetans. The Military Governor Yang Hsi-ku fled to Hsi *chou*[68] leading two thousand men who were under his command."[69]

In part due to this defeat and in part due to political turmoil at their court in Ordubalïq, the Uyghurs withdrew. At the Uyghur capital, the El ügäsi came to an immediate understanding with the new qaghan, and, in the autumn of 790, he again turned to the west. This time, however, he led an army composed of "all the troops in the country." Joined by the forces of the Chinese commander Yang Hsi-ku, the objective was to recapture Pei-t'ing. But the campaign was a disaster; more than half their men were

[62] Mackerras, 1972:103, "White-eyed T'u-chüeh." The reading chosen by Mackerras is undoubtedly the result of a textual error due to the similarity of the characters for clothing (*fu*) and eye (*yen*). These Turks may have been Manicheans or, more likely, members of a Muslim sect. Cf. the discussions in W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion* (1958) 198 et seq.; Hamilton, 1955:50; Mackerras, 1972:164 (n. 202).

[63] Mackerras, 1972:103, "Uighurs."

[64] Mackerras, 1972:103, "made trouble in," a strange translation for the Chinese, *k'ou*.

[65] *HTS*, 217a:6125. The translation is by Mackerras, 1972:103, with minor changes as noted above. On the parallels and previous scholarship, see Moriyasu, 1979, and the recent French version of the same article (1981).

[66] *CTS*, 195:5209, *TCTC*, 237:7651, *K'ao-i* gloss. Cf. Moriyasu, 1981:193, 196.

[67] During the fifth month. The El ügäsi had been attacking at least since the fourth month (*TCTC*, 233:7521).

[68] That is, Qocho.

[69] *TCTC*, 233:7521.

killed in battle by the Tibetans and their western allies.[70] Moreover, Yang Hsi-ku, who had intended to return to Qocho, was murdered by the El ügäsi.[71] This new disaster meant that Kucha, the one remaining Garrison of the Pacified West, was cut off from China, where "no one knew if it held out or was lost."[72] Moreover, "[t]he Qarluqs took advantage of the victories to capture the Uyghurs' Fu-t'u Valley.[73] The Uyghurs were shocked and afraid; they moved all of their northwestern tribes to the south of their royal encampment [Ordubalïq] in order to avoid them [the Qarluqs]."[74] Qocho, then still in Chinese hands, fell to the Tibetans in the following year.[75] Sometime before 794 (probably in 791 or 792), the Tibetans finally took Khotan: " ʿBro Khri gzú ram śags, having invaded the Western Regions, subjugated Khotan and levied taxes [on the Khotanese]."[76] Thus began the long period of Tibetan rule over Khotan and the neighboring regions of the southern route through eastern Central Asia.

The respective fortunes of the Uyghurs and the Tibetans in the Tien Shan region were reversed in the course of 791. In the early autumn,[77] the Tibetans attacked Ling *chou*, but were driven off by the Uyghurs, who presented the prisoners and captured cattle to the Chinese emperor, Te-tsung.[78] That winter, the Tibetans and Qarluqs suffered a major defeat when the Uyghurs retook part of Pei-t'ing.[79] The siege of the rest of the city, presumably the fortified part, continued.[80] In December, the Uyghurs presented a

[70] Ibid.

[71] *TCTC*, 233:7522.

[72] Ibid.

[73] This was located to the northwest of the Ötükän Mountains, according to Hu San-hsing's gloss in *TCTC*, 233:7522.

[74] Ibid.

[75] *YHCHTC*, 40:14v-15r (pp. 563-564): during the seventh year of Chen-yüan, which was A.D. 791. The common scribal error of Chen-kuan instead of Chen-yüan is here corrected. (The seventh year of Chen-kuan corresponds to A.D. 633.)

[76] *OTC*, viii.

[77] Eighth month (September 3 to October 2).

[78] *CTS*, 195:5210; *TCTC*, 233:7524.

[79] *CTS*, 195:5210; *HTS*, 217a:6125. Cf. Mackerras, 1972:106-107.

[80] Karabalgasun inscription (Chinese text), lines 14-15. See the edition in

prize captive, the Tibetan general Źaṅ ⋆Rgyal ⋆sum,[81] to Tetsung.[82] In 792,[83] the Uyghur crown prince, the later Pao-i Qaghan, led a new assault: "The Heavenly Qaghan, personally leading a great army, annihilated the chief culprits and recovered the city."[84] Many Tibetans, and no doubt Qarluqs and other allies as well, are said to have been killed.[85] The Uyghurs continued on to Qocho, which they captured from the Tibetans later in 792.[86] Probably not long after this (the exact date is unknown), the Uyghurs attacked the Tibetan army which was besieging Kucha, by then the only T'ang outpost remaining from the Four Garrisons of the Pacified West. After a forced retreat, the Tibetans entered Yü-shu,[87] a fortified town located 560 *li* east of Kucha and 70 *li* west of Agni.[88] There they were besieged by the Uyghurs led by Pao-i Qaghan. The Tibetan army was destroyed.[89]

This series of Tibetan defeats had as one of its consequences the defection to the T'ang in 794 of Tibet's long-time vassal, Nan-chao.[90] The immediate cause of this rupture was Tibet's urgent need for soldiers to fight in the northwest and Nan-chao's refusal to supply them.[91] The direct result was a serious weaken-

T. Haneda, *Haneda hakushi shigaku rombun shû* (1957) 1:308-309. On the presumed date, see below.

[81] Chinese, Shang Chieh-hsin.

[82] *TCTC*, 233:7524-7525.

[83] This date is a deduction from the fact of the Uyghur capture of Qocho in 792, an improbable occurrence had they not taken Pei-t'ing first. There is no source which gives an explicit date for the Uyghurs' capture of Pei-t'ing.

[84] Haneda, 1957, 1:308 (line 15).

[85] *HTS*, 222a:6274; *TCTC*, 234:7552; *TFYK*, 973:18v (p. 11435).

[86] According to the manuscript Fonds Pelliot chinois 3918. See Moriyasu, "Uiguru to Toban no Hokutei sôdatsu-sen oyobi sono go no Seikki jôsei ni tsuite" (1973) 483-484, and 1979:226-227.

[87] Haneda, 1957, 1:309 (line 16). Cf. É. Chavannes and P. Pelliot, "Un traité manichéen retrouvé en Chine" (1913) 178 (n. 1).

[88] *HTS*, 43b:1151. Cf. Chavannes, 1903:7.

[89] Haneda, 1957, 1:309 (line 16).

[90] *TCTC*, 234:7552-7553. Cf. Backus, 1981:94-98

[91] There were of course other, more fundamental reasons for this reversal. See Backus, 1981:81 et seq. Backus, however, mistakenly finds a breach in Nan-chao vassalage "in the mid-70s" (p. 82). It is clear that the revolt described in the *OTC* is that of 794. The Tibetan source indicates merely that

ing of Tibet's military position along its entire southeastern border, a weakness that lasted through the mid-ninth century. Tibet's overall military posture in Central Asia, however, does not seem to have suffered any further damage. But Tibet had endured a severe setback. From near predominance in the Tarim Basin, the Tibetan forces now apparently settled down to a war of attrition with the Uyghurs around Qocho. Unfortunately, there is doubt about when the Uyghurs established firm control over Qocho,[92] and little else is known about the fate of the city in this period.[93] With the exception of a brief, minor reversal,[94] the border between the Tibetans and Uyghurs in the eastern Tien Shan region appears to have remained around Qocho. Control of the city may have changed hands several times.

Meanwhile, the Tibetans had become intensely involved in a protracted war with the Arabs in western Central Asia. It was no doubt partly due to the support provided by their Qarluq allies that the Tibetans were able to extend themselves so far west. It is also clear, however, that the Tibetans had been able to expand unassisted into the area of the Hindu Kush, via the Pamirs.[95]

The first indication of warfare between Arabs and Tibetans is in a report on a battle that took place in 801 between the Tibetans on one side and the Chinese and Nan-chao on the other. Fought by the Lu Shui on Tibet's eastern border, the Tibetans were defeated in battle: "The Samarkandi and Abbasid Arab troops, and the Tibetan commanders, all surrendered. Twenty thousand suits of armor were captured."[96] It is clear that these soldiers of western

the Nan-chao were better at serving two masters than either Tibetan or Chinese historians would like us to believe.

[92] See manuscript Fonds Pelliot chinois 3918, line 9, and the discussion in Moriyasu, 1973:484-487 and 1979:226-229.

[93] There is no information in any source on the Tibetans in this area for the subsequent period up to 851, when the Tibetans were driven from Qocho (Hsi *chou*) and Hami (I *chou*) by the Chinese warlord-prefect of Sha *chou*, Chang I-ch'ao. (On these events, see below.)

[94] In 808; see below.

[95] Cf. K. Jettmar, "Bolor" (1977) 421.

[96] *HTS*, 222a:6277. Chang, 1980:92, translates the whole passage, which gives details about the battle.

Central Asia had been transported east by the Tibetans, perhaps as prisoners of war or hostages.[97]

The next report of Tibetan involvement in the west comes from 193 A.H./A.D. 808-809, when the rebellion of Râfiʿ b. Layth in Samarkand came to a head. Large numbers of Central Asians from many countries, among them "troops of Tibet,"[98] joined the side of Râfiʿ. The situation became so dangerous that Harun al-Rashid himself set out for Khurasan to deal with the rebellion, but he died on the way in Ṭûs on March 24, 809.[99] His older son, al-Amîn, succeeded to the caliphate and to the rule of the provinces west of Rayy; his younger son, al-Maʾmûn, became the heir apparent and ruler of the eastern half of the Arab Empire.[100] Al-Maʾmûn quickly ran into trouble. In 810, he described his problems with the Tibetans, their Qarluq allies, and others in Central Asia in the following way: "I have learned, moreover, of the alienation of Khurasan and the restiveness of its populous and desolate [localities]; of the withdrawal of the yabghu [of the Qarluqs][101] from submission; of the turning away of the qaghan, lord of Tibet;[102] of the mobilization by the king of Kabul for a raid on those places in Khurasan which are near to him; and of the withholding by the Utrârbandah of the tribute which he used to pay. I have no control over any of these things."[103] The prince thought

[97] Cf. Chang, 1980:92, who thinks they might have been political refugees. He also notes: "Il se peut qu'ils aient été les premiers Musulmans du Yunnan."

[98] Yaʿqûbî, ii:435. The short notice on this in Ṭabarî, iii:775, refers only to "Turks." The specificity of the expression "troops of Tibet" (none of the other foreign participants are so described) gives Yaʿqûbî's account the ring of authenticity. Daniel, 1979:174, gives a distorted picture of the latter source by omitting, without explanation, selected names, including that of Tibet.

[99] *CHI*, 4:72.

[100] Ibid.; Shaban, *Islamic History* (1976) 2:39-40. In 194 A.H./A.D. 809-810, the Arabs raided Qûlân, a city east of Talas, near Mîrkî (Ibn al-Athîr, vi:237). Cf. Barthold, 1958:202.

[101] Arabic, *ġabghûya*; as usual, the definite article is omitted.

[102] Arabic, *khâqân ṣâhib al-Tubbat*; literally, "[of] Qaghan, the lord of Tibet."

[103] Ṭabarî, iii:815. Cf. Dunlop, 1973:310 et seq. Utrârbandah was the title of the ruler of Utrâr, which place was also called Fârâb.

that his best hope lay in fleeing from Khurasan to the Tibetan lines: "I do not think that [there is any other way open to me] except the vacating of the place where I am, joining up with the qaghan, king of Tibet,[104] and seeking refuge with him and his country; for it would behoove me to guarantee my personal security and be in an impregnable position with regard to those who want my betrayal and defeat."[105]

Al-Maʾmûn's problems did not entirely emanate from his eastern front, for civil war over control of the caliphate was nearly at hand. One of his greatest challenges was to stabilize affairs in the east while conserving his resources for the imminent conflict with his brother the caliph. Al-Faḍl b. Sahl, al-Maʾmûn's vizier,[106] advised him: "Write to the yabghu and the qaghan, and appoint the two of them rulers of their two countries, and promise them support in their warfare with the [other] kings. Send some presents and rarities of Khurasan to the king of Kabul and ask him for a truce—you will find him eager to get it. And concede to King Utrârbandah his tribute for this year."[107] Al-Faḍl also proposed that his prince admit into the army the officers and troops who had been heretofore excluded from it. The optimistic

[104] The text has *khâqân malik al-Turk*, or "Qaghan, the king of the Turks." The ruler of the Qarluqs, the theoretical successor to the Türgiś qaghan as overlord of the Western Turks, is not intended because in these texts he is always called "Yabghu." The ruler of the Uyghurs is also out of the question, for two reasons: first, the Uyghurs are consistently called Tughuzghuz or Tughuzughuz (for Turkic, Toquzghuz or Toquz Oghuz), and second, al-Maʾmûn would have had to fight his way through enemy Qarluq territory to reach the Uyghurs, whom he could hardly have known much about at that time anyway. Moreover, throughout this section, Ṭabarî refers to the ruler of Tibet as Khâqân, as does Azraqî (cited below), where there is no possibility of confusion with another ruler. The passage in Ṭabarî should therefore be emended to read *khâqân malik al-Tubbat*, or "Qaghan, the king of Tibet."

[105] Ṭabarî, iii:815. I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Wadie Jwaideh, for assisting me in the translation of this and the following two quotations from Ṭabarî.

[106] In office from raǧab, 196 to śaʿbân, 202 A.H./A.D. March 18-April 16, 812 to February 12-March 12, 818. See D. Sourdel, *Le vizirat ʿAbbāside* (1960) 2:726.

[107] Ṭabarî, iii:815-816. See note 103.

vizier predicted victory with his plan, indicating that al-Ma'mûn still had an option open to him were he to fail: "you would be able to achieve your aim by joining up with the qaghan."[108]

Al-Ma'mûn "perceived the truth of what he said" and implemented his vizier's proposal.[109] It was just in time to face the invasion of his brother's forces, which left Baghdad for Khurasan in the month of śa'bân, 195 A.H./A.D. April 29–May 27, 811.[110] Despite al-Ma'mûn's doubts, his armies soundly defeated the invaders. After his final victory in 198 A.H./A.D. 813-814, the year of al-Amîn's death, the new caliph did not move to Baghdad as expected, but remained in Marw, which became the capital of a reunited empire.[111] His throne secure, al-Ma'mûn was now able to encourage a jihad against the very Central Asian nations with which he had just concluded peace. He appointed al-Faḍl b. Sahl as his viceroy "over the East from the mountain of Hamadhân to the mountain of Shughnan and Tibet, longitudinally, from the Persian Gulf and India to the Caspian Sea and Ġurġân, latitudinally,"[112] and reopened hostilities in Central Asia.

The campaigns of al-Faḍl were directed against the four states—the kingdom of the Kabul Shah, the kingdom of the Utrârbandah, the realm of the yagbhu of the Qarluqs, and the empire of the Qaghan of Tibet—that had been hostile to or at war with al-Ma'mûn before 194 A.H./A.D. 809-810.[113] The first to capitulate was the king of Kabul, who submitted and became a

[108] Ṭabarî, iii:816.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Ibid.

[111] He finally left Marw in 202 A.H./A.D. 817-818 (Ṭabarî, iii:1025) and entered Baghdad to stay in 204 A.H./A.D. 819-820 (Ṭabarî, iii:1036.

[112] He had already been appointed to this position in April 812, according to Ṭabarî (iii:841), who also reports that he was given the title *Dhû al-riyâsatayn*, or "Holder of the Two Commands [the army and the fiscal administration]." For two important contemporaneous documents relating to this powerful figure, see W. Madelung, "New Documents Concerning al-Ma'mūn, al-Faḍl b. Sahl and 'Alī al-Riḍā" (1981).

[113] As previously mentioned, the Qarluqs and Tibetans had supported the large-scale revolt of Râfi' b. Layth, who surrendered to al-Ma'mûn in 195 A.H./A.D. 810-811 (*CHI*, 4:72; Shaban, 1976, 2:40).

Muslim sometime between 197 and 199 A.H. (A.D. 812-813 and 814-815). As a token of his submission and conversion, he sent al-Ma'mûn a golden statue on a silver throne.[114] Sa'îd b. Yaḥyâ of Balkh described it to Azraqî: "A king from among the kings of Tibet became a Muslim. He had an idol of gold that he worshipped, which was in the shape of a man. On the head of the idol was a crown of gold bedecked with chains of jewelry and rubies and green corundum and chrysolite. It was on a square throne, raised above the ground on legs, and the throne was of silver. On the throne was a cushion of brocade; on the fringe of the cushion were tassels of gold and silver hanging down, and the tassels were as . . . draperies on the face of the throne."[115] Al-Ma'mûn sent it to Mecca as a trophy to be stored in the treasury of the Ka'ba. In Mecca, it was first displayed in the Square of 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭâb for three days, with a silver tablet on which was written: "In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. This is the throne of so-and-so, son of so-and-so, king of Tibet. He became a Muslim and sent this throne as a gift to the Ka'ba; so praise God who guided him to Islam."[116] Although it is not surprising that the ruler of Kabul, a Buddhist kingdom, would give a Buddhist

[114] Azraqî, 227, 231, 244 (the date of reception of the statue). Cf. Madelung, 1981:337. The Mecca edition of Azraqî reads both *sb'*, i.e., *sab'* (pp. 227 and 231), and *ts'*, i.e., *tis'* (p. 244). Since the dots distinguishing different letters with the same basic shape were seldom written in Azraqî's day, the two words were probably often identical. Perhaps 199 is too late as the date of the king's submission, but one would assume that al-Ma'mûn could not have undertaken any major campaigns until the death of al-Amîn in 198. Unfortunately, there is no explicit reference in Azraqî to fighting with the king of Kabul.

[115] Azraqî, 225. This translation contains several uncertainties due to corruption and other difficulties in the existing manuscripts. I felt, however, that a complete translation, even one with possible errors, would be better than a summary. I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Robert Dankoff, for the assistance he gave me when I first tackled these texts in Azraqî.

[116] Azraqî, 226. This announcement was read aloud to the people morning and night, and praise was offered to God, "who had led the king of Tibet to Islam." The statue and throne were melted down to make coins in 202 A.H./A.D. 817-818, but the crown and tablet were kept in the Ka'ba until the time of Azraqî, who copied the inscriptions on them.

statue to al-Ma'mûn, it is rather unexpected to hear him called a "king of Tibet." The texts clearly distinguish, however, between "*a king* from among the *kings* of Tibet" and "the *qaghan* of Tibet," who was considered to have the imperial dignity. One may conclude from this that the Tibetans, who were close allies of the Qarluqs, were at war with the Arabs in the west,[117] and were the dominant power in the Pamirs,[118] had also made a vassal of the Kabul Shah.[119] The Shah's submission to al-Ma'mûn at this point—after little or no resistance, it would seem—was perhaps his reaction to the danger of being overwhelmed by the increasingly powerful Tibetans.[120] Al-Ma'mûn's posture as a "Khurasani" ruler[121] may have been the decisive factor.

Al-Ma'mûn's next move was further to the east. Al-Faḍl b. Sahl led a campaign "to Kashmir and to the realm of Tibet."[122] He triumphed in Wakhan and in the country of Balûr, and sent the captured Tibetan commander and "Tibetan cavalrymen" back to Baghdad.[123] Al-Faḍl next turned north, where he subdued the country of Utrâr,[124] and captured the wives and children of the Qarluq yabghu, who fled to the land of the Kimäk.[125] Al-Faḍl also recaptured the city of Kâsân and other citadels in Ferghana.[126]

[117] The Chinese were aware of this war, which they believed to be responsible for fewer Tibetan raids on China (*CTS*, 198:5316; *HTS*, 221b:6263).

[118] Azraqî, 229. See below.

[119] One may also conclude that a major reason for so many Indian Buddhist sages coming to Central Tibet from Kashmir, and, notably, the famous Padmasambhava from Udyâna, was the simple fact that Tibet then ruled much of this region. Cf. Jettmar, 1977:421-422.

[120] Compare the situation of Nan-chao, another of Tibet's vassals, two decades earlier.

[121] Cf. *CHI*, 4:72; Daniel, 1979:177-178.

[122] Azraqî, 229. For a provisional translation of this difficult section of Azraqî, see É. Combe et al., *Répertoire chronologique d'épigraphie arabe*, Vol. 1 (1931) 94. The original is unfortunately more than a little corrupt.

[123] Azraqî, 229. Cf. Madelung, 1981:337, "the commander of the cavalry of al-Tubbat.".

[124] Azraqî, 230. Other places which Azraqî names are al-Trbd, Śâwghar (north of Utrâr), and Z'wl. On the location of Utrâr and Śâwghar, see Le Strange, 1966:485.

[125] Azraqî, 230.

[126] Azraqî, 231.

He thus reestablished, and even briefly extended, the Arab Islamic hold on Central Asia. The Tibetans seem shortly thereafter to have recovered, however, and to have held on to some of their positions in the Pamirs until later in the century.[127] Unfortunately, there is no more direct historical source material on their activities—or those of the Arabs—in this region during the rest of the Early Middle Ages.

On Tibet's northeastern frontier, the Uyghurs had continued to press into Tibetan territory. In 808, for example, they attacked and captured the strategic city of Liang *chou*.[128] This defeat resulted in a Tibetan effort at moving the Sha-t'o tribes from that area: as former allies or vassals of the Uyghurs, their loyalty to their new Tibetan masters was suspect, and they could not be trusted in such a sensitive area of the frontier. The Sha-t'o resisted, however, and fled down the Yellow River to the north while fighting off the Tibetans. Finally, in the summer of 808, the remaining 1,300 Sha-t'o tribespeople surrendered to the T'ang at

[127] This follows the accepted view that most of the material in the early Arabic and Persian geographical works dates to this period. See Barthold, "Tibet," in *E.I.1*, 1:742. Note that Barthold mistakenly believed that the Arabs "seem to have generally understood by Tubbat, Little Tibet or Baltistan." All of the early geographers (those writing during and shortly after the period of the Tibetan Empire), however, clearly and accurately described Tibet as bounded by China on the east, India on the south, the Uyghur Turks on the north, and the eastern marches of Khurasan on the west. On this question, see my paper, "The Location and Population of Tibet According to Early Islamic Sources," given at the Csoma de Kőrös Symposium held at Visegrád, Hungary in 1984 and forthcoming in *AOH*.

[128] *TCTC*, 237:7651. It is manifestly clear from these events that the Uyghurs must have come across the desert to the north of Liang *chou* via the Etsin Gol that flows past Kan *chou*. Had they attacked from the Tien Shan region, the Uyghurs would have had to slip past the Tibetan forts in Kansu, which probably extended as far as Hami. Coming from the east would have been just as difficult: there they would have had to face considerable Tibetan strength. This hypothesis is confirmed by the Uyghur attack of 813, which was in the area of Kan *chou*, just west of Liang *chou* (see below). The Uyghurs thus followed a regular route. Indeed, there was an important route that followed the Etsin Gol all the way to the Uyghur court in Mongolia. The route is attested by the location given for the Uyghur capital and the Ötükän Mountains with respect to Kan *chou* in *TCTC*, 237:7651 gloss.

Ling *chou*.[129] In the summer of the following year, the Chinese moved them east of the Yellow River in order to put distance between them and the Tibetans.[130]

Also in 809, the Military Governor of Tibet's Northern *tao*[131] led a punitive expedition against the Uyghurs.[132] That autumn, the Tibetans again attacked the Uyghurs. Fifty thousand Tibetan cavalry rode via P'i-t'i Springs, 300 *li* north of Hsi Shou-hsiang City,[133] to a place called Great Stone Valley.[134] There they plundered an Uyghur embassy that was returning from a mission to the T'ang court in Ch'ang-an.[135] It took four years for the Uyghurs to respond to the Tibetan thrust that had penetrated deep into their territory.

But by the autumn of 813, the Tibetans had finished the construction of a bridge over the Yellow River at Wu-lan.[136] Ssu-ma Kuang comments: "Henceforth, Shuo-fang had no respite from withstanding their raids."[137] In the early winter (tenth month) of that year, an Uyghur army crossed the Gobi Desert to the south and attacked the Tibetans west of Liu Ku,[138] which was located somewhere near Hsi Shou-hsiang City.[139] The Uyghur cavalry,

[129] *TCTC*, 237:7651-7652.

[130] *TCTC*, 237:7660-7661.

[131] The Tibetan term is unknown. This administrative unit was located west of the Yellow River from the Shuo-fang prectures of Ling, Yen, and Feng.

[132] J. Kolmaš, "Four Letters of Po Chü-i to the Tibetan Authorities (808-810 A.D.)" (1966) 404-405.

[133] Located in present-day Inner Mongolia. See Map I. The name Hsi Shou-hsiang *ch'eng* means "West City for Accepting Surrender."

[134] Chinese, Ta-shih Ku.

[135] *HTS*, 216b:6100; *TCTC*, 238:7666.

[136] *TCTC*, 239:7701. Wu-lan was in Hui *chou*, which was about sixty miles downstream (to the north) of Lan *chou* (*CKKCTMTTT*, 735-736).

[137] *TCTC*, 239:7701.

[138] Ibid.

[139] *HTS*, 218:6155, reports that they captured both of these places. The many other localities called Liu Ku ("Willow Valley") seem highly unlikely to be the Liu Ku mentioned here. Hu San-hsing's gloss, which locates this place north of the Tien Shan, must be rejected, as pointed out by Moriyasu, 1981:201 (n. 40).

now several thousand strong, then rode to P'i-t'i Springs, causing the T'ang generals in the area some anxiety.[140] This demonstration, however, was probably intended more for the benefit of the Tibetans than for the Chinese.[141] Notwithstanding, Tibetan raids continued throughout the area northeast of Lan *chou* up to the Gobi. One Tibetan thrust even penetrated "across the desert," to within two or three days' march of "their city walls"—presumably the Uyghur capital, Ordubalïq—in 816.[142] But it was only in 821 that Uyghurs and Tibetans came into full-scale conflict again.

The Uyghur Empire had by now expanded to its greatest east-west extent. In the late spring or early summer of 821, an Uyghur army appeared in Uśrûsana,[143] apparently after attacking a Tibetan and Qarluq force to their west and chasing them across the Jaxartes into Ferghana,[144] where the Uyghurs collected great quantities of plunder from the local people.[145] It was also probably in that year that the Arab envoy, Tamîm b. Baḥr, traveled to Ordubalïq via the Uyghur-controlled lands near Talas, the Issyk Kul, and Jungaria.[146] But these events are deceiving; things were not going so well for the Uyghurs. The Kirghiz, old enemies of

[140] *CTS*, 195:5210; *TCTC*, 239:7701-7702.

[141] Mackerras's puzzlement, 1972:170-171, is thus unwarranted.

[142] *CTS*, 196b:5265. Cf. Mackerras, 1972:172 (n. 250). Moriyasu, 1979:225-226, describes this as a raid across the desert between Lop Nor and Agni. But the Chinese, who apparently believed the Tibetans to be the major power in Central Asia, must have understood the Tibetan raid to have been across the Gobi Desert toward Ordubalïq, for that more closely touched their interests. Moreover, as I have discussed, the historical context heavily favors the Gobi here.

[143] Ṭabarî, iii:1044. For other explanations of this event, see Barthold, 1958:210-211.

[144] Haneda, 1957, 1:310 (line 20). Chinese, Chen-chu Ho.

[145] Haneda, 1957, 1:309 (line 17). The fate of the Tibetan army is unknown. The Karabalgasun inscription does not allow absolute dates to be determined for the events it describes. Such a major Uyghur expedition into Arab-dominated territory should have been noticed by the Arab chroniclers, hence my assumption that the entry in Ṭabarî (see note 143) refers to this event.

[146] For text, translation, and discussion of this material, see V. Minorsky, "Tamîm ibn Baḥr's Journey to the Uyghurs" (1947-1948) 275-305.

the Uyghurs, warred constantly with them and had sworn to destroy them.[147] Moreover, Tibetans in Hami and Lop Nor still kept the Uyghurs out of the southern Tarim and Kansu while Tibetans in Ho-hsi even threatened the Uyghurs' only direct route to China, which passed by P'i-t'i Springs.

By early 821, the Tibetans and Chinese had more or less reached agreement on the terms of a new peace treaty, while the Uyghur qaghan was about to receive a T'ang princess as official reconfirmation of the Sino-Uyghur alliance. On July 1, the Chinese court proclaimed that the new Uyghur qaghan, Chao-li (Pao-i's successor), would receive the Princess of T'ai-ho as his consort.[148] Eight days later, perhaps incensed at the Uyghurs for their diplomatic success while China had still not signed the Tibetan treaty, the Tibetans raided Ch'ing-sai Fort.[149] After a counterattack by the prefect of Yen *chou*, however, they withdrew.[150] The Uyghurs quickly used this Sino-Tibetan clash to their advantage. On July 16, they memorialized Emperor Mu-tsung: "By sending ten thousand cavalrymen via[151] Pei-t'ing and ten thousand via Kucha,[152] we will ward off the Tibetans in order to welcome the T'ai-ho Princess and bring her to our country."[153]

Although this statement might seem to indicate that the

[147] The warfare had begun "over twenty years" before 840 (*TCTC*, 246:7947).

[148] *TCTC*, 241:7791. It is notable that, after the convulsions of the mid-eighth century that shook all of Eurasia (see the Epilogue), the Tibetans began insisting on written treaties with China while the Uyghurs continued to make old-fashioned "marriage-alliances" with the T'ang. The latter type of accords did, however, change in one interesting way: for the first time, natural daughters of the reigning T'ang emperors were married to the Uyghur qaghans.

[149] Unidentified, but obviously located near Yen *chou*.

[150] *CTS*, 195:5211; *TCTC*, 241:7791.

[151] Chinese, *ch'u*. This word has caused much argument among scholars who have discussed this passage. The usage is common in descriptions of military campaigns of the late Ming and early Manchu periods. I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Lynn Struve, for this information.

[152] The text reads *An hsi*, literally "the Pacified West," but by this time the name had become fixed as one of the names of Kucha.

[153] *CTS*, 195:5211; *TCTC*, 241:7791-7792.

Uyghurs intended to attack the Tibetans in the west again,[154] it is obvious that its only purpose could have been to reassure the T'ang that the Uyghurs could protect the princess and the imperial retinue from Tibetan raiders in the Ordos region. This supposition is supported by the memorial of Li Yu, prefect of Feng *chou*, who noted that winter (in the eleventh month) that "three thousand of the Uyghurs welcoming the T'ai-ho Princess had camped at Liu Springs to push back the Tibetans."[155] Since the Military Governor of Ling-wu had in fact just defeated a Tibetan force in the previous month[156] (while the princess was traveling northward nearby), one must conclude that the Uyghurs sent only a fairly small cavalry detachment to the T'ang border at Feng *chou*. There is, moreover, no record of any battle between Tibetans and Uyghurs near Pei-t'ing or Kucha, nor any indication that their relative positions in the area of Qocho changed at this time.

Notwithstanding these Sino-Tibetan troubles, a Chinese delegation had left for Tibet on November 8, 821 to sign the treaty.[157] During 822, Tibet also made peace with the Uyghurs and apparently with Nan-chao as well. By 823, the last Sino-Tibetan treaty—one distinguished, even more than its predecessors, by careful treatment of the two countries as equals—was signed and in effect.[158] This time, both sides observed the treaty stipulations to the letter[159] and peace reigned on the borders of Tibet for the first time in decades; it lasted for over twenty years.

[154] The obvious problem with the passage is that no destination is mentioned for these hypothetical armies. Nevertheless, it would seem to support the supposition that the bulk of Uyghur military strength was now in the west, around the Tien Shan.

[155] *CTS*, 195:5212; *TFYK*, 979:19r-19v (p. 11507). Mackerras, 1972:118, 179 (n. 278), miscontrues this passage.

[156] *TCTC*, 242:7802.

[157] *TCTC*, 242:7800.

[158] See J. Szerb, "A Note on the Tibetan-Uigur Treaty of 822/823 A.D." (1983), for details and a bibliography on the Uyghur treaty. No text of this treaty (or of that with Nan-chao) survives. For the text of the Sino-Tibetan treaty inscription, see F. Li, "The Inscription of the Sino-Tibetan Treaty of 821-822" (1956), and H. Richardson, "The Sino-Tibetan Treaty Inscription of A.D. 821/823 at Lhasa" (1978).

[159] For an example, see *TCTC*, 244:7898.

This new, stable political order in eastern Eurasia was shattered in 840. After considerable turmoil within the Uyghur state, an Uyghur general defected to the Kirghiz and, leading a huge army of Kirghiz cavalry, attacked the Uyghur cities. The victorious Kirghiz not only took the cities; they also captured and killed the qaghan, seized his golden domed tent,[160] and set fire to Ordubalïq, the capital.[161] The Uyghurs fled in all directions. One group escaped into Qarluq territory to the west. *Mänglig Tegin and others, along with fifteen tribes, turned west and south and settled in the area around Pei-t'ing, Kucha, Agni, and Qocho.[162] The dead qaghan's brothers and other members of the royal family and the court—thirteen tribes in all—led their followers to the Chinese border at the T'ien-te Army, and sought to submit to China on their own terms.[163] Another group fled south to the Tibetans.[164] This collapse of the Uyghur Empire thoroughly destabilized Tibet's northern border. Despite their former good relations with the Tibetans, the Kirghiz were in no position to help stem the tide of displaced Uyghurs, even presuming they wished to do so.

To confound matters further, Tibet now had internal troubles as well. In 842, Khri ʿU'i dum brtsan, better known as Glaṅ

[160] The Kirghiz qaghan had previously sworn to capture it (*HTS*, 217b:6149; *TCTC*, 246:7947). For a description of this tent, see the account of Tamîm b. Baḥr (Minorsky, 1947-1948:283). So far as I can determine, there is no reason to think that it had been "brought from China along with the Princess of T'ai-ho" (Mackerras, 1972:182-183 [n. 296]). Why would the Chinese strengthen their potentially dangerous neighbors by bestowing symbols of imperial legitimacy upon them? It is worth noting that the Tibetan emperor also had such a tent (Demiéville, 1952:202-203) and that the Arab caliph had the equivalent, the "Heaven Dome" in the famous Qaṣr al-Dhahab, or "Palace of Gold" (Beckwith, 1984b).

[161] *CTS*, 195:5213; *HTS*, 217b:6130; *TCTC*, 246:7947. All sources number the Kirghiz force at "100,000 cavalry."

[162] The name *Mänglig Tegin has been reconstructed by Hamilton, 1955:7 et seq. Cf. Moriyasu, 1977b, on the movement of Uyghurs to the T'ien Shan region.

[163] See the unpublished dissertation by M. Drompp, "The Writings of Li Te-yü as Sources for the History of T'ang–Inner Asian Relations" (1986).

[164] *CTS*, 195:5213; *HTS*, 217b:6131; *TCTC*, 246:7947.

Darma,[165] was assassinated by a Buddhist hermit, Lhaluṅ Dpalgyi rdorje.[166] The succession was disputed, and central authority rapidly disappeared.[167] In Mdosmad, two generals, *Blon* Guṅ bźer[168] and *Źaṅ* Pei-pei,[169] fought inconclusive engagements for several years.[170] *Źaṅ* Pei-pei steadfastly refused to submit to his countryman, declaring "How could I serve this dog-rat?"[171] This internecine warfare countinued unabated, with the more cultured *Źaṅ* Pei-pei more than holding his own against the fairly brutal *Blon* Guṅ bźer. In 849, *Blon* Guṅ bźer inflicted a serious defeat on *Źaṅ* Pei-pei's forces near a Tibetan bridge over the Yellow River.[172] Perhaps as a result of this internal turmoil, many fortified Tibetan cities and other positions in the area of Ho-hsi surrendered or fell to the T'ang in that same year.[173] It seems that even lands further inside the Tibetan Empire's borders were also in an unsettled state. In 850, *Źaṅ* Pei-pei left Shan *chou* in the hands of a lieutenant, T'o-pa Huai-kuang, and marched to the pastures west of Kan *chou*,[174] perhaps to attack the Uyghurs who

[165] See Bacot et al., 1940:82, 89.

[166] Although the story has been somewhat embellished, it appears to be true, due to corroborative traditions about the later life of Dpalgyi rdorje in Mdosmad.

[167] *HTS*, 216b:6105; *TCTC*, 246:7969-7970. The name of Glaṅ Darma's successor in these Chinese sources, i.e., Ch'i-li-hu, corresponds to Tibetan *Khri ʿod, i.e., the (Khri) ʿOd sruṅs of the traditional Classical Tibetan sources.

[168] Chinese, K'ung-je. *HTS*, 216b:6105, gives his complete name and explains his title. His surname was Mo (i.e., Dbás) and his given name, Nung-li. Je (Tibetan, *bźer*, "steward") is explained as being "like the Chinese title *lang*." His Tibetan name occurs in the Old Tibetan documents from Tun-huang. For example, see M. Lalou, *Inventaire* (1961) 3:159 (no. 1873, "*blon guṅ–bźer*").

[169] Or Pi-pi. His name appears to have been something like *Byi-byi in Tibetan. Of Źaṅ-źuṅ origin, he was Tibet's Military Governor of Shan *chou*. His surname was Mo-lu (i.e., *ʿBro), his given name, Tsan-hsin-ya (i.e., *Rtsan *sum *ṅa). See *HTS*, 216b:6105.

[170] See Demiéville, 1952:26-27.

[171] *TCTC*, 247:7986-7987.

[172] *HTS*, 216b:6106; *TCTC*, 248:8037.

[173] *TCTC*, 248:8038-8039.

[174] *TCTC*, 249:8043. It is interesting to note that one of Guṅ bźer's cap-

were moving into that area (presumably via the Etsin Gol) at the time.[175] Hearing of his adversary's departure, *Blon* Guṅ bźer led a force of 5,000 light cavalry in pursuit. He got as far as Kua *chou*, but gave up the pursuit and turned back. He then went and mercilessly plundered the prefectures of Shan, K'uo, Kua, Su, Hami, and Qocho, among others.[176]

In the spring of 851, Chang I-ch'ao, the prefect of Tibetan Sha *chou* (Tun-huang), sent a memorial to the T'ang court which described how he had driven the Tibetan general of Sha *chou* out of the city. Having given this evidence of good faith, Chang asked permission to submit to the T'ang. His request was of course granted, and he was given the title of Fang-yü-shih of Sha *chou*.[177] *Blon* Guṅ bźer was now in serious trouble: his people were deserting or defecting, and the T'ang rejected his last-ditch request for an official appointment.[178] By this time, *Źaṅ* Pei-pei had disappeared from the purview of the Chinese chroniclers, but his former deputy, T'o-pa Huai-kuang, was still receiving defectors from Guṅ bźer. Later in the year, Chang I-ch'ao led a sweeping campaign from Sha *chou* into the neighboring prefectures. By the early winter (tenth month), he had captured the prefectures of Kua, Kan, Su, Lan, Shan, Ho, Min, K'uo, Hami, and Qocho from the Tibetans.[179] The T'ang rewarded him by setting up the

tains was a monk, Mang-lo-lin-chen (or *Maṅ ra rin-chen). This makes the document studied by Uray, "Notes on a Tibetan Military Document from Tun-huang" (1961), even more important, since it shows actual implementation of the military service requirement. Cf. the discussion in Beckwith, 1983:11 et seq. Note that T'o-pa was a common clan name among the Tanguts; one may assume that T'o-pa Huai-kuang was by origin a Tangut.

[175] *CTS*, 195:5215; *HTS*, 217b:6133; *TCTC*, 248:8032.

[176] *HTS*, 216b:6106; *TCTC*, 248:8044.

[177] *TCTC*, 249:8044-8045.

[178] *HTS*, 216b:6106-6107; *TCTC*, 249:8047. One must still credit him for the sheer audacity of going to the T'ang court to ask!

[179] *CTS*, 18b:629; *HTS*, 8:249; *TCTC*, 249:8048-8049; *TFYK*, 20:9v-11r (pp. 216-217), 170-23r (p. 2057). The *K'ao-i* quotes from the *Shih-lu* and discusses the chronology of these events (*TCTC*, 249:8049). It makes clear that all sources agree Chang recaptured Hami (I *chou*) from the Tibetans; those sources that have a complete list include, among the other prefectures, Qocho (Hsi *chou*). In the face of such explicit testimony, and in the absence

Return to Allegiance Army[180] in Sha *chou*, with Chang as the Military Governor. His great success and the forces arrayed behind him, however, made him all but independent of the T'ang.[181]

Khotan also appears to have regained its independence from Tibet in 851.[182] Some twelve years later, Chang I-ch'ao described in a memorial to the T'ang court how, leading 7,000 Chinese and foreign troops, he had recaptured Liang *chou* from the Tibetans.[183] By now, little was left of Tibet's once vast colonial empire. In 866, at about the same time as an upheaval that shook the new Uyghur state in the Tien Shan region,[184] the Tibetan general T'o-pa Huai-kuang entered K'uo *chou*, which apparently had returned to Tibetan control. He captured *Blon* Guṅ bźer alive, executed

of any clear evidence that the Uyghurs had been in control of Hami or Qocho in 851, I cannot accept the arguments of Moriyasu, 1981:203-204. Even though Qocho was doubtlessly under strong Uyghur cultural influence at the time, it was located at the Tibetan-Uyghur frontier, and must have changed hands many times. It is hard to believe that it remained in unchallenged Uyghur possession during the half century from 792 to 851 (or 866; see below). Since, as has been shown, disaster struck the Uyghur state two years before the political collapse of Tibet in 842, the Tibetans had a good chance to retake Qocho then, if they had not done so long before. Chinese sources indicate that *Blon* Guṅ bźer raided Hami and Qocho in 850, seemingly because *Źaṅ* Pei-pei was unable to defend the two prefectures from his depredations. The presence of Uyghurs in Qocho in 851 can indicate any number of things, but the one source that refers to them makes no reference as to how or when they got there. The Chinese sources clearly show that Qocho was captured by Chang I-ch'ao from the Tibetans in 851, and then taken by the Uyghur chief P'u-ku Chün in 866, but from whom is unknown. It may be that P'u-ku Chün did not capture Qocho from the Tibetans, but that does not necessarily mean that he did capture it from Chang I-ch'ao. Indeed, it is quite possible that the Tibetans of Qocho revolted against Chang after his victory. In the final analysis, the sources are so sparse as to leave too much room for speculation on many points.

[180] Chinese, Kuei-i *chün*.

[181] Cf. the discussion in L. Čuguevskiĭ, "Touen-houang du VIII[e] au X[e] siècle" (1981).

[182] J. Hamilton, "Les règnes khotanais entre 851 et 1001" (1979) 49-50.

[183] *TCTC*, 250:8104, dates this to 863, but *HTS*, 216b:6108, has 861. Liang *chou* generally remained under local Tibetan control, however, until the Tanguts captured it in the eleventh century.

[184] See Moriyasu, 1977b, for details.

him, and then sent the head of his enemy—the last known high-ranking representative of Tibetan imperial power in Central Asia—to Ch'ang-an.[185] Guṅ bźer's remaining followers fled to the city of Ch'in *chou* in China, where they were easily subdued.[186] Of all the Central Asian territory conquered by the once powerful Tibetan Empire, only bits and pieces, such as the Lop Nor region,[187] Liang *chou*, and parts of the Pamirs, remained under local Tibetan control. Soon, they too passed out of the historian's ken, and one epoch of world history gave way to another.

[185] *TCTC*, 250:8115. The other Chinese sources (quoted in Moriyasu, 1977b:119) have condensed the account of these events and, in so doing, have introduced serious errors. It is not possible to accept the story that P'u-ku Chün executed Guṅ bźer, as does Moriyasu, 1981:203.

[186] *TCTC*, 250:8115. They were captured by the Tibetan chief Shang Yen-hsin (i.e., *Źaṅ* *Yan *sum), who had previously surrendered to the T'ang and received an appointment (*TCTC*, 249:8064-8065).

[187] Uray, 1979a.

Epilogue

TIBET AND EARLY MEDIEVAL EURASIA TODAY

The Tibetan Empire of the Early Middle Ages was located far from Western Europe, which was then dominated by the Frankish Carolingians, and it does not appear that either nation knew of the other's existence.[1] Yet the strange turnings of fate have intertwined the history of early medieval Tibet with that of medi-

[1] This chapter is a brief essay rather than a detailed and well-documented treatise, as it perhaps should be. It assumes general familiarity, which is the most that I myself can claim, with the broad issues of early medieval European history. Many of the ideas and arguments that I express are derived from or are parallel to those of other scholars, but it has not been possible to record my debt to them at every point. My intention has not been to assert a bold, new theory, but only to debunk some of the more tenacious misconceptions by viewing them from a new perspective. I only hope that I have not introduced new ones. Many topics have been, unfortunately, left out. One of them, which is alone worthy of a powerful book, is the subject of "the barbarian." Even today, some of the most respected scholars continue to use the term "barbarian" when discussing non-"Roman" Western Europeans and non-Chinese Asians from antiquity through the "High" Middle Ages or the Renaissance (in East Asia, down to the twentieth century!). In addition, as will be seen, I prefer to emphasize the unity of, and continuity within, the early medieval period. (See note 5.)

GLOSSARY

T'ang Chinese Titles

Commander-in-Chief (military), *tsung kuan*[1] 總管
Expeditionary Army, *hsing chün* 行軍
General, *chiang chün* 將軍
Governor-General, *tu tu* 都督
Military Governor, *chieh tu shih* 節度使
Prefect, *ts'e shih* 刺史
Prince, *wang* 王
Protector-General, *tu hu* 都護

Common T'ang Geographical Terms

ch'eng 城 Walled City[2]
chou 州 Prefecture
chün 郡 Commandery (alternate name for a Prefecture)
chün 軍 Army[3]
hsien 縣 County
tao 道 Circuit (administrative term); Road (direction of attack)

[1] This has been left untranslated when it refers to nonmilitary officials.
[2] This has generally been translated "City."
[3] This has generally been translated "Army."

Chinese Characters

This is a complete list of the Chinese characters transcribed in this book. Names of dynasties, book titles, names that only appear in the Table of Rulers, and modern names are omitted. Alphabetization is according to the *CHC* style.

A-ch'ai 阿豺
A-hsi-chi 阿悉吉
A-hsi-chieh 阿悉結
A-hsi-chieh ch'üeh *i-chin* 阿悉結闕俟斤
A-hsi-chieh ni-shu *i-chin* 阿悉結泥孰俟斤
A-hsi-lan 阿悉爛
A-liao Ta 阿了達
A-liao Ts'an 阿了參
A-nu-yüeh 阿弩越
A-pu-ssu 阿布思
A-se-na 阿瑟那
A-se-na Shu-ni 阿瑟那鼠匿
A-shih-na 阿史那
A-shih-pi 阿失畢
an chi ta shih 安集大使
An hsi 安西
An-hsi 安息
An hsi ssu chen 安西四鎮
An-jen 安人
An-jung 安戎
An Lu-shan 安祿山
An nan 安南
An pei 安北
An Ssu-shun 安思順
An tung 安東
Chang Ch'ien-hsü 張虔勗
Chang Chiu-ling 張九齡
Chang Chung-liang 張忠亮
Chang Hsiao-sung 張孝嵩
Chang Hsüan-piao 張玄表
Chang I-ch'ao 張義潮
chang shih 長史
Chang Shou-kuei 張守珪
Chang Ssu-li 張思禮
Chang-sun Wu-chi 長孫無忌
Chang Yüeh 張說
Ch'ang-an 長安
Ch'ang-lo *hsien* 常樂縣
Ch'ang-ning 長寧
Ch'ang-sung *hsien* 昌松縣
Ch'ang-ts'en *tao* 長岑道
Chao I-chen 趙頤貞
Chao-li 昭禮
ch'ao kung 朝貢
Che-nu 遮弩
Ch'e-pi-shih 車鼻施
Ch'e-pu 車薄
Chen hsi 鎮西
Chen-hsi 鎮西
Chen-kuan 貞觀
Chen-wu 振武
Chen-yüan 貞元

Ch'en Ta-tz'u 陳大慈
Ch'en Tzu-ang 陳子昂
Cheng Jen-T'ai 鄭仁泰
ch'eng 城
Ch'eng-ch'i 成器
Ch'eng-feng 承風
Ch'eng-feng Ling 承風嶺
Ch'eng-tsung 承宗
Chi Ch'u-na 紀處訥
Chi-lien 祁連
Chi-shih 積石
Chi-shih Ho 積石河
Chi-wang-chüeh 繼往絕
Ch'i-cheng 起政
Ch'i-li-hu 乞離胡
Ch'i-pi 契苾
Chia-liang *i* 嘉良夷
Chia Shih-shun 賈師順
Chiang 姜
Chiang-hsia 江夏
Ch'iang 羌
Chiao-ho 交河
Chiao-ho *chün* 澆河郡
Chieh-chung-shih-chu 竭忠事主
Chieh-shih 羯師
Ch'ieh-shuai 羯帥
chien ch'a yü shih 監察御史
Chien-nan 劍南
Ch'ien-yüan 乾元
Chih-sheng 制勝
Ch'ih-ling 赤嶺
Ch'ih Shui 赤水
Ch'ih-shui *ch'eng* 赤水城
Chin-ch'ang *hsien* 晉昌縣
Chin-ch'eng 金城
Chin-fang *tao* 金方道
Chin Shan 金山
Chin Shan *wang* 金山王
Chin-t'ien 金天
Chin-wu 金吾
Ch'in *chou* 秦州
Ching *chou* 涇州
Ching-lung 景龍
Ching-yün 景雲
Ch'ing *chou* 慶州
Ch'ing-hai *tao* 青海道
Ch'ing-sai 青塞
Ch'ing Shui 清水
Chiu Ch'ü 九曲
Chu-chü-po 朱俱波
Chu-hsieh Chin-chung 朱邪盡忠
chu tao tsung kuan 諸道總管
Chu Tz'u 朱泚
ch'u 出
Ch'u-mu-k'un 處木昆
Ch'u-mu-k'un [ch'üeh-] lü *ch'o* 處木昆[闕]律啜
Ch'u-yüeh 處月
Chung 忠
Chung-chieh 忠節
chung shih 中使
Chung-shun 忠順
Chung-tsung 中宗
Ch'ü 麴
Ch'ü-le 屈勒
Chün 浚
chün shih 軍使

Fa Ch'iang 發羌
fan 蕃
Fang *chou* [near Ho *chou*] 芳州
Fang *chou* [near Ch'ang-an] 坊州
Fang-yü-shih 防禦使
Feng Ch'ang-ch'ing 封常清
Feng *chou* 豐州
Feng Te-hsia 馮德遐
fu ["again"] 復
fu ["clothing"] 服
fu [bäg] 匐
Fu *chou* 鄜州
Fu-chü 匐俱
Fu-ma tu-wei 駙馬都尉
Fu-meng Ling-ch'a 夫蒙靈詧
Fu-she Hsiung 伏闍雄
fu shih 副使
Fu-t'u 浮圖

Han-hai 瀚海
Han Ssu-chung 韓思忠
Hei-ch'ih Ch'ang-chih 黑齒常之
ho ch'in 和親
Ho *chou* 河州
ho hao 和好
Ho-hsi 河西
Ho-k'ou 河口
Ho-sa 和薩
Ho-sa-lao 賀薩勞
Ho-su 曷蘇
Ho-tung 河東
Ho-yüan 河源

hsi 西
Hsi *chou* [Qocho] 西州
Hsi *chou* [near eastern Tibet] 悉州
Hsi Hai 西海
Hsi-hai chün-wang 西海郡王
Hsi-mo-lang 悉末朗
Hsi-p'ing 西平
Hsi Shou-hsiang *ch'eng* 西受降城
Hsi yü 西域
Hsia 瑕
Hsia *chou* 夏州
hsiang chü 鄉聚
hsiao ch'i 小妻
Hsiao Chiung 蕭炅
Hsiao Ssu-yeh 蕭嗣業
Hsiao Sung 蕭嵩
Hsiao-Yüeh-chih 小月氏
Hsieh-chi-li-fu 頡吉里匐
Hsieh Jen-kuei 薛仁貴
Hsieh-li-fa 頡利發
Hsien 獻
Hsien-ch'ing 顯慶
Hsien-o *tao* 仙萼道
Hsin 昕
Hsin-an 信安
Hsin-t'u Ho 信圖河
Hsing-hsi-wang 興昔亡
Hsiung-nu 匈奴
Hsüan-tsung 玄宗
Hsüan-wei 宣威
Hu 胡
Hu-k'an 鍬侃

Hu-lu 胡祿
Hu-lu-wu 胡祿屋
Hu-lu-wu ch'üeh *ch'o* 胡祿屋闕啜
Hu-mi 護蜜
Hu-se-lo 斛瑟羅
hu shih 互市
Huai-tao 懷道
Huai-te chün-wang 懷德郡王
Huang-fu Wei-ming 皇甫惟明
Huang-ti 黃帝
Hui Ch'ao 慧超
Hui *chou* 會州
Hui-ho 回紇
Hun 渾
Hung-chi 洪濟
Hung-yüan 洪源
Huo-shao *ch'eng* 火燒城

i 夷
I-chien 曳建
I *chou* 伊州
I-hai *tao* 瓠海道
I-lin 宜林

Jui-tsung 睿宗

Kai Chia-yün 蓋嘉運
K'ai-yüan 開遠
Kan *chou* 甘州
K'an 瞰
Kao-ch'ang 高昌
Kao Hsien 高賢
Kao Hsien-chih 高仙芝

Kao-tsung 高宗
K'ao-i 考異
Ko-lo-feng 閣羅鳳
Ko-lo-lu 葛邏祿
Ko-shu ch'u-pan *i-chin* 哥舒處半俟斤
Ko-shu ch'üeh *i-chin* 哥舒闕俟斤
K'o-p'i-shih 訶毗施
K'o-po 渴波
K'o-sai *ch'eng* 渴塞城
k'o-tun 可敦
k'ou 寇
Ku-ch'o 骨啜
K'u Shan 庫山
Kua *chou* 瓜州
Kuan-lung 關隴
Kuan-nei 關內
Kuan-tung 關東
Kuei-ch'uan 貴川
Kuei-i *chün* 歸義軍
K'un-ling 崑陵
Kung-jen 弓仁
Kung-yüeh 弓月
K'ung-je 恐熱
Kuo Ch'ien-kuan 郭虔瓘
Kuo Chih-yün 郭知運
Kuo Tai-feng 郭待封
Kuo Yüan-chen 郭元振
K'uo *chou* 廓州

Lan *chou* 蘭州
lang 郎
Leng-ch'üan 冷泉

li 里
Li Che-fu 李遮匐
Li Ching 李靖
Li Ching-hsüan 李敬玄
Li Mi 李密
Li Ssu-yeh 李嗣業
Li Te-yü 李德裕
Li Wei 李褘
Li Yu 李祐
Liang *chou* 涼州
Liang-fei Ch'uan 良非川
Lien-yün 連雲
Lin *chou* 麟州
Lin-t'ao 臨洮
Ling *chou* 靈州
Ling-wu 靈武
Liu Huan 劉渙
Liu I-ts'ung 劉易從
Liu Ku 柳谷
Liu Shen-li 劉審禮
Lo Chen-t'an 羅眞檀
lo-t'o 駱駝
Lou Shih-te 婁師德
lu 虜
Lu Chih 陸贄
Lu Shui 瀘水
lun 論
Lun Yen 論巖
Lung-chih 龍支
Lung-hsi 隴西
Lung-yu 隴右
Lü Hsiu-ching 呂休璟

Ma-lai-hsi 馬來兮
Ma-wei 馬嵬
Mang-je 莽熱
Mang-lo-lin-chen 莽羅藺眞
Mang-pu-chih 莽布支
Mao *chou* 茂州
Meng-ch'ih 濛池
Mi-she 彌射
Min *chou* 岷州
Ming-hsi-lieh 名悉獵
Ming-huang 明皇
Mo 末
Mo-chi-lien 默棘連
Mo-chin-mang 沒謹忙
Mo-ch'o 默啜
Mo-chü 默矩
Mo-ho ta-kan 莫賀達干
Mo-lu 沒盧
Mo-ssu 沒斯
Mu-jung No-ho-po 慕容諾賀鉢

Na-tu-liu 訥都六
Na-tu-ni-li 那都泥利
Nan-chao 南詔
Nan-ni 難泥
Nan Shan 南山
Nan T'ien-chu 南天竺
nang-ku 曩骨
Ni-nieh-shih 泥涅師
Ni-shu 泥孰
Ning *chou* 寧州
Niu Hsien-k'o 牛仙客
Niu Shih-chiang 牛師奬
Nu-la 奴剌
Nu-shih-pi 弩失畢

Nung-li 農力

Pa-sai-kan tun sha-po[-lo] *i-chin* 拔塞幹暾沙鉢[羅]俟斤
Pa-ti-she 跋地設
Pai *chou* 白州
Pai-ku 百谷
Pai-shih Ling 白石嶺
Pai-ts'ao 白草
P'an-tu-ni-li 般都泥利
Pao-i 保義
Pao-wang 寶王
Pei-t'ing 北庭
P'ei Chü 裴矩
P'ei Hsing-chien 裴行儉
pen chi 本紀
pi ching 比境
Pi-pi 婢婢
P'i-sha 毗沙
P'i-t'i 鵯鵜
Pien Ling-ch'eng 邊令誠
Pin *chou* 邠州
Pin-wang 賓王
P'ing-hsi *chün* 平西軍
P'ing-liang 平涼
P'ing-lu chieh tu tu chih ping ma shih 平盧節度都知兵馬使
Po Chü-i 白居易
Po-huan [Aksu] 撥換
Po-lan 白蘭
Po-lu 薄露
Po-lü [Balur] 勃律
Po-ta 勃達
Po-t'e-mo 勃特汶
P'o-le 婆勒
p'o-lo 頗羅
pu [division] 部
Pu-chen 步眞
pu chih shu 不知書
Pu-li 步利
pu shih tzu 不識字
P'u-ku 僕骨
P'u-ku Chün 僕固俊
P'u-lo 僕羅
P'u-sa-lao 菩薩勞

Sa-p'i 薩毗
Sha *chou* 沙州
Sha-t'o 沙陀
Shan-ch'eng *hsien* 鄯城縣
Shan *chou* 鄯州
Shan-yü 單于
Shang Chieh-hsin 尚結心
Shang-mi 商彌
Shang shu 上書
Shang Yen-hsin 尚延心
Shang-yüan 上元
she 設
She-she-t'i tun *ch'o* 攝舍提暾啜
Shen-lung 神龍
Shen-ts'e 神策
Shen-wei [Army] 神威
Shen-wu 神武
shih 氏
Shih-chih-han 施質汗
shih li 市里
shih lu 實錄
Shih-ni 識匿

Shih-pao 石堡
Shou-ch'ang 壽昌
shou cho 守捉
Shou-hsiang 受降
Shou shih 守使
Shu 蜀
Shu-ni-shih 鼠尼施
Shu-ni-shih ch'u-pan *ch'o* 鼠尼施處半啜
Shu-tun 樹敦
Shun-kuo *kung* 順國公
Shuo-fang 朔方
So-i 娑夷
So-ko 娑葛
So-le 娑勒
So-le-se-ho 娑勒色訶
Ssu chen tu chih ping ma shih 四鎮都知兵馬使
Ssu-chieh 思結
Ssu ma 司馬
Su-chia 素迦
Su *chou* 肅州
Su-fu 素福
Su-fu-she-li-chih-li-ni 蘇弗舍利支離尼
Su Hai-cheng 蘇海政
Su-ho-kuei 素和貴
Su-lo-han 素羅汗
Su-lu 蘇祿
Su-p'i 蘇毗
Su-pien 肅邊
Su-shih-li-chih 蘇失利之
Su Ting-fang 蘇定方
Su-tsung 肅宗
Sui *chou* 嵩州
Sun Jen-shih 孫仁師
Sung 宋
Sung *chou* 松州

Ta-fei Ch'uan 大非川
Ta-fei Shan 大非山
Ta-hsing 大興
Ta-hua *hsien* 達化縣
Ta-ling 大嶺
Ta-mo-men 大莫門
Ta-shih Ku 大石谷
Ta-tou Ku 大斗谷
Ta-tou-pa Ku 大斗拔谷
Ta-t'ou 達頭
Ta-tu 大渡
Ta-t'ung 大同
Ta-yeh 大業
Ta-Yüeh-chih 大月氏
Tai-tsung 代宗
T'ai-ho 太和
T'ai-tsung 太宗
Tang-hsiang 黨項
T'ang Chia-hui 湯嘉惠
T'ang Hsiu-ching 唐休璟
T'ang-mao 唐旄
Tao-chen 道眞
Tao-tsung 道宗
T'ao *chou* 洮州
T'ao Ho 洮河
T'ao Shui 洮水
Te-tsung 德宗
T'e-le-man 特勒滿
ti 帝

ti kuo li 敵國禮
Tiao-k'o 雕窠
Tiao-lu 調露
T'ieh-jen 鐵刃
T'ieh-le 鐵勒
T'ien-ch'eng 天成
T'ien-chu 天竺
T'ien Jen-hsien 田仁獻
T'ien Jen-wan 田仁琬
T'ien tzu chia ch'en 天子家臣
T'ien Yüan-hsien 田元獻
Ting-jung 定戎
To-lu 咄陸
To-lu K'o-han Ni-shu 咄陸可汗泥孰
T'o-hsi 拓西
T'o-pa Huai-kuang 拓跋懷光
Tsan-hsin-ya 贊心牙
Tsan-p'o 贊婆
Ts'ao Chi-shu 曹繼叔
tsu mu k'o-tun 祖母可敦
Ts'ui Chih-pien 崔知辨
Ts'ui Hsi-i 崔希逸
Tsung Ch'u-k'o 宗楚客
tsung kuan 總管
Tsung-o 宗俄
Tsung-wang 賓王
Ts'ung-ling 葱嶺
Tu-chih 都支
Tu Fu 杜甫
Tu Hsi-wang 杜希望
Tu Hsien 杜暹
tu hu fu 都護府
Tu Huan 杜環
Tu-lu 都陸
Tu-man 都曼
Tu-mo-chih 都摩支
Tu-mo-tu 都摩度
Tu Shan 獨山
Tu-tan 都擔
tu tu fu 都督府
T'u-ch'i-shih ho-lo-shih *ch'o* 突騎施賀邏施啜
T'u-chüeh 突厥
T'u-fan 吐蕃
T'u-fan t'ien tzu 吐蕃天子
T'u-hun 吐渾
T'u-huo-hsien 吐火仙
T'u-yü-hun 吐谷渾
Tuan Chih-hsüan 段志玄
Tuan Hsiu-shih 段秀實
T'ui-hun 退渾
T'ui-tzu 俀子
T'ung-o 同俄

Wan-t'ou *ch'eng* 曼頭城
wang 王
Wang Cheng-chien 王正見
Wang Ch'ui 王倕
Wang Chün-ch'o 王君奠
Wang Chung-ssu 王忠嗣
Wang Fang-i 王方翼
Wang Hsiao-chieh 王孝傑
Wang Hsüan-ts'e 王玄策
Wang Hu-ssu 王斛斯
wang nien 往年
Wang Yü 王昱
wei jung 威戎

Wei-jung 威戎
Wei Kao 韋皋
Wei Tai-chia 韋待價
Wei-yüan 渭源
Wen-ch'eng 文成
Wo-se-te 握瑟德
Wu Chao 武曌
Wu-chih-le 烏質勒
Wu Hai 烏海
Wu-k'ung 悟空
Wu-lan 烏蘭
Wu-lun-yang-kuo 兀論樣郭
Wu-su-wan-lo-shan 烏蘇萬洛扇
Wu Tse-t'ien 武則天
Wu-wei 武威
Wu-wei *chün* 武威郡

Yang Hsi-ku 楊襲古
Yang Kuei-fei 楊貴妃
Yang Kuo-chung 楊國忠
Yang-ti 煬帝
Yang-t'ung 羊同
Yeh-chih A-pu-ssu 葉支阿布思
Yeh-to 擕多
yen 眼
Yen-ch'i 焉耆
Yen *chou* 鹽州
Yen-ch'üan 鹽泉
Yen-jan 燕然
Yen-mien 咽麪
Yen Wen-ku 閻溫古
Yin-chih-chia 寅識迦
Yin *chou* 銀州
Ying-lung 應龍
Yu-i 遊弈
Yü-ch'ih Sheng 尉遲勝
Yü-ch'ih T'iao 尉遲眺
Yü-hai 漁海
Yü-men 玉門
Yü-shu 于術
Yüan-ch'ing 元慶
Yüan *chou* 原州
Yüan-en 遠恩

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The history of Central Asia is of fundamental importance for an understanding of Eurasian history. The region that linked the great civilizations of the Old World and that was the focus of political, military, and economic activity for all bordering states during the Early Middle Ages—when the shape of the early modern world was determined—is of the greatest relevance to the histories (even in the narrow nationalistic sense) of China, the Middle East, and Europe. This must have been the view of an earlier generation of Orientalists, among the greatest of whom were F.W.K. Müller, Édouard Chavannes, W. Barthold, and Paul Pelliot. The works of that generation remain the standard references for nonspecialists and, in many cases, for specialists as well on selected topics of Central Asian studies. This generation of scholars produced no synoptic history of the Tibetan Empire in Central Asia, but it would not be an exaggeration to say that the received opinion on this subject was largely formulated during those early days of Central Asian studies. It is, then, necessary to briefly examine the development of the current image of imperial Tibet, an image much revised in this book, and to comment on the primary

sources, which reveal the early medieval writers' conception of that image.

With the exception of a few pioneering studies largely devoted to the translation of important Chinese or Tibetan sources, the historiography of the Tibetan Empire has been until recently a matter marginal to the historiography of neighboring lands. But the publication of the first book-length study in the field, the two volumes in Japanese by Hisashi Satô,[1] marked the beginning of a boom in ground-breaking research on the history of the early Tibetan state. Soon after, articles by Géza Uray on various problems of Old Tibetan historiography began to appear, and several handbooks and historical surveys devoted considerable space to treatment of the imperial period. In 1979, a brief, preliminary survey by the present writer and a paper by Géza Uray appeared.[2] In the following year, Jih-ming Chang's dissertation in French was published, although it has unfortunately remained unknown to historians of Tibet.[3] Finally, in 1984, Takao Moriyasu published his superb study, in which he discusses most of the major philological problems of the central period of the Tibetan Empire.[4] None of these studies, however, was intended to be a synthetic, narrative history of the Tibetan Empire (or of the various empires of the day, including the Tibetan) in Central Asia. It is hoped that the present work remedies this deficiency.[5]

Unfortunately, as a result of contemporary historians' increasing preoccupation with "national" history—instead of the "international" history that attracted their predecessors—the record of Tibetan involvement in Central Asia during the Early Middle

[1] Satô, 1958-1959.

[2] Beckwith, "The Tibetan Empire in the West" (1980); Uray, 1979a.

[3] Chang, 1980.

[4] Moriyasu, 1984.

[5] In this connection, the remark of Paul Pelliot may be recalled: "Il faut espérer qu'un jour prochain quelqu'un reprendra en un examen d'ensemble tous les textes d'origine tibétaine ou chinoise que permettent de reconstituer l'histoire brillante, mais éphémère, de l'ancien empire tibétain." (Pelliot, 1915:26.) I do not pretend to claim that this book is the long-delayed fulfillment of the great Pelliot's wish, but I hope that it will serve until such a work can be written.

Ages is seemingly only of marginal interest to specialists in medieval Inner Asia. With few exceptions, Sinologists, for example, are now simply uninterested in the history of medieval international relations, if they are even aware of its existence. The same may be said of Arabists. Even Tibetologists are no longer as involved in the field of Old Tibetan studies. This has mainly been due to the availability of a vast corpus of Classical Tibetan material which refugees have brought out of Tibet since 1950. In the case of overall Tibetan studies, this development has not been undesirable. But research on the Tibetan Empire in general and on the Tibetan colonial enterprise in particular has not made as much progress in the past thirty years as has general Tibetan history. In addition, what has been done—above all, the superb scholarship of Géza Uray—has not drawn the attention of historians of neighboring lands that it would have in the past. As a consequence, recent writers on Central Asia seem to be less aware of Tibetan activity there than were those who wrote during the early part of this century. Despite the coverage of recent events in Afghanistan, Central Asian history as a whole is not currently a flourishing field.

Strangely enough, probably the greatest attention paid to the Tibetans in early medieval Central Asia is in the work of Sinologically trained Turkologists who deal with the period. The most important single work on the history of the Turks in Central Asia, in fact, was written by the Sinologist Chavannes and published in 1903. This work remains the fundamental study of T'ang Chinese sources not only on the Turks, but also on many other peoples of Central and Inner Asia, including the Tibetans. Chavannes's perception of the revolutionary effects on Eurasia of the establishment of the Western Turkic empire in Central Asia, together with his extensive coverage of the Chinese source material available to him, constitute a remarkable monument of Orientalist scholarship. James Hamilton's fairly recent study of the Uyghurs is another work—perhaps the most important since Chavannes—in which the Tibetans are discussed to some extent.[6]

[6] Hamilton, 1955.

This work seems to have set off an explosion of Uyghurological studies, which have been published fairly constantly ever since. Among these is the useful book by Colin Mackerras,[7] which provides a general translation of some of the Chinese material available on the Uyghur Turks in Mongolia. Most recently, the studies of Takao Moriyasu have provided a much-needed critical reexamination of problems in the history of the Uyghurs and Tibetans during this period. In addition to the Uyghur specialists, the articles of I. Ecsedy on the Uyghur-Tibetan conflict and on the Qarluqs have drawn attention to previously neglected subjects. Sinologists specializing in the T'ang period could have been expected to be interested (as were the T'ang Chinese themselves) in the history of contemporary Tibet, but this has not been the case. There are, however, several important studies of Chinese sources on general Tibetan history of the period. Among these are the translations by S. Bushell,[8] P. Pelliot,[9] H. Satô,[10] and P. Takla[11] of the chapters on Tibet in the two *T'ang shu* and the excellent study by Paul Demiéville[12] on the so-called debates between the Chinese and Indian schools of Buddhism in Tibet.[13] But much more needs to be done, especially on the Tibetan occupation of most of western China in the eighth and ninth centuries, a subject which this book does not cover in detail.

Although Sinologists never seem to have been terribly interested in the fortunes of the T'ang Chinese in Central Asia, the exploits of the early Arabs in that part of the world have long fascinated Arabists. The first important work on the subject was Hamilton Gibb's famous short book, which was published in

[7] Mackerras, 1972.

[8] S. W. Bushell's translation appeared in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, new ser., 12 (1880) 435-541, but has remained inaccessible to me.

[9] Pelliot, 1961.

[10] Satô, "Toban den" (1973).

[11] P. Takla, *Rgya'i yig-tshaṅ naṅ gsalba'i Bodkyi rgyal-rabs gsalba'i meloṅ* (1973). This is an abridged translation.

[12] Demiéville, 1952.

[13] On this subject, see the important article by Yoshiro Imaeda, "Documents tibétains de Touen-houang concernant le concile du Tibet" (1975).

1923.[14] This pioneering treatise brought much attention to bear on early medieval Islam in Central Asia, but it did so largely as the result of the controversial thesis to which it was directed. Gibb's theory supposed that the Hâśimiyya revolt of 747, which ended in the overthrow of the Umayyad dynasty and the establishment of the Abbasids in 749, was rooted in a pan-Iranian nationalism that arose in the face of foreign invaders, the Arabs. Despite periodic pronouncements that it has been settled, this thesis is still rather hotly debated. At the end of this work, Gibb states that the Abbasid revolt, the terminus of his account, led ultimately to the restoration of "Iranian" independence.

Gibb's student, M. A. Shaban, has respectfully and extensively quoted and cited his teacher in his first and most important work,[15] which deals with the background of the Abbasid revolt in Central Asia. His conclusions, however, are markedly different. Shaban argues that economic factors were responsible for what was primarily an Arab revolt against Arab rulers. The book's most important contributions, usually overlooked by its many critics, are the introduction of primary source material not used by Gibb and the provision of source citations (generally absent in Gibb's work). Among recent studies, the one attempt at a synoptic account, including information from a wide variety of sources, is Elton Daniel's book on the Abbasids in Khurasan.[16] Unfortunately for the purposes of this book, Daniel applies an ahistorical definition to the term Khurasan, which during the early medieval period referred to all Arab possessions east of the Great Iranian Desert. He also edited out at least one reference to Tibet in his account.[17] It is long past time for an Islamicist to rewrite the history of the Arab conquests in Central Asia, and of Arab relations with non-Arabs there, from an internationalist's point of view.

Regarding Central Asia itself, unfortunately almost nothing has been done with the native sources and with the results of ar-

[14] Gibb, 1923.

[15] Shaban, 1970.

[16] Daniel, 1979.

[17] Ibid., p. 174.

chaeological exploration since the early part of this century. That work, while still valuable, could certainly be greatly improved upon and expanded. Despite the existence of general surveys and of articles and books on specialized subjects relating to the region, there is still not one synoptic account of Sogdiana,[18] of Ṭukhâristân, or any of the other early medieval lands of Central Aisa. Perhaps Soviet scholars, who have published valuable archaeological studies in this field, will begin to remedy this deficiency for western Central Asia.

There are numerous works of a more general nature dealing with Central Asia or Inner Asia as a whole. Although only a few are based on primary sources, they are often valuable for their conceptualizations (whether correct or not) that, in any case, bring attention to Central Asian history. Foremost among such works, and the only one to be demonstrably based on primary sources, is Barthold's famous book on western Central Asia down to the Mongol conquest.[19] Nothing has yet been written to replace it. For eastern Central Asia, the brief survey by W. Samolin[20] provides what is essentially a summary of previous scholarship supplemented by a few source references. For the early medieval period, it is no longer useful. The often-quoted work of the popular historian R. Grousset,[21] who depended totally on secondary sources, is to a large extent irrelevant to the present subject. L. Kwanten's recent book,[22] which was apparently intended as a scholarly updating of Grousset, is instead also based completely on secondary sources, but is far more inaccurate than Grousset. The mystical theories Kwanten has developed on the supposed existence of a continuous Inner Asian "historiographical tradition" among such nomadic peoples as the Huns,

[18] Among the several useful recent books on aspects of the history of Sogdiana and other areas of Central Asia, one may note in particular G. Azarpay, *Sogdian Painting* (1981), and B. Litvinsky, *Adžina-Tepa* (1971).

[19] Barthold, 1958.

[20] W. Samolin, *East Turkistan to the Twelfth Century* (1964).

[21] R. Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes* (1970).

[22] L. Kwanten, *Imperial Nomads* (1979). Cf. the incisive comments in C. Hung, "China and the Nomads: Misconceptions in Western Historiography on Inner Asia" (1981) 600.

Turks, and Mongols are not based on any known sources and must be rejected as pure speculation.[23]

The famous work of Owen Lattimore on the Inner Asian nations in relationship to China[24] and the equally well-known work of Wittfogel and Fêng[25] on the impact of Inner Asian conquerors on later medieval China are so full of theories that it would take another book to discuss even a few of them. It must be pointed out, however, that the one theory directly relevant to this book, Lattimore's explanation for Tibetan imperial expansion,[26] is not based on primary sources and should be viewed with more than a little skepticism. Suffice it to say that these authors were primarily preoccupied with Inner Asia's relationship to China, not with the history of Central Asia and its relations with neighboring countries, only one of which was China.

Finally, there are several general works on the history of the foreign powers that were involved in early medieval Central Asia; these often include valuable discussion of our subject. Most important among these are the encyclopedic works, especially the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (both editions), which is unparalleled in early medieval Asian studies. Also of fairly high quality are the *Cambridge History of Iran* and the *Cambridge History of China*. The one complete survey history of Tibet, by W. D. Shakabpa,[27] although excellent for recent Tibetan history, is not sufficiently informed on the imperial period. In a popular work coauthored with D. Snellgrove,[28] Hugh Richardson gives a fair account of early Tibetan history, but the book is now useful largely for its excellent photographs of imperial-period monuments located within Tibet. Other Tibetological handbooks and historical treatises, such as those by L. Petech,[29] G. Tucci,[30] E. Haarh,[31] and

[23] Kwanten, 1979:4 et seq.

[24] O. Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (1940).

[25] K. Wittfogel and C. Fêng, *History of Chinese Society* (1949).

[26] Lattimore, 1940:209 et seq.

[27] Shakabpa, 1967.

[28] Snellgrove and Richardson, 1968.

[29] L. Petech, *A Study on Chronicles of Ladakh* (1939).

[30] G. Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls* (1949).

[31] E. Haarh, *The Yar-luṅ Dynasty* (1969).

H. Hoffmann,[32] although useful contributions in one way or another, are only marginally concerned with the Tibetan colonial empire. An exception to this is the handbook by R. A. Stein[33] which notes the importance of the Tibetan colonial enterprise for the development of Tibetan civilization.

As discussed at length in the Epilogue, the modern academic view of imperial Tibet is essentially a clone of the modern academic view of early medieval Western Europe. Despite many disclaimers, generally to the effect that modern medievalists are interested in the Middle Ages for what it was and have no negative opinions about its civilization, the image of the "Dark Ages" lives on in the groves of academe, casting its shadow over the historiography of lands as distant as Tibet. This bias is particularly evident in the works of the older generation of Tibetologists of both East and West.[34] Ignoring for a moment the extremely powerful influence of modern political and radical prejudices, one should note the continuing distortion of perspective experienced by most individuals who have taken it upon themselves to write anything about Tibet for any reason. It is probably no exaggeration to say that all of the general books (and most of the specialized books) about Tibet assume, and stress constantly throughout, that the country and its people were and are abnormal. Biases unfortunately die hard, and, along with many other misleading foreign ideas about Tibet, they may outlive their modern perpetuators. In any case, it is obvious that much of the current output of books on Tibet—scholarly and otherwise—is feeding upon itself. Few writers bother to glance at the vast amount of primary source material available today.

The early medieval world held quite a different view of Tibet from that held today. Although none of the Arabic or Chinese, sources that mention Tibet describe it as a paradise, it cannot be denied that nearly everything they do say is positive. The Chinese,

[32] Hoffmann, 1975.
[33] R. Stein, *Tibetan Civilization* (1972).
[34] See the Epilogue.

for instance, constantly remark on the evil habits of various foreign peoples—and, sometimes, of their own people as well. But such remarks are almost never made about the Tibetans, who were acknowledged to be China's most powerful rival and were usually at war with the T'ang. The products of Tibet—especially marvellous things, often mechanical, made of metal (most memorably, of solid gold)—were considered so wondrous as to deserve public display in the imperial palace. The Arabs also had a high opinion of Tibetan craft, sometimes extolling the same things as the Chinese. Throughout the classical period of Islamic civilization, for example, the expression "bucklers of Tibet" was a byword for both excellent armor and a distinctive round design. Due to its high quality and worldwide demand, the musk of Tibet was universally considered one of the most valuable items in existence. And of course one can not forget the flattering picture of Tibetan culture painted by the Arabs in their famous account of the inexplicable joy experienced by visitors to Tibet. Such is the rather different view of the Tibetan Empire that one finds in contemporaneous sources.

The most important of these sources are, due to the vicissitudes of history, not in Tibetan but in Chinese. Nevertheless, the recently discovered Old Tibetan sources are of immense importance for Tibetan history as a whole and the imperial period in particular. It would not be possible, for example, to determine the correct names of many of the key actors in Tibetan history without these sources, and many important events would remain unknown. By far the most valuable of these sources for the history of the Tibetan colonial empire is the text from Tun-huang now known as the *Old Tibetan Annals*.[35] Although it is generally considered to have been an official compilation, and unpleasant events seem to have been played down or omitted (as in the Old Tibetan inscriptions), its chronology is fairly accurate. It has been the main Tibetan source used in the writing of this book, but it unfortunately breaks off about the year 765. Another Old Tibetan work from Tun-huang, the so-called *Old Tibetan Chroni-*

[35] Reproduced in *CDT*. See the Preface.

cle,[36] is a literary narrative covering the same period; it often supplements the material in the *Annals*. A geographical text from Tun-huang contains a small amount of historical information along with extremely important geographical data on early medieval Inner Asia.[37] Despite their great value for economic, institutional, intellectual, and other approaches to Tibetan and Central Asian history, other Old Tibetan documents, of which precious few have yet been studied, are unfortunately of little use for the present work. The Classical Tibetan histories are, with few exceptions, generally unreliable for the early medieval period. Outstanding among the exceptions is the *Mkhaspaʿi dgáston* ("Festival of the Learned"), a brilliant historical work by Gtsug-lag ʿphreṅba (the second Dpábo incarnation of Gnas-naṅ) which makes an occasional and very general reference to Tibetan political successes in Central Asia. These are so vague, however, that they were of little use in the preparation of the present book.

Arabic sources for the history of the Tibetan Empire are few, widely scattered, and even more difficult to interpret than the Old Tibetan ones. They have been studied, although not too carefully, by many famous scholars, almost all of whom were ignorant of Tibetan. The single most important source is the great history of Ṭabarî, *Ta'rîkh al-rusul wa al-mulûk* ("History of the Prophets and the Kings"), the index references to which Barthold briefly examined in his *Encyclopaedia of Islam* article on Tibet. The well-known reliability of Ṭabarî's work, which is mostly a compendium of often conflicting narrative accounts, is somewhat offset by his extreme conservatism, so that he probably omitted much relating to Tibet and other foreign nations. The histories of

[36] Reproduced in *CDT*. See the Preface. I have retained the paragraph divisions of the manuscript in its present state, as used by Bacot. It is important to realize, however, that the manuscript consists of pieces that were wrongly attached long ago, as has been pointed out by several scholars. These problems are discussed in detail in *CDT*.

[37] Pelliot tibétain 1283, reproduced in *CDT*. For the most recent study of this important document and for a bibliography of earlier studies on it, see Moriyasu, "La Nouvelle interprétation des mots *Hor* et *Ho-Yo-Hor*" (1980), and his more detailed study in Japanese (1977a).

Ibn Aʿtham al-Kûfî, Balâdhurî, and Yaʿqûbî, three near-contemporaries of Ṭabarî, are valuable for their more coherent narratives, which include much material absent from Ṭabarî's compilation. Azraqî's *Akhbâr Makka* ("Account of Mecca") contains additional valuable information. These historical works are the main Arabic sources for this book. Unfortunately, although the medieval Arabic geographies include much that is interesting and useful for relatively early Tibetan history, their early medieval dating is unreliable and they have little which is relevant to the Tibetan Empire's political history. Almost all of these early geographical works are now available in critical editions with indices, and most have been translated into French or another Western European language.[38] Arabic compendia, such as the works of Yâqût, Qazwînî, and others, have much of interest to say about Tibet, but they are all much later in date and do not contain reliable information on the history of the Tibetan Empire.

Despite their relative paucity, unequal coverage, and often fragmentary condition, the Old Turkic primary sources—all epigraphical—are of unusual importance.[39] They are the only surviving records of an Inner Asian steppe people of the early medieval period. Speaking with their own voices, in their own language and script, the Turkic texts are sometimes nearly as moving as the poetry of *Beowulf*. Beside their cultural importance, the Old Turkic inscriptions[40] provide precise information about important historical characters and events in Central Asia. The scholarship on these inscriptions is still rather uneven, and clear rubbings or photographs are quite unobtainable, but the

[38] For the most recent study of this material, see my paper, "The Location and Population of Tibet According to Early Islamic Sources," to appear in the proceedings of the Csoma de Kőrös Memorial Symposium held in Visegrád, Hungary in 1984.

[39] It seems fairly clear that the Turkic manuscripts and inscriptions in Sogdian ("Uyghur") script were all (or nearly all) written after the destruction of the Uyghur Empire in Mongolia in 840. Although some speak of events which might be datable to the Early Middle Ages, it is practically impossible to prove such dates, let alone to test the documents' reliability.

[40] These include the "Uyghur" Turkic inscriptions of this period, which were Old Turkic runic inscriptions produced under Uyghur rule.

most important of them are by now well-enough edited that they can be used fairly readily.

Without doubt, the Classical Chinese sources are the most extensive and detailed body of material relating to the subject of this book. The epigraphical materials seem of little importance for the history of Central Asia, and there are no manuscript narrative histories from the period. But several great traditional compilations have survived, and these constitute the most important body of source material for the history of early medieval Central and Inner Asia. Foremost among these sources is the chronicle by Ssu-ma Kuang called the *Tzu chih t'ung chien* ("Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Governing"). Written when the primary sources of two of the other major chronicles of the period were still available, this work reflects Ssu-ma Kuang's ability to make historiographical judgments on the wisdom of his predecessors' decisions. More importantly, he was able to include much that had been omitted by previous Chinese historians, in particular material on Central Eurasia. As many modern historians have noted, his work forms the necessary starting point for any investigation of the T'ang period.

Also of great importance are the two official dynastic histories of the T'ang, the Five Dynasties period *Chiu T'ang shu* ("Old T'ang History") and the Sung period *Hsin T'ang shu* ("New T'ang History"). These are particularly valuable for their specialized treatment of various foreign nations and their biographies of famous people of the day. The treatises on foreign nations have, however, been greatly overrated as sources for Central Eurasian history, especially in comparison to materials that can be found elsewhere. These chronicles were written with a particular didactic point in mind, and their contents were often selected in what today seems a rather peculiar manner. There are, in addition, numerous other Chinese sources which contain materials used in the preparation of this book.[41]

[41] Of particular importance is the Sung encyclopedia, *Ts'e fu yüan kuei*, a huge work which contains some material not in the other sources and variant versions of much that is. Unfortunately, this work is cursed with an unusually large number of serious textual errors, to the point where its reliability must often be seriously questioned. The confidence many scholars place in it is unfounded. Among other sources, potentially the most useful are the little-studied collections of official documents written by various T'ang officials. Preserved at the time for their literary merit, several—particularly those of Chang Chiu-ling, Lu Chih, Po Chü-i, and Li Te-yü—contain a vast amount of information on Inner Asian history. They deserve to be thoroughly investigated by students of China and Inner Asia.

The only contemporaneous literary sources from Central Asia itself are several religious histories, *ex eventu* prophecies, and similar texts, all related to Khotan. These sources survived by being translated into Old Tibetan—one of them subsequently into Chinese—and preserved in either the Tibetan Tanjur or the Tun-huang literary cache or both. Some pioneering work has been done on these texts, but most need critical editions, and all deserve a much more thorough examination. Despite their great intrinsic value, their usefulness for this book has proved to be rather limited.

There are of course many other types of sources beside literary histories for early medieval Central Asian history. Among them are, most importantly, the large number of religious texts that contain evidence bearing on certain historical problems. There is some numismatic evidence, but it has received little attention. Since I lack the technical expertise in numismatics necessary to investigate such evidence properly, and since numismatics bears only indirectly on the political history I deal with in this book, I have regrettably had to ignore the numismatic evidence. The archaeological evidence, which might well prove a treasure trove for historians of Central Asia, is practically nonexistent. Work on this has barely begun. In most areas, the knowledge of city plans and the location and construction of major fortresses is a goal for the future.[42]

The political history of the Tibetan Empire in Central Asia should be read with the understanding that the view of history presented in the sources, and thus what can be reconstructed at

[42] A beginning has been made in the archaeological study of western Central Asia, particularly the area of Khwârizm. For an excellent survey of the results, see A. Belenitskiy, *Srednevekoviy gorod sredney azii* (1973).

the present, is radically different from the view of a twentieth-century observer from the West. The interest of the chroniclers, whether governmental functionaries or monks, was above all in the morality of powerful individuals, the emperors and kings and leaders of the day. Thus it is no wonder that the pages of early medieval chronicles are full of gruesome events amid ostentatiously pious deeds. Modern readers (and writers) are often justifiably frustrated by the gaps that seem to appear just where information is most needed. It may be suggested that one way to understand the Early Middle Ages would be to try to follow the interests of those early medieval men who wrote, whatever their supposed limitations. Political disorder, violence, war—none of these have ever been the monopoly of a single age. Nor have they ever totally dominated one. But if any epoch of world history comes to mind when comparisons with the Early Middle Ages are made, none would be more apt than our own. Perhaps in the sometimes heroic, oftentimes tragic history of early medieval Central Asia there are lessons for leaders of the present day.

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